On the political economy of state highway expenditures: Some evidence of the relative performance of alternative public choice models

Public Choice ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 84 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger D. Congleton ◽  
Randall W. Bennett
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Choice Models ◽  
Relative Performance ◽  
The Political ◽  
State Highway ◽  
Highway Expenditures

The Political Economy of Trust

2019 ◽  
pp. 627-648
Author(s):  
Christian Bjørnskov
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Government Policy ◽  
Social Trust ◽  
The Political ◽  
Institutional Changes ◽  
Reverse Causality ◽  
Quality Of Institutions

This chapter provides a selective survey of the literature on social trust in public choice and political economy. It outlines the empirical evidence and discusses theoretical channels through which social trust can affect the quality of institutions and policies, and the conditions under which such mechanisms are likely to work. It also addresses the discussion of reverse causality, that is, whether good institutions or policies actively create trust. It then discusses whether trust can be created or destroyed by activist government policy or accidental institutional changes. Its main focus is on the set of theories and evidence of the association between social trust and institutions of governance.

scholarly journals The Political Economy of Redistribution Policy

2019 ◽  
pp. 519-541
Author(s):  
Luna Bellani ◽  
Heinrich Ursprung
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
The Political ◽  
Economic Relationships ◽  
The Public ◽  
Generic Models ◽  
Redistribution Policy ◽  
Choice Analysis ◽  
Beliefs And Attitudes

The authors review the literature on the public-choice analysis of redistribution policies. They restrict the discussion to redistribution in democracies and focus on policies that are pursued with the sole objective of redistributing initial endowments. Since generic models of redistribution in democracies lack equilibria, one needs to introduce structure-inducing rules to arrive at a models whose behavior realistically portrays observed redistribution patterns. These rules may relate to the economic relationships, political institutions, or to firmly established preferences, beliefs, and attitudes of voters. The chapter surveys the respective lines of argument in turn and then present the related empirical evidence.

The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Choice Models ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Comprehensive Overview ◽  
The Public ◽  
Choice Literature ◽  
Selection Of

The two volume Oxford Handbook of Public Choice provides a comprehensive overview of the Public Choice literature. Volume 1 covers rational choice models of elections, interest groups, rent seeking, and public choice contributions to normative political economy. It begins with introductory chapters on rational choice politics, the founding of public choice, and the evaluation and selection of constitutions. The chapters were all written for this handbook by scholars who are well known for their contributions to research in the areas discussed.

On James Buchanan's Public Choice Enterprise

2013 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-75
Author(s):  
Francesco Forte
Keyword(s):  
Public Finance ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
The Political ◽  
James Buchanan ◽  
Classical Sense ◽  
Gordon Tullock ◽  
Natural Progression ◽  
Directed Research ◽  
The University

Abstract James Buchanan came to Italy in 1955 as Fulbright visiting professor until July 1956 and made his research at the library of the Bank of Italy. He visited the University of Pavia, a quite famous center for public finance studies, still directed by Benvenuto Griziotti. On that occasion I became acquainted with professor Buchanan and our longlasting friendship started soon. On his itinerary from the political economy perspective to public choice that James Buchanan did undertake, after the Italian 1955-56 visit, he has written: «After Italy I was prepared, intellectually, psychologically and emotionally to join in an entrepreneurial venture with my Virginia colleague Warren Nutter, a venture aimed at bringing renewed emphasis to ‘political economy’ in a classical sense. And from these beginnings, the more directed research spin-off into the ‘economics of politics’ initiated jointly with my colleague Gordon Tullock, now seems a natural progression»

scholarly journals Against a voiceless world: Albert O. Hirschman’s political economics as an alternative to public choice

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-22
Author(s):  
Rafael Galvão de Almeida
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Mechanisms Of Action ◽  
The Political ◽  
Formal Models ◽  
Albert Hirschman

This article proposes to analyze the contributions of Albert Hirschman to political economy. Although he was explicitly affiliated to any school of thought, Hirschman worked with both economics and political science to understand questions such as ‘why do people vote and participate in politics?’. He was disappointed with what mainstream economics could provide and elaborated the Exit-Voice-Loyalty (EVL) framework, to understand mechanisms of action in politics and the economy. His EVL framework has been widely read, but it did not develop a paradigm around it and was ignored by economists due to its lack of formal models. Hirschman went on to work on the political economy of citizenship in his works (Hirschman, 1977, [1982] 2002, 1991), in order to provide answers to questions of political economy away from rational choice theory, which he considered harmful.

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