Introduction

This chapter serves as an introduction for the reader. It will familiarise them with the topic of the Minimum Livelihood Guarantee (dibao) in China, the existing academic literature on the topic, the overall argument of the book, and a rundown of the structure of the book. It will set out the case that fragmented authoritarianism explains the development of dibao. Each of the three aspects of fragmented authoritarianism will be discussed, related to dibao, and linked to the relevant chapter.

Rural Dibao: The Countryside and Fragmentation

In 2007 the Chinese government nationally implemented the rural dibao programme. The chapter argues that while the circumstances of rural dibao’s implementation were different from its urban predecessor there are three striking similarities. First, in terms of values, it is argued that the rural dibao programme did fit comfortably with the agenda under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao to address China’s unequal development and in particular the san nong wenti of the countryside. However, the process surrounding implementation of the rural programme also carried appeals to social stability. Second, the political structure had a significant impact on the implementation of the rural MLG. As with the urban programme implementation faced local intransigence. This was overcome by not only using similar means as with the urban programme; but also through explicitly dealing with one common source of problems, funding. Finally, there is the problem of administrative capacity in running the rural MLG programme. This appears as a classic outcome of the fragmented political and decision making structure in China where local government, often struggling to meet mandates passed down from above, prioritises the resources it has. What this all shows is that the challenges facing social assistance in China are not specific to the urban or the rural programme; but are a consequence of the structure of the state.

Historical Background to Dibao and the Question of Poverty in China

This chapter will provide readers with the historical background to developments in Chinese social assistance. The chapter starts by providing some context for the changes which occurred after 1992 by discussing provision of social assistance in China from the dynastic period through to the reforms of the 1980s. It is then followed by sections which discuss in detail developments which occurred throughout the emergence, development and implementation of the minimum livelihood guarantee programme. These sections are broken down into the following periods: 1992-93, 1994-97, 1997-99, 2000-02, 2003-07, 2007-08, and 2009-14. The chapter will provide readers with the background context for the discussions of particular developments in the chapters which follow.

Urban Dibao: The Resolution of Unwanted and Unintended Outcomes, 1999–2003

This chapter first highlights the problems faced by both central and local government in shaping dibao into the programme it was intended to be after the initial national roll out in 1997. The discussion focuses on three unintended outcomes which attracted the most from policy actors: exclusion; resource dependencies; and variation. This is then followed by two discussions related to how the features of fragmented authoritarianism contributed to the outcomes discussed. The first discussion argues that fragmented authoritarianism, especially the structure of the state and decision making, contributed to the emergence of what I identify as unintended consequences. I will argue that the MCA struck a compromise with local government in the 1990s achieving implementation of dibao systems by allowing local variation. The second discussion argues that the MCA played a game where policy goals sought by Premier Zhu Rongji, primarily the moving of xiagang workers to dibao, were used to also resolve some of the unintended consequences which had emerged post-1999. This shows that while the assumptions of fragmented authoritarianism hold, especially the importance of resource allocation and hierarchical authority, policy actors lower down the hierarchy cannot use these circumstances to achieve their own goals.

Conclusion

In the final chapter of the book I bring the different aspects of diabo’s development, implementation and consolidation explored in the preceding chapters together. First, I provide an explanation for the development of dibao which draws both on the arguments presented in the book and engages with the literature published on the programme. Following this, I offer some concluding thoughts regarding the future direction of the dibao programme, arguing that the programme’s policy journey is not quite complete. To broaden the discussion I also offer some policy suggestions for ensuring the programme’s long-term viability if that is what is deemed desirable. To finish the chapter I discuss how the book contributes to wider discussions on China and policy studies, some thoughts regarding further research in this area (both dibao, social policy and policy making in China), and final thoughts regarding the programme and the research which has been presented.

Urban Dibao: Emergence and Transition to National Policy, 1992–1999

The chapter covers two analytical discussions. The first discusses the emergence and spread of the MLG from the early 1990s. Through analysis of the relationship between the Ministry of Civil Affairs, in particular Minister Duoji Cairang, and local government it will show how two aspects of fragmented authoritarianism in particular, values and political structure, shaped the spread of the policy. This is followed by an analysis of the campaign to achieve national implementation in 1999. This shows how a ministry lacking in resources achieved implementation, addressing one of the criticisms of the fragmented authoritarianism model raised by Michel Oksenberg. It will argue that while the MCA made extensive efforts to achieve implementation without expending resources these appear to have had little impact. Rather successful implementation was achieved through the intervention of the highest tiers of the state and subsidies. This shows that appealing to shared values under fragmented authoritarianism has limitations and these can be overcome, eventually, through use of political structure, decision making authority, and the allocation of resources.

Institutionalisation? Achieving Policy in a Fragmented State

The penultimate chapter argues that dibao is afflicted by institutionalisation issues common to other policies during the reform era. I use two cases from dibao to examine this lack of institutionalisation and discuss the implications. The first case discusses the progress of the social assistance law. The second case addresses the responsiveness of social assistance to changes in prices. Both cases highlight the problems of and opportunities a lack of institutionalisation creates. The chapter seeks to discuss both the positive and negative cases for the lack of institutionalisation in China’s social assistance system. Using recent legislative development and recent announcements on the running of dibao to frame the discussion the chapter argues that while the lack of institutionalisation both causes problems and creates opportunities. The fragmented nature of the Chinese state is the reason for both a lack of institutionalisation and its responsive and adaptive nature. To resolve the challenges facing the programme a compromise incorporating some institutionalised elements would work best. Finally, the chapter looks beyond China at how social assistance has been implemented and automatic government introduced for examples relevant to dibao and situates the current challenges within a comparative context.