Equilibrium Selection in Bargaining Models

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Binmore ◽  
Larry Samuelson ◽  
H. Peyton Peyton Young
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Bargaining Models

FRIENDLINESS AND RECIPROCITY IN EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION

2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (01) ◽  
pp. 53-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
GIUSEPPE DE MARCO ◽  
JACQUELINE MORGAN
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Reciprocal Altruism ◽  
Altruistic Behavior ◽  
General Context ◽  
Equilibrium Existence ◽  
Normal Form Games ◽  
Bargaining Models ◽  
Theory Review

A concept of altruistic behavior (called friendly behavior) has been defined and used for equilibrium selection in some bargaining models in Rusinowska (2002), "Refinements of Nash Equilibria in view of Jealous and Friendly Behavior of Players", International Game Theory Review, 4, 281–299. In this paper, the situation in which every player has friendly behavior is incorporated into the general context of normal form games by introducing a new refinement concept (called friendliness equilibrium). Existence, properties and connections with another refinement concept, introduced by the authors in a previous paper and which captures an idea of reciprocal altruism, are investigated. Examples and counterexamples are given illustrating concepts, results and links with other classical refinement concepts.

Equilibrium selection in bargaining models

2003 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 296-328 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ken Binmore ◽  
Larry Samuelson ◽  
Peyton Young
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Bargaining Models

Equilibrium selection for multi-portfolio optimization

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorenzo Lampariello ◽  
Christoph Neumann ◽  
Jacopo M. Ricci ◽  
Simone Sagratella ◽  
Oliver Stein
Keyword(s):  
Portfolio Optimization ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Selection For

scholarly journals Competing Conventions with Costly Information Acquisition

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
Roberto Rozzi
Keyword(s):  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Evolutionary Model ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
The Other ◽  
Group Interactions ◽  
Social Coordination ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Stochastic Stability Analysis ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Cost

We consider an evolutionary model of social coordination in a 2 × 2 game where two groups of players prefer to coordinate on different actions. Players can pay a cost to learn their opponent’s group: if they pay it, they can condition their actions concerning the groups. We assess the stability of outcomes in the long run using stochastic stability analysis. We find that three elements matter for the equilibrium selection: the group size, the strength of preferences, and the information’s cost. If the cost is too high, players never learn the group of their opponents in the long run. If one group is stronger in preferences for its favorite action than the other, or its size is sufficiently large compared to the other group, every player plays that group’s favorite action. If both groups are strong enough in preferences, or if none of the groups’ sizes is large enough, players play their favorite actions and miscoordinate in inter-group interactions. Lower levels of the cost favor coordination. Indeed, when the cost is low, in inside-group interactions, players always coordinate on their favorite action, while in inter-group interactions, they coordinate on the favorite action of the group that is stronger in preferences or large enough.

Equilibrium selection and altruistic behavior in noncooperative social networks

Top ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 454-470 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giuseppe De Marco ◽  
Jacqueline Morgan
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Altruistic Behavior

EVOLUTION WITH ENDOGENOUS MUTATIONS

2005 ◽  
Vol 07 (02) ◽  
pp. 229-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
IVAR KOLSTAD
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Basin Of Attraction ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Mutation Rates ◽  
And Control

Bergin and Lipman (1996) prove that equilibrium selection in the evolutionary dynamics of Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993), is not robust to variations in mutation rates across states. Specifically, a risk dominant equilibrium can be selected against if mutation rates are higher in its basin of attraction than elsewhere. Van Damme and Weibull (1998) model mutations as a compromise between payoff losses and control costs, which implies lower mutation rates in the risk dominant equilibrium. This paper argues that this result is not driven by control costs, but by players focusing on payoff losses when choosing mutation rates.

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