Conclusion

The conclusion summarizes the arguments made in the previous chapters and returns to the key questions raised in the introduction. It concludes that the available evidence suggest that the Islamic Republic was not bent on the development of nuclear weapons and that key political factions within Iran were happy to forego them in return for reciprocal concessions from the USA. It further follows from that conclusion that claims that the JCPOA represented a successful coercion of Iran through sanctions are wide of the mark. Iranian leaders had been prepared to offer a compromise before effective sanctions were imposed and a deal was only reached when Obama conceded Iran the right to continue enriching uranium. Finally, the chapter argues, based on these conclusions, that Donald Trump's decision to abandon the agreement and re-impose sanctions is unlikely to produce the concessions from Iran that he desires

Introduction

This chapter outlines the main questions the book seeks to address and the explanatory framework adopted. The key questions it sets out to answer are: What was Iran's nuclear ambition? Why did the USA for so long fail to deal effectively with that ambition? And how was a negotiated solution to the conflict over Iran's nuclear programme eventually reached? The chapter goes on to outline the fundamental dilemma posed by the nature of nuclear energy and summarizes the attempt to resolve it through the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Finally, the chapter summarizes the explanatory framework employed by the book, which emphasizes the impact of domestic political considerations on the diplomacy of both sides and the obstacle this created to effective resolution of the conflict over Iran's nuclear programme

2001–8: George W. Bush and the Failure of Confrontation

Chapter Four looks at US policy during the administration of George W. Bush. The revelations that focused international attention on the Iranian nuclear programme in 2002 exposed divisions within the Iranian elite over the nuclear programme, with the pragmatists and reformists who controlled policy-making until 2005 making repeated efforts to pursue a negotiated solution. Hard line conservatives in the Bush administration, however, had no interest in compromise with Iran. They were committed to regime change (at best) or compelling Tehran to abandon its pursuit of the fuel cycle (at worst). Once again, however, the policy was incoherent and ineffective. It contained no meaningful incentives for Tehran while the coercive measures employed were ineffectual, with Washington's continued unilateralism undermining its efforts to bring effective pressure to bear. Bush's rejection of the outreach of the Khatami government, moreover, contributed to the discrediting of the latter and to the reassertion of Iranian hard liners. The subsequent election of Ahmadinejad to the Iranian presidency in 2005 guaranteed continued stalemate.

2009–15: Obama and the Road to the JCPOA

Obama introduced significant changes to US policy that brought ambitions more effectively into line with the means available to achieve them. He secured more effective multilateral cooperation from key states, which in turn enabled him to impose more effective coercion. Of equal importance, however, was his abandonment of the demand that Iran give up the fuel cycle. That decision was driven by his recognition that continued enrichment was non-negotiable as far as Tehran was concerned and his fear that the alternative to acknowledging that would be military conflict. There would have been no JCPOA, however, without parallel changes inside Iran. After eight years of dominance by Iranian hard liners, the 2013 election saw Hassan Rouhani returned to office. Obama's concession on enrichment created the political space for him to pursue a negotiated solution while Iran's economic problems and growing legitimacy crisis persuaded the Supreme Leader to support him in doing so. A nuclear agreement was finally reached as a result of smarter diplomacy on the part of the USA, the exhaustion of coercive options short of war, and domestic political changes on both sides, but especially in Iran.

The 1980s: Developing Hostility and the Origins of the Islamic Republic’s Nuclear Programme

Chronologically, Chapter Two focuses on the 1980s, but the main theme of the chapter is the development of mutual antipathy between Iran and the United States. This development is traced through an examination of their interactions from the 1953 coup to the Iran-Iraq War. The chapter emphasizes how the experiences of the 1953 coup in Iran, the Iranian Revolution and subsequent hostage crisis and the Iran-Iraq War contributed to the development of a profound and widespread mutual hostility between the two countries that would subsequently come to act as a major constraint on policy-makers on both sides. The chapter also examines the origins of the IRI's nuclear programme and its connection to the emerging conflict with the USA.

The 1990s: Clinton and the Failure of Containment and Engagement

Chapter three explores developments under Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. It examines the continued development of the Iranian nuclear programme, US efforts to curtail it, and the broader course of US-Iranian relations. The chapter demonstrates how domestic politics on both sides continued to prevent coherent policy-making and resolution of the conflict. Leaders with an interest in dialogue found their efforts to engage the other government undercut by the actions and opposition of hard liners in both countries. The need to pander to domestic (and Israeli) pressures also undermined the efficacy of US efforts to curtail the Iranian nuclear programme by driving them down a path of unilateral coercion that was completely ineffective. Consequently, the Iranian nuclear programme continued to develop largely unhindered by the United States.

The 1970s: The Nuclear Relationship under the Shah

The main focus of the chapter is on the period between 1974 and 1978, when the Shah sought to accelerate Iran's nuclear programme, creating tensions with the USA. This short period witnessed the emergence of a number of key features of the US-Iranian nuclear relationship: The divergence of perspectives on proliferation and the fuel cycle quickly became clear. Even in a context in which the two were Cold War allies, Iranian nationalism and ambition and American fear of proliferation produced deadlock in their nuclear negotiations. The American refusal to provide Iran with fuel cycle technology was, moreover, strongly influenced by pressure from Congress, which was able to exploit the need for its ratification of any nuclear agreement to great effect. Finally, the chapter reveals a tension between unilateralism and multilateralism that would recur in US policy, as it tried to persuade the other nuclear powers to join it in not transferring sensitive nuclear technology whilst also pursuing its own national interests and accommodating domestic pressures.