China’s Contemporary Roles in Southeast Asia

This chapter assesses China’s “contemporary” roles in Southeast Asia. China’s relations with Southeast Asian countries and ASEAN have grown dramatically since the turn of the twenty-first century and have now achieved a high degree of interactions on the eve of 2020. China’s contemporary approach toward Southeast Asia is shaped by multiple factors. Among them, geography is perhaps the most important. China’s geographical proximity facilitates easy access and regular presence. This has led to growing economic interconnectedness, buttressed by transportation links, and this relative proximity also facilitates tourism, academic exchanges, and a regular presence of Chinese officials visiting the region. Through the four dimensions of China’s “toolbox” in Southeast Asia—diplomacy, people-to-people exchanges, commerce, and security—the PRC has established a broad and increasingly deep footprint across all of Southeast Asia.

America’s Legacies in Southeast Asia

This chapter traces the history of American presence in Southeast Asia. The American legacy in the region began with traders and missionaries during the first half of the nineteenth century, then progressed to diplomats and official relations during the second half, and then to the arrival of American armed forces at the turn of the twentieth century. Meanwhile, America’s commercial interests and footprint continually broadened and deepened; educational and religious ties also blossomed. Except in the Philippines, America was largely seen as a benevolent partner—but not yet a power. That would change in the wake of World War II and the Cold War. With the advent of communist regimes in China, North Vietnam, and North Korea, and the ensuing Korean War, Southeast Asia took on a completely different cast in Washington. It became one of two major global theaters of conflict against communism. Thus began America’s long and draining involvement in Vietnam and Indochina (1958–1975). But with the end of the long and exhausting Indochina conflict, which tore the United States itself apart, American attention naturally began to wane and dissipate. Yet, the United States continued to engage and build its relations with the region from the Carter through the Bush 43 administrations.

Navigating between the Giants

This chapter explores how the ten Southeast Asian countries each try their best to navigate between the two big powers of China and the United States. Not a single country in the region is entirely under either Chinese or American influence. Most Southeast Asian states “hedge” between the two big powers; they seek to maintain their independence and freedom of choices and action; most seek benefits from each while avoiding dependency; and all have to simultaneously navigate bilaterally with each power, trilaterally with both powers, and multilaterally with other significant regional powers and within the framework of “ASEAN centrality.” Among the ten states, the chapter reveals one notable overarching characteristic: pervasive ambivalence. That is, all ten countries exhibit ambivalence about both powers—not fully trusting either.

China’s Legacies in Southeast Asia

This chapter traces the history of China’s legacies in Southeast Asia. Historically, China has loomed large—geographically, culturally, militarily, and economically—over Southeast Asia. This was particularly the case before the sixteenth-century arrival of European colonial powers, which encroached upon not only Southeast Asia but China itself, and began to limit earlier Sino-Southeast Asian interactions. Prior to that time, they were a mixture of cross-border migration and economic exchanges; a flourishing maritime trade; outright occupation and subjugation in one case (Vietnam); and ritualistic expressions of the “tribute system” for many others. These four legacies are all extraordinarily complex, for which there are not particularly good historical records. Thus, how one interprets these pre-modern interactions between China and Southeast Asia really does have to do with the available sources, and it seems that the lack of preserved Southeast Asian sources has had the impact of tilting interpretations in favor of the Chinese tributary paradigm. The chapter then describes this long sweep of Sino-Southeast Asian pre-modern and modern interactions in a relatively condensed fashion before turning to the post-1949 period.

Sino-American Competition in Southeast Asia

This chapter explains that the global competition between the United States and China is increasingly centered in Southeast Asia, and the region will be considerably impacted by the US-China rivalry—much more than most ASEAN states recognize or care to admit. The Sino-American rivalry in Southeast Asia is thus going to be an epic challenge for regional governments (and ASEAN itself) to maneuver effectively between the two major powers, maintain their independence of action, and protect their national sovereignty. The chapter then looks at the spectrum of ASEAN states’ relations with the United States and China. It also studies how both major powers bring certain comparative advantages and disadvantages to their interactions with different Southeast Asian countries. While the Sino-American competition in Southeast Asia is increasingly and comprehensively competitive, it remains fluid and can develop differently in the future. The chapter concludes by assessing the future of the region’s ties with the major powers, considering four distinct possibilities.

America’s Contemporary Roles in Southeast Asia

This chapter discusses America’s “contemporary” roles in Southeast Asia. It examines the Obama and Trump administrations’ policies and actions in the region, and considers three categories of the US footprint at present: commerce, security, and soft power/public diplomacy. For Southeast Asia, the United States continues to be an important guarantor of regional security and stability—but its commercial contributions and soft power appeal are also strong attractive features. If America has a pronounced weakness in the region it is in the area of diplomatic engagement. This is not new—as the strategic and economic importance of Northeast Asia and the “tyranny of distance” to Southeast Asia have long conspired to limit Washington’s attention span. The Obama administration was the exception to the rule, as it prioritized ASEAN as never before. The Trump administration does seem to have relatively downgraded the region when compared with the Obama years. Still, this has been a relative downgrading—and, if anything, a return to the more traditional pattern of episodic US (in)attention.

Sino-American Competition in Southeast Asia

This chapter provides an overview of the competition between the United States and People’s Republic of China, particularly in one geo-strategically important part of the world: Southeast Asia. Both scholarly analyses and public opinion polls indicate that the Sino-American competition in the region is intensifying. This book examines the competition broadly, their respective capabilities more narrowly, and assesses the relative balance of power between the two. However, some cautionary caveats are in order at the outset. First, the US-China competition is not merely dyadic, as if no other actors matter. Quite to the contrary, the superpower competition is ameliorated and adjudicated by the ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Indeed, ASEAN states have a long history of protecting their independence and warding off interference and great power competition. The second caveat flows from the first. Thus far, the US-China competition is not (yet) a Cold War–style one. With these two caveats, the chapter presents several principal findings. It also considers the importance of Southeast Asia.