Deception-on-Nile, July 1972

This chapter continues description of the disinformation campaign mounted by Egypt and the USSR to implant the deceptive impression that all Soviet advisers were expelled by President Anwar Sadat in July 1972 as part of a rift with Moscow and a shift to the US camp in the Cold War. The advisers were recalled en masse to Cairo, which had to be noticed by foreign observers, but soon were unobtrusively reposted to Egyptian formations where they continued preparations for an anti-Israeli offensive and induction of offensive weapons such as long-range bombers which supposedly had been refused by the Soviets. Among other components of this deception, supposed Israeli spy Ashraf Marwan is documented as falsely advising an MI6 agent that all Soviets were gone and Egypt would revert to procurement of British weapons – which reinforces evidence that he was actually an Egyptian double agent. US statesman Henry Kissinger assisted the ruse by feigning surprise at Sadat’s move, which had actually been coordinated with him at the Moscow Summit, and concealing this from others in the administration as well as from Israel.

Flexing Muscles While Offering a Pullback

Soviet-Egyptian preparations for an offensive continued through 1971, including plans against an Israeli system for flooding the Suez Canal with fuel and igniting it. Recent disclosures confirmed that Soviet advisers initiated the shootdown in September ’71 of an Israeli surveillance aircraft east of the canal, and they successfully countered an Israeli retaliation against the SAM array with US-supplied Shrike missiles. Shortly after this show of force, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko proposed to US President Nixon to withdraw Soviet troops (but not advisers) from Egypt as part of a settlement in terms similar to Sadat’s earlier offer. This remained under discussion until the Moscow summit in May 1972. Meanwhile, MiG-25 overflights of Sinai and Israel went on unimpeded, and Primakov’s continuing contacts with Israeli officials took on a threatening tone.

SAM Successes and a Mig Debacle

Despite its considerable losses in the 18 July engagement, the Soviet SAM array’s success against Israel’s US-supplied planes and technology bolstered confidence in Egypt and the USSR that the Israelis could not prevent advance of the missile shield to the Suez Canal bank – a precondition for the future cross-canal offensive. Nasser, with Soviet backing, accepted Rogers; proposal of a ceasefire. Among Soviet forces, the MiG pilots’ envy of the missilemen led them to initiate combat but then into an Israeli trap on 30 July, when five Soviet planes were shot down in a dogfight for no Israeli losses. This enabled Israel too to accept the ceasefire without loss of face, though it was actually imposed on the Israelis by continuing, unsustainable losses of aircraft and especially irreplaceable crews to the Soviet SAMs.

A New Phase from March ’69?

The start of the Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition is usually dated 8 March 1969, when Egypt launched a massive artillery bombardment at the Bar-Lev Line and Nasser supposedly declared transition from “active defense”’ to this new phase. This chapter examines the actual continuity with earlier stages. It also addresses the transition from the leadership of Levi Eshkol to Golda Meir and the change in US policy management from the Johnson to the Nixon Administration, especially the rise of Henry Kissinger and Soviet moves to exploit his ambitions by means of a “back channel.” On the ground, Soviet advisers were reinforced and although it remains unclear whether they initiated the resumption of warfare, they supported the continuous hostilities that went on from this point. They especially encouraged live-fire training by means of cross-canal raids in increasingly large formations.

“We Will be Two Ismails”

The failure of US President Richard Nixon to make good on his post-reelection vow to press Israel was evident when Prime Minister Golda Meir, visiting Washington in the spring of 1973, offered no concessions in return for continued arms supply. Reports from “Mossad spy” Ashraf Marwan and others of imminent Egyptian attack led Israel to call a costly alert in April; US statesman Henry Kissinger took credit for getting the Soviets to make Egyptian President Anwar Sadat delay the offensive until after a summit with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in California in June. But evidence shows that the ultimate timing of a joint offensive with Syria in October had already been determined. While Sadat’s envoy Hafez Ismail impressed Kissinger with peace proposals in Washington, War Minister Ahmed Ismail shuttled between Moscow and Damascus to coordinate war plans and weapons supplies. At the summit in August, Brezhnev took a belligerent stance. The USSR’s support for the impending attack was exemplified by delivery of Scud missiles with Soviet operators, and participation in the final councils of war.

Jockeying and Posturing

Through the spring of 1972, US adviser Henry Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin continued “back channel” discussion of the Soviet offer to withdraw regular forces from Egypt as part of and interim settlement with Israel. Meanwhile, Egyptian crews completed training for operation of the SAM array that the Soviet personnel had manned, which enabled beginning a handover that would ease political difficulties caused for Egyptian President Anwar Sadat by these troops’ presence. Around a visit by Sadat to Moscow in April and a subsequent one to Egypt by Soviet Defense Minister Andrey Grechko, reports were spread about discord due to Soviet denial of Egyptian demands for offensive weapons. In fact, cooperation continued, including MiG-25 flights over Sinai to provide intelligence for a future offensive; renewed Israeli attempts to intercept them failed.

Trial Balloons from Both Sides

Responding to Kissinger’s “indiscretion” about expulsion of the Soviets from Egypt as a US objective, in May 1971 President Sadat offered to end the presence of Soviet troops (but not advisers) as part of an interim settlement with Israel. However, he relayed it through Secretary Rogers, who after the failure of his peace plan was losing influence to Kissinger, and there was no US response. Simultaneously Sadat was reported to have foiled a pro-Soviet coup (which elevated the Israeli informant Ashraf Marwan to a higher position), but Egypt’s alleged turn against Moscow was disproved when Soviet president Podgorny visited Cairo again and signed a 15-year friendship treaty. Still, suspicions in Moscow about Sadat’s loyalty and recognition of the drawbacks of its rupture with Israel led to missions there by journalist Victor Louis and KGB operative Evgeny Primakov, which produced no breakthrough. The USSR continued to demand a settlement leading to full Israeli withdrawal as a component of détente, to be concluded at a Moscow summit with was now scheduled for May ’72.

Ceasefire Violation Seals a Strategic Gain

The ceasefire that ostensibly ended the War of Attrition went into effect at midnight between 7 and 8 August 1970. Within minutes, the standstill provision that the US initiative had stipulated was broken by Soviet and Egyptian advancement of SAM batteries to the Suez Canal bank. US inspection flights by U-2 spy planes began too late to document the violation, and the Soviets rejected American protests. Israel responded by suspending compliance with the rest of Rogers’s peace plan, including UN mediation – leaving the United States with little benefit but the Soviets with a major gain. However, for domestic consumption Israel declared victory, which limited effective countering of the increased threat. Nasser’s death the following month and his unexpected succession by Anwar Sadat led to doubts about continuing dependence on Moscow.

The Soviet–Israeli Battle is Joined

In mid-April 1970, the Soviets’ SAM batteries’ presence in the Egyptian interior was detected and their MiG-21s had first encounters with Israeli planes. Though the latter suffered no losses at this stage, Israel’s “depth bombings” – which by now had caused massive civilian casualties, with resulting political damage -- were halted. The US administration, accepting the version that those Israeli bombings caused the Soviet intervention, blamed Israel for this setback and froze deliveries of more jets. The Soviets’ success spurred them to advance the SAM array toward the Suez Canal front. Soviet fighters began to engage Israeli planes in the Canal zone and caused first losses. Soviet-advised Egyptian naval units also initiated more aggressive action.

“Yellow Arab Helmet, Blue Russian Eyes”

Nasser’s visit to Moscow in July 1968 was extended for medical examination at the Kremlin VIP clinic and, after a brief trip home, for treatment at a spa in Soviet Georgia. His talks resulted in reaffirmation of Soviet support for military action and continued arms supplies on favorable terms. On the Suez Canal front, Soviet advisers were involved in preparations to resume hostilities. These began with a massive cannonade and cross-canal raids on 8 September 1968, repeated on 26 October, both times causing serious Israeli casualties. The Soviet advisors identified and counteracted a new Israeli missile designed to balance the Egyptian numerical advantage in artillery pieces Rumors spread of an impending Soviet move to force an opening of the canal. Israel responded by starting airborne raids in the Egyptian hinterland. Various explanations are offered for the proximity of this flareup to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.