Why Candidates Win: Assessing Latino Voter Response to Anglo Candidate Characteristics

Chapter 5 investigates Anglo/white candidate attributes that might prove beneficial to their Latino-targeted cross-racial mobilization. Building upon Beto O’Rourke’s recent success this chapter theorizes and empirically verifies a cross-racial mobilization success model composed of the following characteristics: (1) Partisan predisposition: Candidates will perform better when their party identification matches the party identification of the vast majority of cross-ethnic voters they seek to mobilize; (2) Issue convergence: Candidates who have or adopt policy views similar to the majority of cross-racial/ethnic voters are expected to outperform their candidates; (3) Cultural competence: Candidates that better understand the cultural norms and mores of other groups will feel more comfortable being around members of that group and so will ultimately outperform other candidates. (4) Candidates who conduct extensive amounts of cross-racial mobilization are expected to outperform candidates who conduct little cross-racial mobilization. Finally, the chapter develops a framework to understand why Latino voters respond the way that they do.

Contemporary Cross-Racial Mobilization: CRM in the 2010–2012 U.S. SenateElections

Chapter 4 examines cross-racial mobilization in contemporary U.S. politics. Employing a similar design as that employed in chapter 3, chapter 4 presents data gathered from all 2010–2012 general election U.S. Senate candidate websites. By focusing on both policy and valence cross-racial mobilization, the chapter then analyzes why some candidates conduct more (or less) cross-racial mobilization. The chapter finds strong support for the cross-racial mobilization framework, particularly among Democratic candidates: (1) Democratic candidates who had previously engaged in cross-racial mobilization (incumbents) are more likely to conduct cross-ethnic appeals; (2) when the Latino population is larger Anglo Democratic candidates are more likely to conduct cross-racial mobilization; (3) more cross-racial mobilization is observed when the election is considered competitive; and (4) Democratic candidates are less likely to make cross-racial appeals in states where whites are most hostile. Finally, Democratic candidates perform better when they conduct extensive cross-racial mobilization, whereas the converse is the case for GOP candidates.

Introducing and Theorizing Cross-Racial Mobilization

Chapter 1 introduces and theorizes the concept of cross-racial mobilization: (1) What are the conditions (beyond well-established demographic indicators) under which white/Anglo candidates for public office are likely to use cross-racial mobilization to appeal to Latino voters? (2) When are white candidates’ cross-racial mobilization appeals to Latino voters successful? The chapter argues that cross-racial mobilization is most likely to occur when elections are competitive, institutional barriers to the vote are low, candidates have previously developed a welcoming racial reputation with target voters, whites’ attitudes are racially liberal, and the Latino electorate is large and growing. To maximize the vote across the racial aisle, white/Anglo candidates must develop minority-group cultural competence and group-specific policy expertise, share party identification, and conduct extensive cross-racial mobilization. With these qualities, and maximum efforts at cross-racial mobilization, non-co-ethnic candidates can begin to approach the electoral benefits previously thought only accrued to co-ethnic candidates.

Cross-Racial Mobilization in Perspective

The final chapter summarizes the research developed and presented in chapters 1 through 5. The chapter discusses the rise of Donald Trump, his takeover of the Republican Party, and what this means for continued political polarization along racial lines. Despite the immigration policies of the Reagan and Bush Administrations, and general warmth to Latinos under Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush, the contemporary GOP seems set to generate policies that disproportionately target and lock up immigrants. The pull to the right on immigration policy is likely generating major long-term political and coalitional consequences. While this policy may be smart for the GOP in the short term (i.e., Trump won the 2016 election by employing hard-right anti-Mexican racial appeals), in the long term, as the U.S. rapidly diversifies, this approach will lead to an extremely untenable for the GOP and Democrats work to strengthen their position with minority voters in general and Latinos in particular.

The Origins of Latino-Targeted Cross-Racial Mobilization: TheCaseofTexas

Chapter 3 examines the origins of cross-racial mobilization in Texas between white/Anglo candidates and Latino voters. The chapter employs extensive archival evidence and quantitative data to provide the first rigorous statistical and empirical test of the book’s overall cross-racial mobilization model. First, the chapter lays out a detailed classification methodology that sorts candidates into different levels of cross-racial mobilization based on data located in archives, newspapers, books, and the public record. Second, the chapter shows that cross-racial mobilization disproportionately occurs after the passage of key civil rights reforms, as the Latino population grows, and as white hostility drops. The chapter also reveals how cross-racial mobilization—measured via Spanish-language ad-buys—increased Dwight Eisenhower’s vote share in high-density Hispanic counties in the 1956 presidential campaign. Finally, the chapter includes several short case studies of Lyndon Johnson’s, John Tower’s, and Bill Clements’ cross-racial mobilization.

Early Evidence of Cross-Racial Mobilization: White Candidates and Black Voters in the U.S. South 1940–1970

Chapter 2 examines the origins of cross-racial mobilization in the U.S. South between white/Anglo candidates and black voters. The author examines the 1950 U.S. Senate election in Florida between Claude Pepper and George Smathers, identifying the Smith v. Allwright Supreme Court ruling as a critical juncture leading to rapid deployment of cross-racial mobilization across the South. In particular, Claude Pepper covertly mobilized black Floridians by funding a black-run get-out-the-vote operation. The chapter argues that Pepper’s efforts dramatically increased black political participation. Relying on a candidate-level dataset across the U.S. South from the 1940s to the 1970s, the chapter then shows how cross-racial appeals also increased after the Civil Rights reforms of the mid-1960s, that white candidates from the Black Belt were much slower to adopt cross-racial mobilization tactics, and that white candidates mobilized blacks significantly more in the Peripheral South than in the Deep South. Finally, the chapter shows that increasing black registration likely leads to increased cross-racial mobilization.