A Schur Concave Characterization of Risk Aversion for Non-expected Utility Preferences

1995 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
pp. 402-435 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chew Soo Hong ◽  
Mao Mei Hui
2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (2) ◽  
pp. 596-627
Author(s):  
Eric Bahel ◽  
Yves Sprumont

We model uncertain social prospects as acts mapping states of nature to (social ) outcomes. A social choice function (or SCF ) assigns an act to each profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. An SCF is strategyproof if no agent ever has an incentive to misrepresent her beliefs about the states of nature or her valuation of the outcomes. It is unanimous if it picks the feasible act that all agents find best whenever such an act exists. We offer a characterization of the class of strategyproof and unanimous SCFs in two settings. In the setting where all acts are feasible, the chosen act must yield the favorite outcome of some ( possibly different) agent in every state of nature. The set of states in which an agent’s favorite outcome is selected may vary with the reported belief profile; it is the union of all states assigned to her by a collection of constant, bilaterally dictatorial, or bilaterally consensual assignment rules. In a setting where each state of nature defines a possibly different subset of available outcomes, bilaterally dictatorial or consensual rules can only be used to assign control rights over states characterized by identical sets of available outcomes. (JEL D71, D81, R53)


2004 ◽  
Vol 8 (5) ◽  
pp. 617-632 ◽  
Author(s):  
DANIELE COEN-PIRANI

This paper studies the role played by differences in risk aversion in affecting the long-run distribution of wealth across agents in the context of an endowment economy. The economy is populated by two types of Epstein-Zin agents who differ only in their attitudes toward risk. By choosing riskier portfolio strategies, less-risk-averse agents enjoy returns on their investments characterized by a higher mean and a higher variance than the ones enjoyed by more-risk-averse agents. The former effect tends to make less-risk-averse agents wealthier over time, whereas the latter tends to make them poorer. The paper shows that, contrary to the results obtained using standard expected utility preferences, for some parameter values the long-run distribution of wealth is dominated by more-risk-averse agents.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 51-63
Author(s):  
Marie-Charlotte Guetlein

This paper suggests a characterization of increases in risk aversion within the smooth ambiguity model by Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). I show that an increase in risk aversion is qualitatively different from that under expected utility, due to the incomplete separation between risk and ambiguity attitude. The analysis clarifies how ambiguity perception and attitude depend on risk aversion. (JEL D81)


2002 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moez Abouda ◽  
Alain Chateauneuf
Keyword(s):  

1986 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isaac Levi

In The Enterprise of Knowledge (Levi, 1980a), I proposed a general theory of rational choice which I intended as a characterization of a prescriptive theory of ideal rationality. A cardinal tenet of this theory is that assessments of expected value or expected utility in the Bayesian sense may not be representable by a numerical indicator or indeed induce an ordering of feasible options in a context of deliberation. My reasons for taking this position are related to my commitment to the inquiry-oriented approach to human knowledge and valuation favored by the American pragmatists, Charles Peirce and John Dewey. A feature of any acceptable view of inquiry ought to be that during an inquiry points under dispute ought to be kept in suspense pending resolution through inquiry.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Soheil Ghili ◽  
Peter Klibanoff

Consider a canonical problem in choice under uncertainty: choosing from a convex feasible set consisting of all (Anscombe–Aumann) mixtures of two acts f and g, [Formula: see text]. We propose a preference condition, monotonicity in optimal mixtures, which says that surely improving the act f (in the sense of weak dominance) makes the optimal weight(s) on f weakly higher. We use a stylized model of a sales agent reacting to incentives to illustrate the tight connection between monotonicity in optimal mixtures and a monotone comparative static of interest in applications. We then explore more generally the relation between this condition and preferences exhibiting ambiguity-sensitive behavior as in the classic Ellsberg paradoxes. We find that monotonicity in optimal mixtures and ambiguity aversion (even only local to an event) are incompatible for a large and popular class of ambiguity-sensitive preferences (the c-linearly biseparable class. This implies, for example, that maxmin expected utility preferences are consistent with monotonicity in optimal mixtures if and only if they are subjective expected utility preferences. This incompatibility is not between monotonicity in optimal mixtures and ambiguity aversion per se. For example, we show that smooth ambiguity preferences can satisfy both properties as long as they are not too ambiguity averse. Our most general result, applying to an extremely broad universe of preferences, shows a sense in which monotonicity in optimal mixtures places upper bounds on the intensity of ambiguity-averse behavior. This paper was accepted by Manel Baucells, decision analysis.


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