Do As I Say, Not As I Do?

This chapter challenges the modern belief that augural theory permitted practitioners to create or nullify signs simply by making announcements about them, regardless of the empirical results of observation. It analyses the passages in ancient texts which have typically been seen as proof for this view, ranging from the Middle/Late Republic to Late Antiquity. Specific kinds of auspication such as the tripudium ritual and the auspication of investiture are discussed. The most important conclusions are (1) we have not paid sufficient attention to the context and genre of these statements, which do not all point in the same direction; (2) in the Republican period empirical observation remained a fundamental part of augury. This suggests that augural practitioners and their contemporaries did not believe Jupiter to be bound by their own announcements but instead saw themselves as vulnerable to the messages the god chose to send.

Introduction

The Introduction traces the state of the question in modern studies of augury and explains why the current consensus is open to challenge. It highlights current developments in the study of Roman and Greek religion and culture, as well as anthropological studies of divination, which suggest that a re-evaluation is possible and needed. The limitations of ‘functionalist’ interpretations of divination are discussed. Four guiding principles for the inquiry are outlined: (1) The purpose of augury was to obtain information from Jupiter about how and when to act. (2) Augury included some consistent rules and sign-interpretations, with which most of its users were familiar. (3) Augury worked by consensus, as specific rules, precedents, and customs were balanced against contingent circumstances. This consensus compelled elite compliance with the divinatory system and acceptance of its results. (4) Religion at Rome was ‘embedded’, but also meaningful in its own right.

Out of Control?

This chapter considers Roman augury in practice, arguing that the results of augury did not always cohere with human will and challenging the ‘alignment model’ of Roman divination. In modern scholarship on Roman divination, the dominant assumption remains that state divination procedures, including augury, were so contrived as to tell the individual magistrate/politician or the senate what they wanted to hear. The question posed here is whether it is true that augury never or seldom produced results which its users did not want. The shortcomings of the methodology used by proponents of the alignment model are highlighted. The chapter presents evidence that some Roman recipients chose to heed signs which they might have preferred to ignore and concludes that there was at Rome a religious dimension of ideas, motives, and activities which was separate from, and at odds with, the political.

Convenience or Conversation?

This chapter addresses what has long been seen as the best evidence for the modern view that augural theory permitted Romans to fabricate signs that aligned with their own desires, the technique of ‘watching the sky’ (servare de caelo). Modern reconstructions of this technique suppose that practitioners always received the sign they wanted, because if no real sign was forthcoming, one could simply be created by a report (obnuntiatio). On this view, Romans considered such fabrication acceptable, and publicly chose to treat as true signs which they privately knew had been faked. The chapter provides an alternative explanation for the prohibitive effect of sky-watching on assemblies, reinterpreting the ancient evidence (mostly from Cicero) and arguing that sky-watching can be understood as genuine open-ended consultation of Jupiter.

Conclusion

The Conclusion proposes avenues for future research in augury and considers the implications of the book’s findings for the nature of Roman religion and cognition. It explores the possibility that Roman willingness to abide by the results of augury was driven by fear of Jupiter. If so, the god would not have been conceived of purely as an equanimous fellow citizen, but as an uncontrollable and potentially hostile person with his own interests and desires, which did not always overlap with those of his human enquirers. This conception of the divine–human relationship suggests that fear may have played an important part in Roman religion. Ultimately, when human and divine will clashed, it was the will of Jupiter, not of the man consulting him, which was supposed to prevail. In theory as in practice, it was the Romans, not their supreme god, who were ‘bound’ by the auguries and auspices.