Doktryna cartel facilitator – początek oraz rozwój w praktyce decyzyjnej zagranicznych organów ochrony konkurencji oraz orzecznictwie sądów unijnych

The purpose of the article is to present the issue of the ‘cartel facilitator’ doctrine based on the decision-making practice of the European competition authorities and the case-law of EU courts. The article is an attempt to approximate the behaviour of third parties, which have so far been assessed in terms of their compliance with competition law, as well as the criteria developed in EU judicial decisions, which must be met in order to be able to hold such entities liable for violations of competition law.

Odpowiedzialność deliktowa uczestników kartelu – aspekty podmiotowe w świetle wybranego orzecznictwa

The article concentrates on the problem of the liability of cartel participants towards third parties for infringements of competition law. First of all, the legal basis for the redress and the resulting rights for third parties were analysed. This was followed by judgments of the CJEU and national courts, in which victims – not bound by a contract with the cartel participants – claimed damages from them. The analysis of the case-law shows how far the liability of the cartel participants reaches and what are the limitations of this liability.

Odpowiedzialność przebijająca w ramach private enforcement

In the context of private enforcement of competition law, the issue of piercing the corporate veil, that is, the possibility of holding a non-direct infringer liable becomes particularly important. Pursuant to the thesis of the CJEU ‘Skanska’ judgment, civil courts adjudicating in cases of damages for infringements of competition law should understand the concept of ‘undertaking’ in accordance with Article 101 TFEU and its established interpretation by the Court, which may mean also adopting, under private law, the doctrine of economic succession (economic continuity) and the concept of a single economic unit. Individual member states, such as Spain and Portugal, have already adopted relevant legal regulations regarding the issue in question. In other countries, this matter has become the subject of judicial considerations. In Poland, neither of these two situations occurs. One should opt for the broad adoption of the concept of piercing the corporate veil in the context of liability for damages arising from an infringement of competition law – with both EU and national dimension.

Odpowiedzialność a swoboda przepływu osób, towarów i usług w ramach UE – próby unifi kacji odpowiedzialności na przykładzie ubezpieczeń.Zarys problemu

The article is an attempt to present the problem of the impact of building the Security, Freedom and Justice Space on the institution of responsibility. Works on the codifi cation of private law within groups and teams have been analyzed. A special place in these works was occupied by works on codifying tort liability. The European Union is also trying to sort out liability issues in the form of legal acts resolutions. The Court of Justice of the European Union also plays an important role in interpreting the application of law.

Odpowiedzialność przedsiębiorcy za niedostarczanie informacji i dokumentów na żądanie Prezesa UOKiK – kilka refl eksji po decyzji w sprawie Engie

The article contains an analysis of the solutions adopted in the Polish legal system governing the procedure for requesting information and documents by the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (President of UOKiK). In the first part of the article, the author discusses the basic standards that should be met by a request of the UOKiK, with regard to the scope of the request and its purpose, taking into account, in particular, the guidelines which follow from EU case-law. The author considers the scope of the obligation under Article 50 Section 1 of the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection (the Act), criticizing the solution that makes it impossible in practice to challenge the demands of the President of UOKiK without a risk of exposure to severe financial sanctions. The proposals for amendments of applicable regulations are also discussed, the aim of which would be to provide business undertakings with an adequate standard of protection of their fundamental rights in connect in with the procedure for submitting information and documents requested by the President of UOKiK. The second part of the article is devoted to issues concerning financial penalties for a breach of the obligation referred to in Article 50 Section 1 of the Act. The author discusses the current legal framework and indicates the need to introduce certain legislative changes in the future. The analysis also covers the practice of the Polish competition authority to impose penalties for a breach of the obligation under Article 50 Section 1 of the Act

Ustalone w Niemczech jednolite ceny dla wydawanych na receptę produktów leczniczych są sprzeczne z prawem Unii.Glosa do wyroku Trybunału Sprawiedliwości z dnia 19 października 2016 r. w sprawie C-148/15: Deutsche Parkinson Vereinigung eVprzeciwko Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs eV

System of fi xed prices for the sale of prescription-only medicinal products for human use by pharmacies as a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on imports. Case comment to the Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 19 October 2016 in case C-148/15: Deutsche Parkinson Vereinigung eV v. Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs eV

Spór o homeopatię (czyli o władzę nad rynkiem)

The article discusses the effects of rulings issued by the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection (SOKiK) and the Court of Appeal concerning homeopathy upon the scope of the powers of medical self-government to regulate markets. The author provides an analysis of these powers on the basis of competition law, since the latter intersects with pharmaceutical law and laws regulating the professional activities of doctors. The author draws attention to the fact that depriving the competition authority – the UOKiK President – of the power to scrutinize the activities of professional self-government bodies may lead to adverse effects for competition and consumers protection. These would consist of the limitation of the freedom of market access of undertakings as well as limit consumers’ free choice to access legally sold products and services.

Porozumienia pay-for-delay jako ograniczenie konkurencji ze względu na cel.Glosa do wyroku Sądu Unii Europejskiej z dnia 8 września 2016 r. w sprawie T-472/13 H. Lundbeck A/S i Lundbeck Ltd. przeciwko Komisji Europejskiej

Pay-for-delay agreements as “by object” violations of competition law. Case comment to the Judgment of the General Court of 8 September 2016 in case T-472/13 H. Lundbeck A/S and Lundbeck Ltd v. European Commission