Utility Value Criteria in Selection of Species for Sustainable Reclamation of Silica Mining Area

Silica sand mining in Shankargarh, Prayagraj, India area has led to extensive ecological destruction, environmental degradation and erosion of traditional values in the society. Therefore, an integrated organic and socioeconomic approach is urgently required to bioreclaim degraded mine sites.The most common problems linked with degraded land rehabilitation failures are frequently associated with improper selection of plantation species. Subsistence utility preferences of local people are major acclaimed and convincing reasons in the selection of valuable tree species for Bioreclamation. Socioeconomic Survey were carried out in the nearby villages of Silica mining area to study the existing resources of the area, social structure of the community, dependence on forest and species preferred by the local people. Consequently, a Utility Value Index (UVI) framework was conceptualized, designed and subsequently developed to identify species preferred by the local people and highly valued for supporting their livelihood.

Social discount rate: spaces for agreement

We study the problem of aggregating discounted utility preferences into a social discounted utility preference model. We use an axiom capturing a social responsibility of individuals’ attitudes to time, called consensus Pareto. We show that this axiom can provide consistent foundations for welfare judgments. Moreover, in conjunction with the standard axioms of anonymity and continuity, consensus Pareto can help adjudicate some fundamental issues related to the choice of the social discount rate: the society selects the rate through a generalized median voter scheme.

If It Is Surely Better, Do It More? Implications for Preferences Under Ambiguity

Consider a canonical problem in choice under uncertainty: choosing from a convex feasible set consisting of all (Anscombe–Aumann) mixtures of two acts f and g, [Formula: see text]. We propose a preference condition, monotonicity in optimal mixtures, which says that surely improving the act f (in the sense of weak dominance) makes the optimal weight(s) on f weakly higher. We use a stylized model of a sales agent reacting to incentives to illustrate the tight connection between monotonicity in optimal mixtures and a monotone comparative static of interest in applications. We then explore more generally the relation between this condition and preferences exhibiting ambiguity-sensitive behavior as in the classic Ellsberg paradoxes. We find that monotonicity in optimal mixtures and ambiguity aversion (even only local to an event) are incompatible for a large and popular class of ambiguity-sensitive preferences (the c-linearly biseparable class. This implies, for example, that maxmin expected utility preferences are consistent with monotonicity in optimal mixtures if and only if they are subjective expected utility preferences. This incompatibility is not between monotonicity in optimal mixtures and ambiguity aversion per se. For example, we show that smooth ambiguity preferences can satisfy both properties as long as they are not too ambiguity averse. Our most general result, applying to an extremely broad universe of preferences, shows a sense in which monotonicity in optimal mixtures places upper bounds on the intensity of ambiguity-averse behavior. This paper was accepted by Manel Baucells, decision analysis.

A Generalization of Quantal Response Equilibrium via Perturbed Utility

We present a tractable generalization of quantal response equilibrium via non-expected utility preferences. In particular, we introduce concave perturbed utility games in which an individual has strategy-specific utility indices that depend on the outcome of the game and an additively separable preference to randomize. The preference to randomize can be viewed as a reduced form of limited attention. Using concave perturbed utility games, we show how to enrich models based on logit best response that are common from quantal response equilibrium. First, the desire to randomize can depend on opponents’ strategies. Second, we show how to derive a nested logit best response function. Lastly, we present tractable quadratic perturbed utility games that allow complementarity.

Multiplicative Gains, Non-ergodic Utility, and the Just One More Paradox (with Supplemental Information)

Interest in multiplicative vs. additive returns on bets has been revived by Peters, who proposes ergodicity and added noise are useful in understanding utility preferences. Peters requires a Monte Carlo simulation to demonstrate empirically a supposed paradox that arithmetic expectation is inappropriate for multiplicative gain distribution forecasting. Here I formalize the r operator notation, which significantly simplifies multiplicative problems, as an extension of the arithmetic group's Δ/d discrete and continuous operators into the multiplicative semigroup. I show how the annihilating (absorbing) element of the multiplicative semigroup at 0, not +/-∞, may be used to conveniently represent nonlinear sequence occurrences, such as running out of money, without the need for special computer rules outside the mathematics. I use this to solve Peters' expected-value paradox elegantly, without ergodicities nor noise. But Peters misses the real paradox, called “Just One More”: the outcome of an advantageous additive gamble is identical to the outcome of a similar disadvantageous multiplicative gamble, after one trial; hence, by induction, an agent will keep playing. I propose games “Hero or Heroin” and “American Roulette” to highlight this paradox. This may help in explaining addiction. The Supplement contains further visualizations and arguments against the need and applicability of ergodics for utility. The results contribute to the understanding of repeated multiplicative gambles with annihilating states, and their utility.

A Critical Outlook on Assumptions—Decision Systems in Transformation Towards Sustainability

Some assumptions about decision systems in the context of transformation towards sustainability will be presented in this chapter. These assumptions are backed by rationales, which highlight the utility preferences of agents and audience. In addition, trade-offs reflect the selection of the most important caveats that decision-makers are confronted with.

The Relation between Behavior under Risk and over Time

The paper establishes a tight relation between nonstandard behaviors in the domains of risk and time, by considering a decision-maker with non-expected utility preferences who believes that only present consumption is certain while any future consumption is uncertain. We provide the first complete characterizations of the two-way relations between the certainty effect and present bias, and between the common ratio effect and temporal reversals. (JEL D11, D15, D81, D91)

Strategyproof Choice of Social Acts

We model uncertain social prospects as acts mapping states of nature to (social ) outcomes. A social choice function (or SCF ) assigns an act to each profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. An SCF is strategyproof if no agent ever has an incentive to misrepresent her beliefs about the states of nature or her valuation of the outcomes. It is unanimous if it picks the feasible act that all agents find best whenever such an act exists. We offer a characterization of the class of strategyproof and unanimous SCFs in two settings. In the setting where all acts are feasible, the chosen act must yield the favorite outcome of some ( possibly different) agent in every state of nature. The set of states in which an agent’s favorite outcome is selected may vary with the reported belief profile; it is the union of all states assigned to her by a collection of constant, bilaterally dictatorial, or bilaterally consensual assignment rules. In a setting where each state of nature defines a possibly different subset of available outcomes, bilaterally dictatorial or consensual rules can only be used to assign control rights over states characterized by identical sets of available outcomes. (JEL D71, D81, R53)