The Role of Leadership

This chapter explores the role of leadership in military adaptation, which may be the most important factor of all. Adaptable tactical leaders must rapidly assess the battlefield and identify the need for change, remain willing to abandon accepted procedures when required, and candidly advocate for organizational change when needed. At the theater level, adaptive leaders face more challenges in identifying the need for change. They need to actively seek out ideas from throughout the chain of command, and to lead rapid battlefield change within their formations. The chapter examines the successful tactical adaptability of Captain John Abizaid during the 1983 invasion of Grenada and the failed tactical adaptability of Lieutenant Colonel Robert McDade in 1965 during the Vietnam War. It also examines the successful theater adaptability of Field Marshall William Slim during the Burma campaign of World War II, and the failed theater adaptability of General William Westmoreland in Vietnam War.

Understanding Adaptation

This chapter examines why military adaptation is so difficult. All organizations resist change, but militaries resist change even more because of the inherent uncertainty of the battlefield, strategic interaction with the adversary, the radical difference between peacetime and wartime, and the existential costs of failure. The authors argue that existing explanations of military adaptation do not provide a sufficient understanding of how adaptation occurs after a war or conflict begins. They then identify the three key elements of their analytic framework—doctrine, technology, and leadership—and explain how they use that framework throughout the rest of the book.

The Challenges of Future War

This chapter argues that it will be increasingly difficult for the US military to predict and adapt to the character of its future conflicts, because of growing strategic uncertainty, the addition of two new domains of warfare (outer space and cyberspace), and the scale and increasing speed of change. The gap between predicted wars and actual wars—what the authors call the adaptation gap—is likely to continue to grow. The adaptability that the US military will need to bridge that growing gap will become ever more important, even as it becomes ever more difficult.

Tactical Leadership Adaptation in Iraq and Afghanistan

This chapter explores the role of leadership adaptability at the tactical level during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It examines how Colonel Sean MacFarland and his US Army brigade successfully adapted to conditions in Ramadi, and dramatically reduced the very high levels of violence in this critical Iraqi city in 2006. It also examines the remarkable adaptability of Captain Mark Nutsch and his 12-man team of US Army Special Forces soldiers, known as the Horse Soldiers, during the opening weeks of the war in Afghanistan in 2001. Their strikingly creative efforts helped achieve a critical strategic objective in the campaign to remove the Taliban from power.

Technological Adaptation in Iraq and Afghanistan

This chapter explores the role of technological adaptability during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the tactical level, it examines how soldiers in Iraq developed “hillbilly armor” to try to protect their vulnerable vehicles from roadside bombs, and how Apache helicopters were successfully adapted to conduct close air support missions in Afghanistan. It also argues, however, that technological adaptability at the institutional level involved disastrous failures. In Iraq, virtually all senior Pentagon officials repeatedly resisted providing adequate numbers of life-saving vehicles called MRAPs to deployed soldiers facing grave threats from improvised explosive devices. And in Afghanistan, the army stubbornly supported its poorly performing intelligence analysis system, called DCGS-A, for more than a decade, despite overwhelming evidence that commercially available software from Palantir would work better and save the lives of more soldiers.

Introduction: Why Military Adaptation?

The US military plans and thinks incessantly about wars and conflict—yet, like many organizations, it inevitably fails to foresee what comes next. That means that it must be able to successfully adapt to unforeseen circumstances in order to prevail on the battlefield. This introduction identifies the central question of this book: Is the US military adaptable enough to prevail in the wars of the 21st century? In order to answer that question, Part I of the book defines the term adaptation, identifies the three critical components of wartime adaptability, and illustrates those components through historical examples. Part II assesses US military adaptability in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, including some key failures that have not yet been widely addressed. Part III argues that the US military is not sufficiently adaptable for the future conflicts it may face, and offers many recommendations for improvement.

Doctrinal Adaptation in Iraq and Afghanistan

This chapter explores the role of doctrinal adaptability during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The US Army’s conventional doctrine of AirLand Battle developed after the Vietnam War rejected counterinsurgency as a mission, which made the army poorly prepared for the recent wars. In Afghanistan, the army rapidly adapted its civil affairs doctrine to address the challenges of security and reconstruction, and ultimately established new provincial reconstruction teams. But the broader processes of adapting army doctrine for counterinsurgency took more than four years and a remarkable confluence of events and determined individuals—including General David Petraeus—in order to circumvent the army’s normal processes for developing doctrine and produce an entirely new manual in the midst of a failing war.

The Role of Technology

This chapter explores the role of technology in military adaptation, and the markedly different challenges of technological adaptability at the tactical and institutional levels. At the tactical level, technological adaptability requires leaders and soldiers to approach problems with creativity, manufacture solutions on the battlefield, and disseminate solutions rapidly across the force. At the institutional level, technological adaptability requires effective communication with soldiers on the battlefield, and overcoming bureaucratic hurdles within established acquisition processes. The chapter includes case studies of French tank development during World War I and US Army tank development and battlefield modifications during World War II in Europe.

US Military Adaptability Today

This chapter argues that the US military is not adaptable enough for the challenges of future warfare discussed in Chapter 9. In the area of doctrine, excessive amounts hinder creativity and flexibility, revision processes are too slow, and flawed training provides too little opportunity to practice adaptability. In the area of technology, few of the problems identified in Chapter 6 have been addressed, because of the structural tension between the services and the combatant commanders, and the broken acquisition system. In the area of leadership, adaptability is hindered by the generational legacy of the recent wars, problems with the system of professional military education, and a growing tendency toward risk aversion that threatens the principle of mission command.

Improving Adaptability in the US Military

In this final chapter, the authors recommend ways to improve the adaptability of the US military so it is prepared to prevail in the wars of the 21st century. To improve adaptability in doctrine, the recommendations include adopting adaptation as a principle of war, integrating free play in training exercises, and training under sustained analog conditions. To improve adaptability in technology, the recommendations include strengthening rapid-adaptation organizations, chartering a rapid-adaptation skunkworks, and sponsoring an annual rapid-adaptation competition. To improve adaptability in leadership, the recommendations include evaluating adaptability in annual fitness reports, strengthening mission command, reforming professional military education, and sending more officers to advanced civil schooling. The authors also recommend that the Department of Defense expand its focus on talent management, getting younger voices in front of senior leaders, increasing the role of combatant commanders in ensuring adaptability, and chartering a Defense Adaptation Board.