“Popular Opinion Can Offer No Useful Contribution”

This chapter begins a month after the previous chapter, on July, 6, 1945, as President Truman, Admiral Leahy, and Secretary of State James Byrnes departed Washington by train, and then by cruiser USS Augusta, heading for Antwerp, Belgium. The formalization for Japanese surrender was finally to begin. American hatred of the Japanese emperor was balanced by a more generalized desire on the part of most Americans to return to peacetime pursuits. Americans were looking past the surrender of Japan and thinking about life after the war. However, the chapter argues, it wasn’t going to be as cut and dried as that. The chapter provides evidence for the subtleties that existed in the debate in political circles.

“We Do Not Exclude a Constitutional Monarch Under the Present Dynasty”

The second chapter picks up in Okinawa, where the last chapter ended, in June 1945, when Japanese forces began an orderly retreat from the Shuri line to the Kiyan Peninsula, located at the southernmost part of Okinawa. Thereafter began a plan within the Japanese political and military elite to end the war. The initial hope was for Japan’s withdrawal from the European colonies it had conquered, providing they were granted their independence. Japan would also disarm itself and accept limits imposed on its defense establishment. There would be no occupation of the homeland. The chapter argues that this was a daring plan. The chapter presents the U.S. reaction to this in terms of how those in power wanted the Japanese surrender to be shaped.

“The A-Bomb Was Not Needed”

The final chapter looks at the aftermath of Japanese surrender. The initial post-surrender policy of the U.S. government put forward a whole host of reforms in Japan. The first year and a half of occupation was known as the “liberal phase.” General MacArthur implemented many of the first reforms. The chapter looks at how these reforms were devised, put in place, received, and implemented and how the nature and extent of reforms changed in time. The chapter also considers the consequences for Japan of the demotion and humanization of the emperor that came with surrender. Did sparing the emperor from prosecution grant the Japanese public general immunity? How could individual Japanese citizens be held responsible for the war if the emperor, in whose name they had acted, was not? The chapter looks at the ramifications for the events covered in this book for the time between then and now, as we are at the point of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the surrender of Japan. Finally, the chapter looks to the future and lesson learned.

“Our Demand Has Been and It Remains—Unconditional Surrender!”

This chapter begins the story of this book on the island of Okinawa, Japan, beginning at dawn on April 1, 1945. This point in time sparked the largest concentrated naval bombardment ever to cover a landing. The chapter charts the dramatic pace of events that followed during that month and beyond. What happened in Okinawa resulted in a change in leadership in Tokyo, which convinced diplomats in the United States that Japan was signaling its intent to end the war. However, the chapter argues, they were mistaken. With the Americans firmly on Okinawa and a new prime minister leading the country, Japan had reached a turning point yet was refusing to turn. Instead, the country continued its fatal path toward the end. The military continued to urge the people to endure sacrifice until they were, hopefully, to be rescued. However, as we now know, this was the beginning of the end.

Conclusion

As we observe the seventy-fifth anniversary of the surrender of Japan, it becomes clear that the terms on which that surrender took place remain among the most central and the most contested issues—and with good reason. Unconditional surrender was destined to be controversial because it was Roosevelt’s policy. It incited the same ideological divisions as his domestic policies and extended those battles to the arenas of foreign policy and military strategy. My goal in this book has been to explain the reasons for the debate over unconditional surrender, so that we can better understand the decisions that Harry Truman and his advisors made and their short- and long-term ramifications. It comes down to two main conclusions about those decisions: that they were strongly influenced by ideological considerations and that the push to modify unconditional surrender was closely tied to concern over the consequences of Soviet entry into the war. A third conclusion is that the chance for a negotiated peace in 1945 was exceedingly slim, given that before August 14, the Japanese never indicated they were willing to accept a dramatic change in their political structure that would reduce the emperor to a symbol without authority or power....

“A Great Victory Has Been Won”

This chapter’s point of departure is the thirteenth and final meeting of the Big Three at Potsdam. During the first few days of August, as the chapter states, the entire outlook for the Pacific War changed dramatically—namely, by one single event: on August 6 (Washington time), the first atomic bomb was exploded 1,900 feet above the city of Hiroshima. The chapter covers the ramifications of this historic point in time. One question was, to what extent should Japan be spared the psychological and physical burdens of defeat? The answer: they shouldn’t be spared it at all. The surrenders conducted throughout Asia relied on displays of force and potent symbols to convey the irresistibility of Allied power and impress upon the Japanese the unconditional nature of their defeat.

“They Will Yield”

This chapter begins its narration of events toward the end of July, as it attempts to explain the context in which President Truman was considering the implications of America’s entry into the atomic age. They needed a solution. The chapter looks at Truman’s journal entries of that time as a way to analyze what was going through his mind. He had some complicated issues to deal with and difficult decisions to make. The chapter charts events surrounding the Potsdam Declaration and looks at for Japan’s response to it. The urgency with which the Allies approached planning for a sudden end to the war was in marked contrast to the desultory fashion in which the Japanese sought an alternative to unconditional surrender.

Introduction

The Introduction gives a brief outline of the history behind the events that led to the unconditional surrender by the Japanese as World War II came to a close in 1945. In the final months of the war, the Introduction argues, a vigorous public debate erupted over the policy of unconditional surrender and the definition of “victory.” This debate wasn’t just about the best way to end a war; it extended the ideological battleground of the New Deal into the international realm. The Introduction concludes that to fully understand Japan’s decision to surrender, readers need to understand what the various participants knew at that time and that is what this book aims to do.