Radical fallibilism vs conceptual analysis: The significance of Feyerabend’s Philosophy of science

Metascience ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 206-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Couvalis ◽  
Gonzalo Munévar ◽  
Eric Oberheim ◽  
Paul Hoyningen-Huehne
1994 ◽  
Vol 18 (6) ◽  
pp. 343-345
Author(s):  
K.W.M. Fulford ◽  
G. Adshead

Questionnaires exploring the attitudes of psychiatrists to philosophy were distributed at two meetings of the Royal College of Psychiatrists. Out of a possible 240, 126 questionnaires were returned (53%). The results showed a surprisingly high level of interest in and support for philosophy. Over 50% of respondents indicated that they considered conceptual analysis, ethics, jurisprudence, the philosophy of science and the philosophy of mind to be practically important in psychiatry. Similarly, 89% believed that ethics, and 72% that other areas of philosophy, should be included in the MRCPsych syllabus. The significance of the study is reviewed briefly.


1983 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
J Allen

Analysis of the role of concepts in urban social research is largely an undeveloped area. Justification of the adoption of particular forms of classification in studies are rarely offered and are often passed over in favour of a discussion of the more tractable areas of empirical research. In this paper the practice of conceptual analysis adopted in one sphere of urban research, landlordism and property relations, is evaluated and criticised for its unreflective mechanistic approach. Invariably, the object (landlordism) is subjected to a form of analysis which treats it as if it were analogous to an onion, from which layers may be peeled off, one after another. It is argued that this mode of analysis does not reveal the economic and social properties that constitute different types of landlordism, which, in turn, may provide the basis for an understanding of the spatial variation in the structure of the market for privately rented housing in Britain. An alternative mode of conceptual analysis, based upon the principles of a realist philosophy of science, is proposed, which has the potential to explain the structural unevenness of the rental market and the roles adopted by different groups of landlords in this market.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Lakens

For over two centuries researchers have been criticized for using research practices that makes it easier to present data in line with what they wish to be true. With the rise of the internet it has become easier to preregister the theoretical and empirical basis for predictions, the experimental design, the materials, and the analysis code. Whether the practice of preregistration is valuable depends on your philosophy of science. Here, I provide a conceptual analysis of the value of preregistration for psychological science from an error statistical philosophy (Mayo, 2018). Preregistration has the goal to allow others to transparently evaluate the capacity of a test to falsify a prediction, or the severity of a test. Researchers who aim to test predictions with severity should find value in the practice of preregistration. I differentiate the goal of preregistration from positive externalities, discuss how preregistration itself does not make a study better or worse compared to a non-preregistered study, and highlight the importance of evaluating the usefulness of a tool such as preregistration based on an explicit consideration of your philosophy of science.


Author(s):  
Pascal Ludwig

How are our scientific theories related to each other? Do they draw, together, a unified picture of the world, or should we infer from their disunity that reality is ontologically plural in some way? This chapter addresses the question of whether ontological pluralism is a defendable metaphysical thesis and whether philosophy of science has anything to say about it. It examines whether psychological phenomena possess an irreducible nature of their own that would be distinct from the nature of the phenomena studied by neuroscience. If, on the contrary, the explanatory gap between physics and special sciences is to be filled, the question is raised as to how it has to be done. Is conceptual analysis enough? Or should the explanatory gap be simply dismissed as being badly formulated? The chapter proposes a discussion of the current reductionist strategies.


2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-141
Author(s):  
Herbjørn Andresen

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to raise attention within the records management community about evolving demands for explanations that make it possible to understand the content of records, also when they reflect output from algorithms. Design/methodology/approach The methodological approach is a conceptual analysis based in records management theory and the philosophy of science. The concepts that are developed are thereafter applied to “the right to an explanation” and “an algorithmic ethics approach,” respectively, to further examine their viability. Findings Different forms of explanations, ranging from “certain” explanations to predictions, as well as varying degrees of control over the input data to algorithms, affect the nature of the explanations and what kinds of records the explanations may reside in. Originality/value This paper contributes to a conceptual frame for discussing where explanations to algorithms may be documented, within different kinds of records, emanating from different kinds of processes.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-124
Author(s):  
Martin Zach ◽  

Conceptual analysis as a method of inquiry has long enjoyed popularity in analytic philosophy, including the philosophy of science. In this article I offer a perspective on the ways in which the method of conceptual analysis has been used, and distinguish two broad kinds, namely philosophical and empirical conceptual analysis. In so doing I outline a historical trend in which non-naturalized approaches to conceptual analysis are being replaced by a variety of naturalized approaches. I outline the basic characteristics of these approaches with illustrative examples, arguing that recent developments in the philosophy of science show that in order to achieve a more adequate understanding of scientific endeavour we need to prioritize the naturalized accounts of the method.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felipe Romero

Replicability is widely taken to ground the epistemic authority of science. However, in recent years, important published findings in the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences have failed to replicate, suggesting that these fields are facing a “replicability crisis.” For philosophers, the crisis should not be taken as bad news but as an opportunity to do work on several fronts, including conceptual analysis, history and philosophy of science, research ethics, and social epistemology. This article introduces philosophers to these discussions. First, I discuss precedents and evidence for the crisis. Second, I discuss methodological, statistical, and social‐structural factors that have contributed to the crisis. Third, I focus on the philosophical issues raised by the crisis. Finally, I discuss several proposals for solutions and highlight the gaps that philosophers could focus on.


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