Asymmetric information, strategic behavior, and discrimination in the labor market

1997 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 175-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Van Kolpin ◽  
Larry Singell Jr.
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Strategic Behavior

scholarly journals THE DANGER OF DEGRADATION OF EDUCATION SYSTEM AND LABOR MARKET IN THE CASE OF MISALIGNED MOTIVATIONS

2018 ◽  
pp. 218-225
Author(s):  
QUJI BICHIA
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Labor Markets ◽  
Unemployment Rate ◽  
Education System ◽  
Education Level ◽  
Inverse Relation ◽  
Education Attainment ◽  
Useful Signal ◽  
Base Education

The positive correlation between expected wages of workers and additional steps of education attainment has been studied extensively, as well as inverse relation between education level in the country and unemployment rate. Thus, it is important to analyze education and labor markets in relation, more so with the presence of imperfections in these markers. Coordination may fail on markets of asymmetric information when there are high and low quality products, which are indistinguishable. This can cause degradation of the market. In order to avoid it, motivations of each side should be aligned correctly on education and labor markets. This can only be achieved if the education system is constructed with right motivators for both sides right from the base. Education cannot be a useful signal to employers if educational attainment cannot be used as a way of distinguishing employee’s skills from others’.

scholarly journals Asymmetric Information on Noncognitive Skills in the Indian Labor Market: An Experiment in Online Job Portal

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Futoshi Yamauchi ◽  
Shinsaku Nomura ◽  
Saori Imaizumi ◽  
Ana Areias ◽  
Afra Chowdhury
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Noncognitive Skills

scholarly journals Asymmetric Information And Overeducation

2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Concetta Mendolicchio ◽  
Dimitri Paolini ◽  
Tito Pietra
Keyword(s):  
Human Capital ◽  
Labor Market ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Physical Capital ◽  
Skill Levels ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Competitive Equilibria ◽  
The Cost

Abstract We consider an economy where production may use labor of two different skill levels. Workers are heterogeneous and, by investing in education, self-select into one of the two skills. Ex-ante, when firms choose their investments in physical capital, they do not know the level of human capital prevailing in the labor market they will be active in. We prove existence and constrained inefficiency of competitive equilibria, which are always characterized by overeducation. An increase in total expected surplus can be obtained by shrinking, at the margin, the set of workers investing in high skills. This can be implemented by imposing taxes on the cost of investing in high skills or by imposing a progressive labor earning tax.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document