The Crossing Battle, Part 2

The 143rd Division had two primary tasks to accomplish during the crossing battle on the night of October 15–16: to open and secure the Akavish and Tirtur Roads to access the bridgehead, and to bring their division, as well as the 162nd Division and other forces, to the western side of the canal in preparation for Operation Stouthearted Men. The second task was assigned to the 247th Brigade, which would begin by securing a bridgehead on the other side of the canal. Then the 421st Brigade would deploy the crossing equipment and the bridging battalions would construct and maintain bridges over the canal. This task was the linchpin of the division’s entire mission—the success of Operation Stouthearted Men and the crossing battle depended on the 247th Brigade’s ability to capture, secure, and defend the bridgehead.

“Better Is the End of a Thing Than the Beginning Thereof” (Eccles. 7:8)

Even and Maoz note that by its nature, war is waged to achieve goals, and as such, there is a continuum of victory to defeat rather than a win/lose dichotomy. They discuss the varied aims Israel had when entering the Yom Kippur War, from their goals prior to the 1973 war, to their practical goals for the Yom Kippur War, as well as Egypt’s objectives. At the war’s end in 1973, both Egypt and Israel believed, justifiably, that they had won a great victory because they fought for two separate but related goals. Israel sought to remove Egypt from the circle of war, and Egypt hoped to regain territory it had lost in 1967. Even and Maoz conclude that, ultimately, everyone won the war.

The Crossing Battle, Part 3

This chapter focuses on the coordination of various moving parts to bring the crossing battle to completion. On the morning of October 16, the roller bridge was no longer seen as a viable option for crossing the canal, and Sharon commanded the 257th Battalion to detach from the 421st Brigade and go on to Matzmed. The Unifloat rafts were in good shape, and after their arrival at Akavish 55, the 630th Bridging Battalion was ordered to Matzmed to receive further instructions from Sharon. The Crocodile envoy arrived at Matzmed around 4 a.m. and commenced crossing to the western bank at 7 a.m. According to Even and Maoz, the Crocodile rafts saved Operation Stouthearted Men, the Israel Defense Forces, and Israel itself from a catastrophic defeat.

The Egyptian Attack, October 14

By the evening of October 12, reports surfaced of the Egyptians’ intent to dispatch commando units against various targets in order to attack the canal front and transfer armored reserves into Sinai. From that time until the October 14 sunrise, when nearly one thousand Egyptian tanks amassed on the eastern bank of the canal, the General Staff and Southern Command created a reserve force of around 750 tanks, deployed on the line from north to south. The ultimate goals of the Egyptian army’s offensive were lost to history when Egyptian president Anwar Sadat died, but Even and Maoz do their best to reconstruct the axes of the attack.

The Order and the Division

The Yom Kippur War began on Yom Kippur, the highest holy day in Judaism, in 1973. Since the Israeli army was made up of reserve units, the Egyptian army attacked on the holiday, believing the timing would impede the army’s call-up process. In reality, this strategy made it possible for the reservists to arrive at their designated locations sooner than usual because the roads were clear; most people were either at home or their local synagogue. The Egyptian attack came as a surprise to the Israeli reservists because Israel had definitively won the Six-Day War against Egypt and its allies in 1967. However, the Egyptian army had significantly increased its antitank resources in the interim, and both sides were startled to discover that neither had the advantage they thought they did.

On the Defensive, October 10–14

Even and Maoz divide the Southern Command’s six-day defensive period into three sections. October 9 was a pseudodefensive during which the 143rd Division saw great violence. October 10–13 was a time of restive dormancy, and October 14 brought a role change and a reversal of fortune to the IDF. Physically, this period of the war featured low-intensity combat interspersed with furious fire at key points, while diplomatically, drama roiled, future moves were planned, and crucial issues were decided. During the division’s four days of dormancy, Sharon reorganized his brigades, absorbed reinforcements, repaired equipment, and formulated operational plans for the eventual canal crossing.

The Crossing Battle, Part 4

This section covers the crossing battle from the morning of October 17 through the early morning hours of October 18, when the battle ended. Even and Maoz note the lessons learned from the Chinese Farm Battle, planned and begun by the 162nd Division and fought by the 460th Brigade. Unfortunately, the paratroopers’ sacrifice did not enable the transport of the rafts to Akavish and Matzmed, and merely serves to whitewash the commanders who carelessly and irresponsibly sent fifty men to their deaths. The battle failed to achieve its mission, and in retrospect, it began before the commanders had successfully demonstrated that it was an unavoidable fight.

The Crossing Battle, Part 1

The chief of General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces was prepared to surrender, but Egyptian president Anwar Sadat rejected their surrender, giving Israel no choice but to continue fighting. From then on, the defense minister, the chief of General Staff, and the commanding general of Southern Command resolved to achieve a decisive defeat of Egyptian army and end the conflict. Israeli strategists determined that the best option would be to cross the Suez Canal in an operation called Stouthearted Men. Operation Stouthearted Men, implemented on October 15, lasted until the ceasefire on October 25 that officially ended the war. The first battle of the operation was the crossing battle itself—a uniquely large, protracted, dramatic, and significant battle that is often described as “the crossing battle.”

Eight Days

By midday on October 17, the Egyptian army realized the extent of the presence of the IDF and began assembling armor and infantry on the western bank in an attempt to contain the bridgehead. By the original plan, the 421st Brigade was to seize the western bridgehead on Havit Road; however, due to the increased presence of Egyptian forces, the 421st Brigade withdrew slightly to regroup. On the morning of October 18, the 162nd Division planned to be at the bridgehead west of the canal, and then to break through to the west and southwest—a highly unrealistic goal, given the Southern Command’s progress in the previous two weeks.

The Twice-Blessed Day

After the events of October 8, Sharon no longer trusted the chief of General Staff’s ability to lead the IDF on the southern front. Therefore, he ignored their directives and initiated offensive attacks as he saw fit. Sharon instructed his brigade commanders to commence blocking action against the Egyptian advance, and to demonstrate initiative by delivering aggression without direct attacks. Sharon’s goals for the day were twofold: to rescue the men in the Purkan stronghold, and to recapture the Hamutal and Makhshir localities, which had been forfeited by the 143rd Division but would be crucial for the eventual canal crossing.