scholarly journals Against a voiceless world: Albert O. Hirschman’s political economics as an alternative to public choice

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-22
Author(s):  
Rafael Galvão de Almeida
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Mechanisms Of Action ◽  
The Political ◽  
Formal Models ◽  
Albert Hirschman

This article proposes to analyze the contributions of Albert Hirschman to political economy. Although he was explicitly affiliated to any school of thought, Hirschman worked with both economics and political science to understand questions such as ‘why do people vote and participate in politics?’. He was disappointed with what mainstream economics could provide and elaborated the Exit-Voice-Loyalty (EVL) framework, to understand mechanisms of action in politics and the economy. His EVL framework has been widely read, but it did not develop a paradigm around it and was ignored by economists due to its lack of formal models. Hirschman went on to work on the political economy of citizenship in his works (Hirschman, 1977, [1982] 2002, 1991), in order to provide answers to questions of political economy away from rational choice theory, which he considered harmful.

scholarly journals PARTISIPASI POLITIK DALAM KONSEPSI TEORI PILIHAN RASIONAL JAMES S COLEMAN

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 187
Author(s):  
Nila Sastrawati
Keyword(s):  
Political Participation ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Social Action ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
The Political ◽  
External Resources

Social action is an important aspect in analyzing behavior, including in analyzing the political participation of individuals and society. Diverse forms of political participation indicate that individuals make choices of political participation based on subjective considerations with reference to costs and rewards. In the conception of Rational Choice Theory from James S. Coleman, there are 2 main essences, namely actors and resources. Actors as actors of participation, have the power to use resources, including external resources or political modalities so that the actors' political objectives are achieved.

scholarly journals Praktik Demokrasi Pasca-Pemilu di Tingkat Lokal: Preferensi para Aktor Elite dalam Perspektif Teori Pilihan Rasional

Humaniora ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 264
Author(s):  
Yustinus Suhardi Ruman
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Local Level ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Elites ◽  
The People ◽  
Development Policies ◽  
Electoral Democracy

Electoral democracy generates the political elites. Because these political elites are born through a democratic process, they are expected to practice their power in accordance to the basic principles of democracy. One of them is to open the opportunity and acces of people to participatie in decision making proceses. Nevertheless, the problem is that the political elites who were elected through electoral democracy tend to close the participation of citizen in policy making process. To analyze how the political elites formulated the policy and what the rationality of the policy was, this article used rational choice theory. Article used secondary data to analyze the problem. Results of the analysis showed that democracy in local level after elections was determined by rationality, preferences, and interests of the political elites. The practices of power of the elites in local level in the context of rational choice theory made opportunity and access for the people obstructed. It then affects the existing development policies reflect only rationality, preferences, and interests of some elites. 

Revisiting The Political Economy of Development in India

2020 ◽  
pp. 3-27
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Chatterjee ◽  
Matthew McCartney
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
The Political ◽  
Asian Studies ◽  
South Asian Studies ◽  
The Face ◽  
Political Economy Of Development ◽  
Fierce Competition ◽  
Analytical Tools

Pranab Bardhan’s 1984 book The Political Economy of Development in India (PEDI) has had enduring influence. For students of Indian political economy it quickly became a scholarly touchstone. In the years since publication, however, political economy has fallen out of favour in South Asian studies. The contributors to this volume revive class analysis to interrogate India’s great transformation since the 1980s. This chapter outlines Bardhan’s key analytical tools, his innovative fusion of Marxist and rational-choice theory, and his diagnosis of India’s deep collective-action problems as a result of fierce competition between dominant classes. It then surveys the chapters that follow, which together find striking continuities in contemporary Indian political economy in the face of three decades of liberalization.

If Politics Matters: Implications for a “New Institutionalism”

1992 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rogers M. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
New Institutionalism ◽  
Legal Analysis ◽  
Traditional Methods ◽  
Political Analysis ◽  
First Time

From Aristotle and Hobbes through Bentley, Truman, and Riker, many writers have claimed, more or less directly, that they are founding or helping to found a true political science for the first time. Modern scholars have usually expressed this aspiration via criticism of earlier “unscientific” approaches. Thus William Riker in 1962, advocating rational choice theory as the basis of political analysis, dismissed “traditional methods—i. e., his-tory writing, the description of institutions, and legal analysis” as able to produce “only wisdom and neither science nor knowledge. And while wisdom is certainly useful in the affairs ofmen, such a result is a failure to live up to the promise in the name politicalscience ”.lSubsequently, rational choice has indeed become the most prominent pretender to the throne of scientific theory within the discipline.

Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics

2007 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 244-245
Author(s):  
Peter John Loewen
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Extended Family ◽  
Fundamental Question ◽  
Proper Place ◽  
Cambridge University ◽  
Physical Sense

Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics, Ian Shapiro, Rogers M. Smith and Tarek E. Masoud, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. xi., 419.This important volume recounts a meeting of some the best minds in political science, but, in the end, it is a meeting in the physical sense (as the volume comes out of a conference held at Yale in 2002) and not really in any intellectual sense. The ostensible goal of the volume is to proffer answers to what the editors call “a fundamental question about the proper place of problems and methods in the study of politics…. Which should political scientists chose first, a problem or a method?” (1). Unfortunately, a good many of the contributors to the volume ask whether this is a question at all. Perhaps unsurprisingly, most of those who reject the question do not have objections to the increased technical and mathematical nature of modern political science. And, equally unsurprising, those who suggest that method has too often come before problem are those who have earlier, and often eloquently, bemoaned the rise of rational choice theory and econometric applications. As an intellectual rapprochement, the work fails. It rather resembles a dinner of extended family, where long-held differences and grievances are kept just under the breath, but as a collection of essays by leading scholars which consider the methodologies and epistemologies of political science, the volume is a smashing success.

The Political Economy of Regulation

1997 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 675-707 ◽  
Author(s):  
P.M. Booth
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Austrian Economics ◽  
The Political ◽  
Insurance Markets ◽  
Insurance Regulation

ABSTRACTThis paper examines the political economy of regulation, reviewing market socialist, neo-classical and public interest approaches to regulation and analysing the development of financial services and insurance regulation in these frameworks. However, the paper suggests that these approaches do not capture properly many of the features of a market and the behaviour of regulators. Public choice theory is discussed, and it is concluded that there has not been significant capture of the regulatory process by interest groups. Austrian economics is proposed as a possible framework within which to analyse markets and regulators. It is concluded that there is prima facie evidence to suggest that the Austrian view of the market is realistic and that regulation in insurance markets can have unforeseen and undesirable effects. The author also concludes that, until 1970, insurance regulation did not deviate from principles which are appropriate if either a public choice or Austrian view is taken. However, the Financial Services Act 1998 and the Pensions Act 1995 do deviate from those principles.

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