Ebb Tide of the West

This chapter explores the declining efficacy of the Western military model since 2003, canvasses various strategic responses to it—including doubling down on the current approach, embracing decline, and “going Byzantine”—and recommends a strategy of strategic delay. It argues that the high point of Western military dominance in the post–Cold War era—the “high tide of the West”—coincided with the failed decapitation strike against Saddam Hussein in March 2003, and that since then Western powers have acted as if they were still in a Woolseyan security environment (where the principal threats originated from weak states, failing states and nonstate actors) when actually the environment was post-Woolseyan; that is, characterized by a return of state-based threats and great-power military competition. The chapter considers three possible responses to this problem, evaluates their strengths and weaknesses, and concludes that our best bet (though by no means a certain solution) is to play for time, adopt a light footprint offshore balancing strategy, and attempt to create space for a potentially acceptable successor order to emerge.

Woolsey’s Snakes

This chapter applies the evolutionary concepts explained in Chapter 2 to a series of case studies of nonstate adversaries. It explores how specific nonstate adversaries have adapted and evolved since 1993; these include Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and the Lebanese Shi’a group Hezbollah. The chapter shows that each of these irregular armed groups, despite differences of ideology, origin, operating environment and structure, are all responding in their own ways to a fitness landscape created by Western dominance of a particular, narrow, technology-centric form of warfare. Their patterns of adaptation indicate the ways in which evolutionary processes identified in the previous chapter have played out in practice.

Adaptive Enemies

This chapter draws on key concepts from evolutionary theory, anthropology, and social science to explore how adaptive enemies evolve and adapt under conditions of conflict. It identifies four key mechanisms of evolution in irregular warfare—social learning, natural selection, artificial selection (including both unconscious artificial selection and predator effects), and institutional adaptation—and gives examples of each. It also examines forms of conscious military innovation by states, and draws a distinction between peacetime (concept led) and wartime (reactive) modes of innovation. The chapter argues that domination of the operational environment by Western armed forces since the end of the Cold War has created evolutionary pressure to which all adversaries—state and non-state—have responded, and that this response is shaping new approaches to war.

Note on Terminology

Throughout this book, I use the capitalized term “Western” or “the West” to describe a particular military methodology, along with the group of countries whose warfighting style is characterized by that methodology. In essence, it is an approach to war that emphasizes battlefield dominance, achieved through high-tech precision engagement, networked communications, and pervasive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). It is characterized by an obsessive drive to minimize casualties, a reluctance to think about the long-term consequences of war, a narrow focus on combat, and a lack of emphasis on war termination—the set of activities needed in order to translate battlefield success into enduring and favorable political outcomes....

Introduction

The introduction describes the origins of the book and provides an overview of the return of state-on-state conflict in the context of a Western alliance bogged down in the war on terrorism and unable to respond to increasing challenges from Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. It describes the original observation that gave rise to the investigation that led to the book: that both state and nonstate actors, despite very different ideologies and organizations and varying points of origin, all seemed to be converging on certain similar operational approaches. At the same time, there was little evidence of cooperation or cross-pollination among different actors. The hypothesis—that something in the external environment was driving multiple different actors to converge on a small number of approaches, all of which were increasingly hard for Western militaries to counter—led to an exploration of aspects of evolutionary theory, social learning and military innovation.

Liminal Warfare

This chapter discusses Russian evolution and adaptation since the Cold War, surveys the post-Soviet military evolution of Russian forces, offers case studies of the Norwegian-Russian border and the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, introduces and analyzes the concept of liminal warfare as practiced by Russia, and discusses the “Gerasimov doctrine,”, reflexive control, and Russian political warfare methods, including those allegedly used during the 2016 US presidential election. It argues that, in recovering from its post-Cold War eclipse of the 1990s, the Russian Federation engaged in a process of adaptation under pressure, developing significantly more capable conventional and nuclear forces (especially after the Five-Day War of 2008 in Georgia) but also evolving a form of warfare, liminal maneuver, designed to offset US conventional dominance.

Epilogue

The epilogue traces what happened to James Woolsey after 1993, explores issues of resilience and sustainability in the Western approach to war, and emphasizes the need to look beyond military victory to a better peace, which after all is the ultimate object of war. The epilogue looks at the key issues (including climate, energy, vulnerability to cyber and electronic attack, and political stability) that have become Woolsey’s primary focus since leaving government. It examines the issue of societal resilience, including against natural disasters and events beyond human agency, and emphasizes the need for societies—not just military strategists and planners—to adapt and respond to the changing environment.

Conceptual Envelopment

This chapter discusses China’s evolution and adaptation since the Cold War, surveys the evolution of Chinese forces, offers case studies of the Sino-Vietnamese War and the South China Sea, introduces and analyzes the concept of conceptual envelopment as it relates to China, discusses the transformative effect of China’s emergence as a global oceanic and maritime power, and explores the concept of unrestricted warfare and China’s Three Warfares doctrine. It argues that, in the quarter century since 1993, China has learned by watching the West struggle in the post-Cold War era, and has taken advantage of Western preoccupation with terrorism since 2001. The 1991 Gulf War, the 1996 Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, and the 1999 bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade prompted strategists in Beijing to shift from a peacetime, concept-led adaptation process to a wartime, reactive approach that treats the United States as a “pacing threat.”

The Dragon and the Snakes

This chapter lays out the book’s overall thesis: that in the quarter century of western military dominance since the Cold War, adversaries have learned to defeat the west’s military model as pioneered during the 1991 Gulf War. The chapter recounts James Woolsey’s “dragon and snakes” testimony of February 1993, then provides a survey of major developments among nonstate actors such as terrorist groups and state adversaries including Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. The chapter introduces the concept of liminal strategies, where adversaries (recognizing their inability to compete directly with western militaries) ride the edge of detectability, sidestepping our conventional military strength while doing just enough to achieve their goals without provoking a direct military retaliation.