Payments for Ecosystem Services as a Policy Mix: Demonstrating the institutional analysis and development framework on conservation policy instruments

2017 ◽  
Vol 27 (5) ◽  
pp. 404-421 ◽  
Author(s):  
David N. Barton ◽  
Karla Benavides ◽  
Adriana Chacon-Cascante ◽  
Jean-Francois Le Coq ◽  
Miriam Miranda Quiros ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Ecosystem Services ◽  
Institutional Analysis ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
Conservation Policy ◽  
Payments For Ecosystem Services ◽  
Policy Mix ◽  
Development Framework ◽  
Institutional Analysis And Development

Reviewing the role of habitat banking and tradable development rights in the conservation policy mix

2015 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 294-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
RUI SANTOS ◽  
CHRISTOPH SCHRÖTER-SCHLAACK ◽  
PAULA ANTUNES ◽  
IRENE RING ◽  
PEDRO CLEMENTE
Keyword(s):  
Land Use ◽  
Biodiversity Conservation ◽  
Land Use Planning ◽  
Social Impact ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
Conservation Policy ◽  
Time Lags ◽  
Policy Mix ◽  
Biodiversity Offsets ◽  
Development Rights

SUMMARYHabitat banking and tradable development rights (TDR) have gained considerable currency as a way of achieving ‘no net loss’ of biodiversity and of reconciling nature conservation with economic development goals. This paper reviews the use of these instruments for biodiversity conservation and assesses their roles in the policy mix. The two instruments are compared in terms of effectiveness, cost effectiveness, social impact, institutional context and legal requirements. The role in the policy mix is discussed highlighting sequential relationships, as well as complementarities or synergies, redundancy and conflicts with other instruments, such as biodiversity offsets and land-use zoning.Habitat banking and TDR have the potential to contribute to biodiversity conservation objectives and attain cost-effective solutions with positive social impacts on local communities and landowners. They can also help to create a new mind-set more favourable to public-private cooperation in biodiversity conservation. At the same time, these policy instruments face a number of theoretical and implementation challenges, such as additionality and equivalence of offsets, endurance of land-use planning regulations, monitoring of offset performance, or time lags between restoration and resulting conservation benefits.A clear, enforceable regulatory approach is a prerequisite for the success of habitat banking and TDR. In return, these schemes provide powerful incentives for compliance with regulatory norms and ensure a more equitable allocation of the benefits and costs of land-use controls and conservation. Environmentally harmful subsidies in other policy sectors as well as alternative offset options, however, reduce the attractiveness and effectiveness of these instruments. Thus, the overall performance of habitat banking and TDR hinges on how they are integrated into the biodiversity conservation policy mix and fine-tuned with other sectoral policies.

scholarly journals Laws, norms, and the Institutional Analysis and Development framework

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 829-847 ◽  
Author(s):  
DANIEL H. COLE
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Analysis ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Development Framework ◽  
Meta Analyses ◽  
Institutional Analysis And Development ◽  
Type 3 ◽  
Working Rules

AbstractElinor Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework has been described as ‘one of the most developed and sophisticated attempts to use institutional and stakeholder assessment in order to link theory and practice, analysis and policy’. But not all elements in the framework are sufficiently well developed. This paper focuses on one such element: the ‘rules-in-use’ (a.k.a. ‘rules’ or ‘working rules’). Specifically, it begins a long-overdue conversation about relations between formal legal rules and ‘working rules’ by offering a tentative and very simple typology of relations. Type 1: Some formal legal rules equal or approximate the working rules; Type 2: Some legal rules plus (or emended by) widely held social norms equal or approximate the working rules; and Type 3: Some legal rules bear no evident relation to the working rules. Several examples, including some previously used by Ostrom, are provided to illustrate each of the three types, which can be conceived of as nodes or ranges along a continuum. The paper concludes with a call for empirical research, especially case studies and meta-analyses, to determine the relevant scope of each of these types of relations, and to provide data for furthering our understanding of how different types of rules, from various sources, function (or not) as institutions.

scholarly journals Enabling Game-Theoretical Analysis of Social Rules

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nieves Montes ◽  
Nardine Osman ◽  
Carles Sierra
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Multiagent Systems ◽  
Institutional Analysis ◽  
Social Rules ◽  
Agent Interactions ◽  
Development Framework ◽  
Agent Interaction ◽  
Normative Multiagent Systems ◽  
Institutional Analysis And Development ◽  
The Relationship

In the field of normative multiagent systems, the relationship between a game structure and its underpinning agent interaction rules is hardly ever addressed in a systematic manner. In this work, we introduce the Action Situation Language (ASL), inspired by Elinor Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development framework, to bridge the gap between games and rules. The ASL provides a syntax for the description of agent interactions, and is complemented by an engine that automatically provides semantics for them as extensive-form games. The resulting games can then be analysed using standard game-theoretical solution concepts, hence allowing any community of agents to automatically perform what-if analysis of potential new interaction rules.

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