Emergence of Cooperation Through Mutual Preference Revision

2006 ◽  
pp. 81-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pedro Santana ◽  
Luís Moniz Pereira
Keyword(s):  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Preference Revision

Evolution of Conditional Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Seyhun Saral
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Psychological Mechanisms ◽  
Medium Level ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Initial Move ◽  
Evolutionary Success ◽  
Strategy Types

Conditional cooperation has been a common explanation for the observed cooperation, and its decline in social dilemma experiments. Numerous studies showed that most of the experimental subjects can be categorized into three types: conditional cooperators, self-maximizers and hump-shaped (triangle) cooperators. In this study, I investigate conditional strategy types and their role on the emergence of cooperation and their evolutionary success. For this purpose, I use an extension of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game. The agents are characterized by their initial move and their conditional responses to each level of cooperation. By using simulations, I estimate the likelihood of cooperation for different probability of continuations.I show that, when the continuation probability is sufficiently large, high levels cooperation is achieved. In this case, the most successful strategies are those who employ an all-or-none type of conditional cooperation, followed by perfect conditional cooperators. In intermediate levels of continuation probabilities, however, hump-shaped contributor types are the ones that are most likely to thrive, followed by imperfect conditional cooperators. Those agents cooperate in a medium level of cooperation within themselves and each other. The results explain the existence of hump-shaped type of cooperators with a purely payoff-based reasoning, as opposed to previous attempts to explain this strategy with psychological mechanisms.

The Major Transitions in Evolution

1997 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Maynard Smith ◽  
Eors Szathmary
Keyword(s):  
Full Range ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Major Transitions ◽  
Insect Societies ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Major Transition ◽  
Life Itself ◽  
History Of ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Multicellular Organisms

Over the history of life there have been several major changes in the way genetic information is organized and transmitted from one generation to the next. These transitions include the origin of life itself, the first eukaryotic cells, reproduction by sexual means, the appearance of multicellular plants and animals, the emergence of cooperation and of animal societies, and the unique language ability of humans. This ambitious book provides the first unified discussion of the full range of these transitions. The authors highlight the similarities between different transitions--between the union of replicating molecules to form chromosomes and of cells to form multicellular organisms, for example--and show how understanding one transition sheds light on others. They trace a common theme throughout the history of evolution: after a major transition some entities lose the ability to replicate independently, becoming able to reproduce only as part of a larger whole. The authors investigate this pattern and why selection between entities at a lower level does not disrupt selection at more complex levels. Their explanation encompasses a compelling theory of the evolution of cooperation at all levels of complexity. Engagingly written and filled with numerous illustrations, this book can be read with enjoyment by anyone with an undergraduate training in biology. It is ideal for advanced discussion groups on evolution and includes accessible discussions of a wide range of topics, from molecular biology and linguistics to insect societies.

scholarly journals Punishment Strategies across Societies: Conventional Wisdoms Reconsidered

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Ramzi Suleiman ◽  
Yuval Samid
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Strong Predictor ◽  
Social Environments ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
The World ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Cost

Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing cooperation was explained as deterrence of free riders by cooperative strong reciprocators, who were willing to pay the cost of punishing them, whereas in environments in which punishment diminished cooperation, antisocial punishment was explained as revenge by low cooperators against high cooperators suspected of punishing them in previous rounds. The present paper reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a public goods experiment with punishment, conducted by the authors on Israeli subjects (Study 1), and from a study published in Science using sixteen participant pools from cities around the world (Study 2), we found that: 1. The effect of punishment on the emergence of cooperation was mainly due to contributors increasing their cooperation, rather than from free riders being deterred. 2. Participants adhered to different contribution and punishment strategies. Some cooperated and did not punish (‘cooperators’); others cooperated and punished free riders (‘strong reciprocators’); a third subgroup punished upward and downward relative to their own contribution (‘norm-keepers’); and a small sub-group punished only cooperators (‘antisocial punishers’). 3. Clear societal differences emerged in the mix of the four participant types, with high-contributing pools characterized by higher ratios of ‘strong reciprocators’, and ‘cooperators’, and low-contributing pools characterized by a higher ratio of ‘norm keepers’. 4. The fraction of ‘strong reciprocators’ out of the total punishers emerged as a strong predictor of the groups’ level of cooperation and success in providing the public goods.

Emergence of cooperation with reputation-updating timescale in spatial public goods game

2021 ◽  
Vol 393 ◽  
pp. 127173
Author(s):  
Weiwei Han ◽  
Zhipeng Zhang ◽  
Junqing Sun ◽  
Chengyi Xia
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation

scholarly journals The organization and control of an evolving interdependent population

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (108) ◽  
pp. 20150044 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dervis C. Vural ◽  
Alexander Isakov ◽  
L. Mahadevan
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Social Evolution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Large Scale Structures ◽  
External Perturbations ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Scale Structures ◽  
And Control ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Starting with Darwin, biologists have asked how populations evolve from a low fitness state that is evolutionarily stable to a high fitness state that is not. Specifically of interest is the emergence of cooperation and multicellularity where the fitness of individuals often appears in conflict with that of the population. Theories of social evolution and evolutionary game theory have produced a number of fruitful results employing two-state two-body frameworks. In this study, we depart from this tradition and instead consider a multi-player, multi-state evolutionary game, in which the fitness of an agent is determined by its relationship to an arbitrary number of other agents. We show that populations organize themselves in one of four distinct phases of interdependence depending on one parameter, selection strength. Some of these phases involve the formation of specialized large-scale structures. We then describe how the evolution of independence can be manipulated through various external perturbations.

Can the State Create Cooperation?: Problems of Reforming the Labor Supply in France

2000 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 223-245 ◽  
Author(s):  
PEPPER D. CULPEPPER
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
The State ◽  
Vocational Education And Training ◽  
Successful Implementation ◽  
Industrial Countries ◽  
Primary Obstacle ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Private Actors ◽  
And Training

Governments in the advanced industrial countries increasingly rely on supply-side reforms to intervene in the economy. This article examines one such reform, that of vocational education and training in France, whose successful implementation required that private actors cooperate not with the state, but with each other. As demonstrated through an empirical analysis of two employment zones, theories of institutional design that underscore the necessity of sanctioning cannot explain the successful emergence of cooperation, because new sanctioning regimes lack credibility under the uncertain conditions of economic reform. The primary obstacle to successful implementation of these reforms is uncertainty about the consequences of reciprocal cooperation, and the article highlights the mutual roles of states and employers' associations in overcoming this uncertainty. Active collaboration between policymakers and employers' associations, which have uniquely good access to private information about firms, is necessary to enable state policies to target those firms which are the most likely potential cooperators.

Individual memory and the emergence of cooperation

2013 ◽  
Vol 85 (1) ◽  
pp. 233-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
João Moreira ◽  
Jeromos Vukov ◽  
Cláudia Sousa ◽  
Francisco C. Santos ◽  
André F. d'Almeida ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Individual Memory ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation

Emergence of cooperation in peer-to-peer systems: A complex adaptive system approach

2012 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 213-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Golnaz Vakili ◽  
Foroozossadat Tabatabaee ◽  
Siavash Khorsandi
Keyword(s):  
System Approach ◽  
Adaptive System ◽  
Complex Adaptive System ◽  
Peer To Peer ◽  
Peer To Peer Systems ◽  
Complex Adaptive ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation
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