Conclusion

This chapter is a recapitulation of the main claims and the notion that liberal democracy of the kind found in the U.S. and U.K. has the intellectual and moral resources for the most important reforms needed in criminal justice. We do not need to remake the political order but we do need to reform policies, attitudes, and norms.

The Liberal Political Order

The key features of a liberal political order, and the way the liberal rule of law makes possible a dynamic, pluralistic civil society are explicated. In addition, the ways that civil society can be an important locus of moral education is explained. This is the basis for arguing that forms of punishment that diminish persons as agents are especially objectionable, and at odds with liberal principles.

Introduction

The main elements of the book are described in this chapter. They are first, some of the basic respects in which the U.S. and U.K. are liberal democracies and what that implies regarding important aspects of criminal justice. Second, serious moral defects of current carceral practice are highlighted but it is argued that those are not attributable to integral features of a liberal state. In fact, conceptual and normative resources for addressing those defects can be found among the principles and values of a liberal political order.

Deficits of Justice and Civility

This chapter explains the types of harm often caused by long stays in prison in the current conditions. It focuses on how prisoners’ capacities as agents are diminished and the ways that demoralization of that kind renders prisoners ill-equipped to re-enter civil society upon release. It also discusses conviction based impediments to participation in civil society. These might include disenfranchisement and difficulties finding employment, and obtaining public benefits despite prisoners having completed their sentences.

Retributive Sanction in the Liberal State

The chapter discusses several versions of retributivist conceptions of punishment and distinguishes the version defended from them. The view, as is the case with some other retributivist views, includes a morally proper role for resentment. It also responds to many of the objections to retributivism, showing that in several cases, they are based on misconceptions or misrepresentations. The chapter also explains how and why retributivism communicates the values and principles of liberal democracy and why consequentialist conceptions of punishment are seriously flawed.

Resentment and Retributivism

While there are ways that resentment can be morally problematic there is a morally proper form of resentment, and it has to do with the concern to see that justice is served. The chapter defends this form of resentment, showing that it can actually help encourage civility and moral respect for victims and offenders. The chapter explains some of the most common mistakes made regarding the moral psychology of retributivism, and it defends a non-consequentialist retributive basis for sanction.

Criminal Justice and Justice Overall, Part I

The chapter highlights the distinctive elements of criminal justice, and I argue that it is a mistake to shape criminal justice around principles of distributive justice, even though there are important economic and social aspects to criminal justice. The equality of persons in a liberal state does not require egalitarian distributive shares. Criminal justice is indeed related to distributive and political justice but is not to be assimilated by either of them.

Criminal Justice and Justice Overall, Part II

This is further exploration of the themes of Chapter 2, arguing that judges should not appeal to their own moral commitments in arriving at judicial decisions. There are respects in which the law needs to be morally intelligible but it needs to apply with generality that is not customized by the moral commitments of individuals. The pluralism of values in civil society should not translate into pluralism of criteria for criminal justice decisions. Desert has a key role that should not be highly vulnerable to different judges’ interpretations.