State capitalism and capital markets: Comparing securities exchanges in emerging markets

Finance plays a major role in discussions about state capitalism in emerging markets, but the focus has so far been on banks. Capital markets have been neglected. Moreover, findings from the growing literature on financialization in emerging markets indicate that in some cases there is increasing state involvement in the development and functioning of capital markets. Hence, the relationship between the state and finance in these economies may be fundamentally different from the picture provided by liberal Western-centric perspectives. Instead of looking at capital markets as uniform entities, we propose to analyse them as variegated – while characterized by common financialization processes, they can be informed by different institutional logics, leading to very different market dynamics and outcomes. We explore to what extent these differences exist and how state-capitalist economies facilitate capital market development. Our comparative institutional analysis of securities exchanges as central parts of capital markets in six increasingly financialized emerging market economies – Brazil, China, India, Russia, South Africa and South Korea – focuses on the degree to which capital markets are integrated into state-capitalist institutions. Instead of mere platforms on which market transactions take place, we analyse exchanges as powerful actors which actively shape capital markets. While in most advanced economies exchanges are situated within an institutional setting informed by neoliberal institutional logic, we demonstrate that exchanges in emerging markets often organize capital markets to facilitate state objectives.

Clubs, Coase, and the Role of Government

As Ronald Coase and others have shown, deducing the appropriate role of the government in the economy requires a comparative institutions approach. Trying to generalize from oversimplified specifications regarding transaction costs, according to whether exclusion is possible or not, is a futile exercise. An alternative to the Ostrom matrix is to distinguish private, club, and collective consumption goods according to their technical characteristics, specifically their degree of congestabiilty. The other box of the Ostrom matrix, “common pool” resources, can also be usefully analyzed from a club perspective. Spillover goods are spatial clubs. Lastly, a version of the Coase theorem is offered, which provides the foundation of comparative institutional analysis.

Digital markets, competition regimes and models of capitalism: A comparative institutional analysis of European and US responses to Google

The comparative capitalism literature examined how institutions vary on a national or societal level and how these differences affect multinational companies’ strategies. Yet, little attention has been devoted to cross-national or regional differences in the governance of competition, especially in the context of digitalization of markets. The article seeks to fill this gap by looking at the case of Google. It traces the process of the stark US–EU disagreement over Google’s abuse of dominant position in digital markets, which resulted in one of the largest fines in the EU history. It is argued that the variation in the response to the company’s market and nonmarket strategies are traced back to differences between Ordoliberal and Chicago School ideas, which are embedded in the ‘competition regimes’ of European and US capitalist models. The article concludes by discussing the implications of these findings for varieties of capitalism frameworks.

Institutional Aspects of Russian Economic Thought: A View From Outside

The institutional aspects of the Russian economic thought as they are seen to the professor from Montenegro Veselin Draskovic in comparison with such aspects of economic thougt of the former socialistic countries, including Montenegro and wider – former Yugoslavia are studied. The special attention is spared to illumination of the representative themes and directions of the development of economic thougt – both accepted and declined by Russian practice and official politics. The most essential problems and taking place theoretical discussions, lasting during all period of socialism with an accent on today's realities, are investigated. Undertaken by the author of book the comparative institutional analysis of consequences of the strict government control in different periods of development of economic thought allows to differentiate two most essential factors of influence – domination of politics over all forms of life, from one side, and cult of personality – from another. Particular interest is presented by the selfguided enterprises, as they can be interpreted as the popular now ecosystems, i.e. ecosystems in miniature.

Clubs, Coase, and the role of government

As Ronald Coase and others have shown, deducing the appropriate role of the government in the economy requires a comparative institutions approach. Trying to generalize from oversimplified specifications regarding transaction costs, according to whether exclusion is possible or not, is a futile exercise. An alternative to the Ostrom matrix is to distinguish private, club, and collective consumption goods according to their technical characteristics, specifically their degree of congestabiilty. The other box of the Ostrom matrix, “common pool” resources, can also be usefully analyzed from a club perspective. Spillover goods are spatial clubs. Lastly, a version of the Coase theorem is offered, which provides the foundation of comparative institutional analysis.