What Is Pornography Revisited

Many debates considered in earlier chapters of this book pertain to two general issues: What is pornography? What does pornography do (if anything)? A large bulk of the responses discussed so far advanced from speech act theoretical considerations. This chapter takes up these pressing and as of yet unsettled questions from a social ontological perspective. The chapter aims to sketch out promising alternative ways philosophically to discuss pornography that do not hinge on speech act theory. The chapter first considers what pornography apparently does with social ontological tools. Then it considers some alternative ways to understand what pornography is that diverge from speech act theoretical elucidations. The chapter (and the book) concludes with some final methodological remarks when examining the topic of pornography philosophically.

Pornography as Liberation

Pornography debates have tended to polarize the feminist movement and led to the “sex wars” of the 1970s and 1980s. The main opposition can be denoted with PorNo (antipornography positions) and PorYes (pro-pornography and “sex positive” outlooks), but is fraught with difficulties. For example, it is unclear what exactly is under dispute: Is the disagreement about how to define the concept of pornography or merely about which materials fall under it? Subsequently, the chapter considers two questions: Is feminist pornography possible? Might pornography be emancipatory? The chapter answers both questions with “yes” and considers what would make pornography feminist and/or liberatory when thinking about racialization, ability, and “fattism” in pornography. It argues that neither an unqualified PorNo nor an unqualified PorYes position is tenable. Furthermore, these positions share many basic commitments; but both sides tend to paint the opposition in an uncharitable light and in a manner that distorts the debate.

Introduction

The chapter provides an introduction to the book. It offers some initial motivation for thinking why philosophical pornography debates are (and should be) theoretically and socially of significance, and how they are still in many ways unresolved. The chapter also outlines the topics to be covered and discussed in the book more generally. In addition, the chapter provides an overview of past feminist philosophical work on pornography that undergirds more contemporary philosophical debates on the topic. Finally, the chapter sketches out the book’s methodology, aims, and structure as well as discussing some caveats and restrictions in the topics chosen for discussion.

Pornographic Knowledge and Sexual Objectification

This chapter considers sexual objectification and its connection to pornographic knowledge. It examines what sexual objectification amounts to and allegedly does, and whether pornography produces a certain kind of harmful maker’s knowledge, as Langton claims. The philosophical lessons to emerge from the chapter are as follows. First, even though we can make sense of the claim that pornography objectifies women, assessment of whether this claim is true typically involves a problematic focus on what pornography depicts in a decontextualized fashion. This is problematic since it is remarkably difficult to draw ethical conclusions from apparently objectifying pornographic depictions alone. Second, even though some pornographic materials involve objectionable objectification of women and problematic requisite maker’s knowledge, other materials do not. Determination of which materials are worrisome depends on background social conditions and contexts. This then undermines Langton’s view that pornographic maker’s knowledge is always harmful in undermining women’s sexual autonomy.

Free, Regulated, or Prohibited Speech?

This chapter considers whether legal restrictions on pornography that are compatible with liberalism can be defended and if so, in what form. The chapter aims to show the following. First, in disentangling what different feminist and liberal views are committed to, we can see that the supposedly firm opposition between feminist proregulation and liberal antiregulation positions is not so firm after all. Instead, there is much common ground between allegedly opposing sides. Second, some pornography regulations are permissible, even within a liberal framework and on paternalistic grounds. Third, although we have grounds to regulate pornography, criminalizing pornography production, distribution and consumption is the wrong response to pornography’s problems.

Does Pornography Silence Women?

One of MacKinnon’s central claims is that pornography is not only words. Rather, pornographic speech subordinates and silences women. Using Austin’s speech act theory, Langton and Hornsby argue that pornographic speech has the power to silence women, thus depriving women of free speech rights. This silencing claim has attracted much philosophical interest over the past couple of decades. The chapter considers how we should understand the silencing claim by carefully dissecting the relevant literature. It further assesses the philosophical and practical tenability of the claim. The main philosophical lessons to arise from this chapter are as follows. First, even though some aspects of the silencing claim have pretheoretical plausibility, it remains to be established that pornographic speech is responsible for women’s silencing. Second, the silencing claim is often discussed by appealing to intuitive gut-feelings about specific cases. But (the chapter argues) this is not methodologically conducive to settling the matter.

Subordination

The chapter examines a well-known antipornography claim, the subordination claim, which holds that pornography causes and is women’s subordination. The chapter first spells out this claim in detail distinguishing the causal and constitutive understandings of the subordination claim. The chapter then considers how plausible the claim is. The general argumentative gist of the chapter is as follows. Contra critics of the causal subordination claim, it argues that the claim is not so implausible after all. Or, at the very least, prevalent critiques do not conclusively refute the subordination claim, as some critics claim. Nonetheless, the chapter also shows that the constitutive formulation of the subordination claim is much harder to sustain.

The Aesthetics of Pornography

The chapter aims to bring debates in feminist philosophy and philosophy of art closer together, and to discuss central topics of contention in the aesthetics of pornography. It considers three themes: the fictionality of pornography, whether pornography and art are mutually exclusive, and what (if anything) is morally objectionable about digitally generated imagery. In so doing, the chapter offers support for two broad views. First, that fantasies and pornographic fictions are not beyond moral reproach in virtue of being fantastical and fictitious. Second, to hold that pornography is centrally or necessarily about sexual arousal (as philosophers of art typically do) yields misguided analyses of the phenomenon. This chapter, then, tells us something important not only about issues relevant for philosophy of art debates pertaining to pornography; it also instructs us about the nature and morality of pornography.