Defense and Security

This chapter documents how Qatari policymakers strengthened existing defense and security relationships with key Western partners, notably the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and other European states, as well as how ties with ‘newer’ partners, notably Turkey, China, and Russia diversified and expanded the Qatari defense and security portfolio. The chapter also examines how an indigenous strategic industrial capability emerged with the formation of Barzan Holdings, the strategic investment arm of the Qatari Ministry of Defense, and assesses what the fracturing of the GCC – and especially of the common threat perception among the six Gulf States – means for the regional security architecture more broadly.

Economy and Trade

This chapter analyses the impact of the sudden closure of Qatar’s only land boundary and most of the surrounding sea- and airspace on 5 June 2017 on a Qatari economy that was heavily reliant upon international supply chains for most necessary items in daily and commercial life. It examines the range of remedial measures taken to reduce economic risk and financial volatility, as well as the longer-term policies that were implemented as the blockade stretched into months and then years, and which created new economic and trading realities. These include the economic and financial responses that aimed to reassure foreign investors, the restructuring of trade routes, and the expansion of domestic food and manufacturing sectors.

Background and Context

This chapter provides historical context to the tensions between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Abu Dhabi from the mid-nineteenth century up until 2011. The chapter covers the emergence of Qatar and the disruptive impact on all the smaller Gulf States, including the UAE, of Saudi expansionary designs on the Arabian Peninsula. Beginning in the 1990s, a new generation of Qatari leaders began to develop political and economic policies that carved a more autonomous role for Qatar in regional affairs. In February 1996, the same four states that would blockade Qatar in 2017 were linked to an abortive coup attempt against the Emir of Qatar, and the chapter ends by examining the aftermath of the coup attempt and the trajectory of Saudi pressure on Qatar in the 2000s.

The Blockade

This chapter examines in detail the events surrounding the blockade of Qatar from the Riyadh Summit in May 2017 to the visit by Kuwait’s Emir to the White House in September. It begins with the hacking of the Qatar News Agency that formed the trigger for the events that followed, and reviews the campaign of outreach and influence-building in Washington, D.C. that led Saudi and Emirati officials to believe that their move against Qatar, an integral U.S. partner, would receive White House support. This, notably, did not happen, and the chapter focuses on how the blockade unfolded to the surprise and consternation of (most) observers in the United States and other world capitals. The remainder of the chapter explores how and why the blockading states’ ‘gamble’ on the Trump White House backfired over the course of the summer of 2017, as by September, the Trump administration had committed itself to a diplomatic resolution of the blockade.

Energy and Infrastructure

This chapter examines the changes in Qatar’s energy sector that began prior to the blockade, when the key decision to lift a moratorium on new gas exploration in the North Field was taken, and accelerated in December 2018 with the Qatari withdrawal from OPEC and its decision to prioritize the further expansion of its natural gas reserves. The chapter places energy within the context of the blockade, and analyzes why Qatari policymakers ringfenced the Dolphin pipeline to the UAE and Oman from the rupture in political and economic relations, a move that reinforced the post-blockade effort to portray Qatar as a reliable, rule-of-law partner and responsible member of the international community. The chapter ends with a section that explores how Qatari ‘energy diplomacy’ has evolved since 2017 as Qatar Petroleum entered into a plethora of joint ventures with international partners in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Looking Ahead to 2022

This concluding chapter to Qatar and the Gulf Crisis examines how the 2022 FIFA World Cup became embroiled in the war of ‘fake’ narratives that characterized the opening weeks and months of the blockade. This occurred as individuals and entities with links to blockading states sought to foment an impression of political risk and instability that would require FIFA to strip the tournament from Qatar or share it among other regional hosts. A related aspect of the impact of the blockade was the widespread pirating of broadcasting rights held by Qatar’s beIN Sports by a Saudi-based entity demonstratively labeling itself BeoutQ. The chapter also explores how Qatari officials pushed back against the criticism and sought to use the World Cup as a catalyst for more systemic changes that have drawn cautious approval from international labor bodies.

Regional and Foreign Affairs

This chapter examines how policymakers in Doha utilized the networks and relationships they had built up with regional and global partners since the 1990s to ensure that the blockading states’ attempt to isolate Qatar failed to gain anything other than minimal international support. Qatari officials adapted pragmatically to the changed regional environment after 2014 and cooperated closely with other stakeholders in more of a multilateral process than before. The contours of Qatar’s collaborative approach became evident in the hosting of a Taliban delegation in Doha and the provision of aid and assistance to Gaza, and these are examined in case studies within the chapter, as is the effective use of public diplomacy. The chapter also assesses the implications of the blockade for small states elsewhere, using Singapore and Dubai as case-studies.

Politics and Society

This chapter analyzes the political and social response in Qatar to the blockade in June 2017, beginning with the immediate decision to call for dialogue and mediation rather than attempt to respond in kind. The chapter explores the range of political and policy responses as Qatari officials enacted measures to offset the disruptive short-term impact of the blockade, building upon contingency plans and infrastructure development that occurred since 2014. In addition, the chapter examines the ways in which the blockade created new social realities on the ground, as feelings of national identity and belonging surged, and eroded some of the hitherto-dominant boundaries between Qatari nationals and expatriate residents.

Introduction

The Introduction to Qatar and the Gulf Crisis introduces the chronology and basic facts of the blockade of Qatar as well as the key themes that are addressed in the book. These include the ways in which the Gulf crisis since 2017 has differed from previous episodes of tension between Gulf Cooperation Council states and a summary of the reasons why the blockade failed to achieve its objectives. The Introduction provides an overview of Qatar’s policy responses to the blockade and the successful attempts to strengthen the bilateral relationship with the United States in the aftermath of President Trump’s controversial initial reaction to the blockade.

The 2014 Rift

This chapter examines the period between the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 and the first iteration of the rift between Qatar and its three Gulf neighbors in 2014, when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain withdrew their Ambassadors from Doha for eight months. The chapter analyzes why and where policy responses to the Arab Spring differed and explores how they generated new tensions between Qatar and its neighbors, especially after the election of a Muslim Brotherhood-led government in Egypt in 2012 and its toppling a year later. By the time Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani became Emir of Qatar in June 2013, Saudi Arabia and the UAE had emerged at the head of a counter-revolutionary coalition determined to roll back the gains of the Arab Spring, and the chapter examines the immediate buildup of pressure on Qatar in late-2013, the contours of the 2014 rift, and the aftermath through 2016.