Demanding the Demanding

Several authors have worried, or anyway assumed, that confronting people with highly demanding moral requirements would be counterproductive, in the sense of causing people to turn away from morality, and thus actually decreasing (for instance) amounts donated. In this chapter, Ben Sachs notes that whether or not such behaviour would be counterproductive is a non-obvious empirical matter. After reviewing the available evidence, Sachs concludes that we should not be at all confident that “demanding the demanding” would be counterproductive. Sachs argues that more empirical studies are needed, but tentatively defends a theory of moral psychology according to which, when people are confronted with a demanding ethical theory (like act-consequentialism) they will, if they accept the theory, respond by coming close to conforming to it.

A Brief Argument for the Overwhelming Importance of Shaping the Far Future

In this chapter, Nick Beckstead argues that the best available interventions gain most of their expected value via the effects that they have on the long-run future, rather than via their more immediate effects. Because of the vastness of humanity’s possible future, this line of argument tends to favour actions that reduce risks of premature extinction, and actions that increase probabilities of other significantly beneficial “trajectory changes” to the course of humanity’s long-run future, even where the change in probabilities that we are able to bring about is very small.

Effective Altruism and Transformative Experience

In this chapter, Jeff Sebo and L.A. Paul investigate the phenomenon of experiences that transform the experiencer, either epistemically, personally, or both. The possibility of such experiences, Sebo and Paul argue, frequently complicates the practice of rational decision-making. First, in transformative cases in which your own experience is a relevant part of the outcome to be evaluated, one cannot make well-evidenced predictions of the value of the outcome at the time of decision. Second, in cases in which one foresees that one’s preferences would change following the decision, there are issues about whether rational decision-making should be based only on one’s ex ante preferences, or should also incorporate some element of deference to foreseen future preferences. While these issues arise quite generally, Paul and Sebo suggest that they are especially pressing in the context of effective altruism.

On Satisfying Duties to Assist

In this chapter, Christian Barry and Holly Lawford-Smith take up the question of whether there comes a point at which one is no longer morally obliged to do further good, even at very low cost to oneself. More specifically, they ask: under precisely what conditions is it plausible to say that that “point” has been reached? A crude account might focus only on, say, the amount of good the agent has already done, but a moment’s reflection shows that this is indeed too crude. Barry and Lawford-Smith develop and defend a nuanced account according to which considerations of three types are all relevant to whether one has satisfied one’s duties to assist: “inputs” (types and quantities of sacrifice made), “characteristics” (the beliefs and intentions that informed the donor’s decisions), and “success” (the extent to which the donations in question succeeded in generating value).

Beyond Individualism

In this chapter, Stephanie Collins examines the idea that individuals can acquire ‘membership duties’ as a result of being members of a group that itself bears duties. In particular, powerful and wealthy states are duty-bearing groups, and their citizens have derivative membership duties (for example, to contribute to putting right wrongs that have been done in the past by the group in question, and to increase the extent to which the group fulfils its duties). In addition, she argues, individuals have duties to signal their willingness to coordinate with others so as to do more good than the sum of what each could do on their own. Putting these two things together, Collins suggests, individuals’ duties in (for instance) matters of global poverty might be largely driven by such group-based considerations, leaving little room for the duties that would follow from more individualistic reasoning.

Effective Altruism, Global Poverty, and Systemic Change

In this chapter, Iason Gabriel and Brian McElwee examine the status of interventions aimed at bringing about large-scale systemic change. According to Gabriel and McElwee, in the domain of global poverty, (i) philanthropic interventions favoured by effective altruists tend to take the form of “low-value/high-confidence” narrowly focused practical interventions, but (ii) it is quite likely that there are “medium-value/medium-confidence” interventions tackling global poverty via systemic change that are ex ante better. In other contexts, effective altruism definitely does take seriously “high-value/low-confidence” interventions (namely, efforts to mitigate extinction risk), so there does not seem to be any simple bias towards high confidence at work here. The explanation Gabriel and McElwee suggest lies in an understandable yet still misguided preference for political neutrality within the effective altruism movement.

Overriding Virtue

In this chapter, Richard Yetter Chappell examines the moral status of a disposition he calls “abstract benevolence”, viz. the disposition to allow abstract considerations of the greater good to override one’s natural inclinations towards prioritizing those whose needs are lesser but in some way more emotionally salient. Many people feel that it is callous to act in this manner, and this view seems to comport well with the traditional view of “sympathy” as an important virtue. Chappell argues to the contrary: according to him, we must recognize abstract benevolence as an important virtue for imperfectly virtuous agents living in present times.

The Hidden Zero Problem

In this chapter, Mark Budolfson and Dean Spears analyse the marginal effect of philanthropic donations. The core of their analysis is the observation that marginal good done per dollar donated is a product (in the mathematical sense) of several factors: change in good done per change in activity level of the charity in question, change in activity per change in the charity’s budget size, and change in budget size per change in the individual’s donation to the charity in question. They then discuss the “hidden zero problem” that some of the terms in the equation (in particular, the last term) might be “hidden zeros” that prevent donations from doing any good—or worse, imply that they do harm—even if the charity is at the top of effective altruism rankings based on the other factors.

Evidence Neutrality and the Moral Value of Information

In this chapter, Amanda Askell takes up the question of whether there is a case for favoring interventions whose effectiveness has stronger evidential support, when expected effectiveness is equal. Of course, in practice expected effectiveness might well not be equal: as Askell notes, given a sceptical prior, it might be only in the presence of substantial positive evidence that any intervention can have an expected value significantly higher than that of “doing nothing”. But is there a case for favoring evidence-backed interventions over and above this contribution of evidence to expected value? Askell argues that in fact the reverse is true: when expected value is equal one should prefer to invest in interventions that have less evidential support, on the grounds that by doing so one can acquire evidence of their effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) that may then be valuable for future investment decisions.

The Moral Imperative Toward Cost-Effectiveness in Global Health

Getting good value for the money with scarce resources is a substantial moral issue for global health. In this chapter, Toby Ord explores the moral relevance of cost-effectiveness, a major tool for capturing the relationship between resources and outcomes, by illustrating what is lost in moral terms for global health when cost-effectiveness is ignored. For example, the least effective HIV/AIDS intervention produces less than 0.1 per cent of the value of the most effective. In practical terms, this can mean hundreds, thousands, or millions of additional deaths due to a failure to prioritize. Ultimately, the author suggests that creating an active process of reviewing and analyzing global health interventions to deliver the bulk of global health funds to the very best.