Noncooperative Approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition

Small Efficient Scale as a Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium**We wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of the referee and also to thank the National Science Foundation for financial support.

Noncooperative Approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition ◽

10.1016/b978-0-12-476750-8.50011-7 ◽

1982 ◽

pp. 127-139

Author(s):

WILLIAM NOVSHEK ◽

HUGO SONNENSCHEIN

Keyword(s):

Financial Support ◽

National Science Foundation ◽

Walrasian Equilibrium ◽

National Science

Download Full-text

Front Matter

Noncooperative Approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition ◽

10.1016/b978-0-12-476750-8.50001-4 ◽

1982 ◽

pp. iii

Download Full-text

Equilibrium in Simple Spatial (or Differentiated Product) Models

Noncooperative Approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition ◽

10.1016/b978-0-12-476750-8.50014-2 ◽

1982 ◽

pp. 199-212

Author(s):

WILLIAM NOVSHEK

Keyword(s):

Product Models

Download Full-text

Efficiency Properties of Strategic Market Games: An Axiomatic Approach**This paper brings together and supersedes Dubey and Shubik (1978) and Mas-Colell (1978). We are indebted for discussion, suggestions, and amendations to K. Arrow, W. Heller, L. Hurwicz, Ch. Kahn, E. Maskin, A. Postlewaite, and W. Thomson. The usual caveat applies. A. Mas-ColelPs research was supported by NSF Grant SOC76-19700A01 and SOC77-06000. The latter grant was at the Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University. The work of Dubey and Shubik relates to Department of the Navy Contract N00014-77-C-0518, issued by the Office of Naval Research under contract authority NR047-006.

Noncooperative Approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition ◽

10.1016/b978-0-12-476750-8.50016-6 ◽

1982 ◽

pp. 225-248 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

PRADEEP DUBEY ◽

ANDREU MAS-COLELL ◽

MARTIN SHUBIK

Keyword(s):

Social Sciences ◽

Axiomatic Approach ◽

Naval Research ◽

Stanford University ◽

Strategic Market Games ◽

Office Of Naval Research ◽

Contract Authority ◽

The Social ◽

Department Of The Navy ◽

Strategic Market

Download Full-text

Entry (and Exit) in a Differentiated Industry**The major part of this work was done while the first author was visiting Bonn University. Financial support from the Sonderforschungsbereich 21 is gratefully acknowledged.

Noncooperative Approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition ◽

10.1016/b978-0-12-476750-8.50015-4 ◽

1982 ◽

pp. 213-224

Author(s):

J. JASKOLD GABSZEWICZ ◽

J.-F. THISSE

Keyword(s):

Financial Support ◽

Major Part ◽

Entry And Exit

Download Full-text

The Limit Points of Monopolistic Competition**Financial support from the National Science Foundation under Grant SOC78–09084 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology is gratefully acknowledged. I am indebted to Oliver Hart for both arousing my interest in this topic and for providing comments on an earlier version of the paper. Useful comments were also received from Glenn Loury and the referee.

Noncooperative Approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition ◽

10.1016/b978-0-12-476750-8.50012-9 ◽

1982 ◽

pp. 141-163

Author(s):

KEVIN ROBERTS

Keyword(s):

Financial Support ◽

National Science Foundation ◽

Monopolistic Competition ◽

Massachusetts Institute ◽

Massachusetts Institute Of Technology ◽

National Science ◽

Limit Points ◽

Institute Of Technology

Download Full-text

Contributors

Noncooperative Approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition ◽

10.1016/b978-0-12-476750-8.50003-8 ◽

1982 ◽

pp. vii

Download Full-text

Index

Noncooperative Approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition ◽

10.1016/b978-0-12-476750-8.50018-x ◽

1982 ◽

pp. 263-268

Download Full-text

Nash Equilibria of Market Games: Finiteness and Inefficiency**The research reported in this paper was partially supported by grant No. SOC77-27435 from the National Science Foundation, and by Contract N00014-77-C0518 issued by the Office of Naval Research under Contract Authority NR-047-006.

Noncooperative Approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition ◽

10.1016/b978-0-12-476750-8.50017-8 ◽

1982 ◽

pp. 249-262

Author(s):

PRADEEP DUBEY

Keyword(s):

National Science Foundation ◽

Nash Equilibria ◽

Naval Research ◽

Market Games ◽

Office Of Naval Research ◽

Contract Authority ◽

National Science

Download Full-text

Perfect Competition and Optimal Product Differentiation

Noncooperative Approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition ◽

10.1016/b978-0-12-476750-8.50013-0 ◽

1982 ◽

pp. 165-198

Author(s):

OLIVER D. HART

Keyword(s):

Product Differentiation ◽

Perfect Competition

Download Full-text

Noncooperative Approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition
Latest Publications

TOTAL DOCUMENTS

H-INDEX

Published By Elsevier

Small Efficient Scale as a Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium**We wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of the referee and also to thank the National Science Foundation for financial support.

Front Matter

Equilibrium in Simple Spatial (or Differentiated Product) Models

Entry (and Exit) in a Differentiated Industry**The major part of this work was done while the first author was visiting Bonn University. Financial support from the Sonderforschungsbereich 21 is gratefully acknowledged.

Contributors

Index

Nash Equilibria of Market Games: Finiteness and Inefficiency**The research reported in this paper was partially supported by grant No. SOC77-27435 from the National Science Foundation, and by Contract N00014-77-C0518 issued by the Office of Naval Research under Contract Authority NR-047-006.

Perfect Competition and Optimal Product Differentiation

Export Citation Format

Noncooperative Approaches to the Theory of Perfect CompetitionLatest Publications

TOTAL DOCUMENTS

H-INDEX

Published By Elsevier

Small Efficient Scale as a Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium**We wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of the referee and also to thank the National Science Foundation for financial support.

Front Matter

Equilibrium in Simple Spatial (or Differentiated Product) Models

Entry (and Exit) in a Differentiated Industry**The major part of this work was done while the first author was visiting Bonn University. Financial support from the Sonderforschungsbereich 21 is gratefully acknowledged.

Contributors

Index

Nash Equilibria of Market Games: Finiteness and Inefficiency**The research reported in this paper was partially supported by grant No. SOC77-27435 from the National Science Foundation, and by Contract N00014-77-C0518 issued by the Office of Naval Research under Contract Authority NR-047-006.

Perfect Competition and Optimal Product Differentiation

Noncooperative Approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition
Latest Publications