The Taliban at War
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Published By Oxford University Press

9780190092399, 9780190099640

2019 ◽  
pp. 237-250
Author(s):  
Antonio Giustozzi
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  

The Taliban differ from the typical insurgencies of the Cold War, but their polycentric approach is popular among Xxi century insurgents, so it’s not a one-off. The Taliban’s polycentrism gave them immense resilience, but it turned into a limitation when they had to go on the offensive and score a decisive final victory.


2019 ◽  
pp. 133-158
Author(s):  
Antonio Giustozzi

The Taliban’s tactics were originally quite clumsy, but were able to evolve towards asymmetric tactics with the help of foreign advisers from Iran and Pakistan. Mines became the main weapon in the arsenal of the Taliban.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Antonio Giustozzi
Keyword(s):  

The book is based on extensive research among the Taliban, with hundreds of interviews carried out at all levels and in every region of activity. This allowed an unprecedented in-depth study of the Taliban.


2019 ◽  
pp. 109-132
Author(s):  
Antonio Giustozzi
Keyword(s):  

The US surge in southern Afghanistan in 2009-11 put the Quetta Shura under heavy stress, at a time when the Shuras of Miran Shah and Peshawar were trying to expand at its expense. The Quetta Shura started to appear as ineffective, and donors started redirecting their finances at the two other shuras. A period of decline had begun.


2019 ◽  
pp. 77-108
Author(s):  
Antonio Giustozzi

The Miran Shah Shura predated the Quetta Shura, but only in 2007 did it start to drift away and become more and more autonomous. The main grudge held against the Quetta Shura was the concentration of power in the hands of southern Taliban. The new Peshawar Shura, established in 2005, also opposed the southern bias of the Quetta Shura and sought to provide an alternative center of Taliban power in the east.


2019 ◽  
pp. 17-42
Author(s):  
Antonio Giustozzi

The Taliban were genuinely crushed in 2001 and for several months they were scattered and helpless. Gradually they started regrouping, but funding and logistics were limited and so were their capabilities.


2019 ◽  
pp. 197-236
Author(s):  
Antonio Giustozzi

From 2014 the Quetta Shura started recovering influence among the Taliban, mostly due to its ability to re-direct funding away from other centers of power. Still the Quetta Shura remained divided internally, and unable to act coherently in order to exploit the opportunities that the withdrawal of western combat troops offered.


2019 ◽  
pp. 251-258
Author(s):  
Antonio Giustozzi

Abstract and Keywords to be supplied.


2019 ◽  
pp. 159-196
Author(s):  
Antonio Giustozzi

Originally, the Taliban were also poorly organized. Under pressure from 2009 onwards, they had to complement their trademark polycentric organization with centralized structures, which enabled great coordination in the battlefield and unity of command.


2019 ◽  
pp. 43-76
Author(s):  
Antonio Giustozzi
Keyword(s):  

Funding to the Taliban started accruing in substantial amounts in 2005, mostly reaching the so-called Quetta Shura. This allowed it to emerge as the main center of Taliban power, and gradually start extending its influence over scattered groups of Taliban.


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