Conclusion

This concluding chapter discusses how the campaign in East Africa was a great success both for the British and Commonwealth forces and the commanders who led them. A massive pincer movement through Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia converged with another that had advanced through Eritrea, and ended with a final series of assaults against a remote Italian mountain fortress. With a speed and comprehensiveness that was not foreseen in the original plan, an eventually significant victory came about gradually through the development of events and the overwhelming of a confused and progressively shattered opponent. This was the unanimous view of the small number of published eyewitness accounts where it was described as a military masterpiece of its time, whilst another conclusion stated that the campaign would go down in military history as a classic.

Strategic Miscalculation

This chapter discusses how there was a good deal of confusion about what strategy to follow in defending East Africa. The thinking of the few politicians interested in the subject, and within the regional governments, was flawed, with the dangers misunderstood or overlooked. Successive British governments showed no real sense of recognizing that this could be an important wartime hub for raw materials and training. These significant failings were compounded by the failure of senior military officers to make a compelling argument about Italian intentions and the potential challenge these presented. While the Chiefs of Staff in London were right to assume that Mussolini would focus on Egypt, due to the vital importance attached to controlling the Suez Canal, they were wrong to conclude that he would enter the war at the first opportunity.

Winning the War, Worrying about the Peace

This chapter discusses how two main objectives remained for General Wavell's commanders, following the Italians' defeat at the Red Sea. From the south, General Cunningham's rapid march had left him poised outside Addis Ababa and its capture would complete the main part of the plan that had been given to him, leaving only the hinterland beyond to be brought under control. As for General Platt, he was now looking to link up with his counterpart, which would complete the devastating pincer movement and destroy any remaining enemy forces in the process. The final military action of the campaign fought in East Africa began on November 27 as artillery opened fire on the main Dalflecha Ridge which, along with the plateau at Maldiba, was the principal target of the attack.

A Third Front

This chapter considers the final element of General Wavell's grand plan: providing support for the rebellion in Ethiopia. What this did was to open up a third front in the war for Italian East Africa, as mobile attacks on isolated posts and ambushes along the main routes helped to create “a deep sense of insecurity in the minds of Italian forces.” The defending troops came to fear the possibility of being captured by the irregular forces that increasingly swarmed around them and their real value lay in this psychological distraction. In sponsoring the use of these forces, Wavell demonstrated once again his formidable understanding of warfare and the degree to which the greatest weapon was not always bullets and bombs but something a little more sophisticated.

The Advance from Kenya

This chapter looks at how preparations on the southern front were nearly complete by late January 1941, and Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham's forces were poised to advance. Accompanied by his aide, who had recently arrived in Kenya, the general had spent the previous few weeks travelling and had visited almost all of his command area. Here, Cunningham faced a diverse variety of problems, such as a potentially significant political issue, as some of the newly arrived South African officers were quick to agitate that they should only have to serve under their own national commanders. However, throughout the advance from Kenya the Italians seemed prepared to withdraw very readily. This was, in large part, a result of their main operational weakness: their leadership.

War Comes to East Africa

This chapter analyzes how the militarization of East Africa increased dramatically during May and June 1940 as British and Commonwealth forces continued to assemble in anticipation of war breaking out with Italy. The policy of ambiguity and confusion which had existed since before the war had led to British Somaliland effectively being offered up for occupation. The prospect of taking advantage of the dramatically changed strategic position became too great for the Italian General Staff to ignore. They concluded that an attack against this territory and a quick and spectacular success could strengthen the flanks of Italian East Africa and raise the morale of Italian people everywhere. In a territory larger than England and Wales, defended by fewer than 3,000 British and Commonwealth troops, the scene was set for the first major battle of the East Africa campaign.

Imperial Defeat

This chapter narrates how the loss of British Somaliland marked the first redrawing of the British Empire's map since 1931 when a strip of land in Sudan had been ceded to Italy. Major-General Reade Godwin-Austen admitted that what had happened drove him on during the subsequent campaign to show the Italians “what being overwhelmed by numbers and superior armament felt like.” Hitler apparently referred to it as a hard blow to British prestige, but it was actually more an emotional setback than a military one. All the British had lost was the privilege of maintaining an expensive garrison in their least valuable colony. However, the chapter shows how the Italians had failed to exploit the opportunities presented to them, and within a matter of months, this high point of victory would seem futile.

Triumph in the Mountains

This chapter follows the British and Commonwealth troops as they passed through Keren. This town was important to both the Italian and British and Commonwealth forces as road and rail routes through it afforded access to Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, and to Massawa, the main port in the southern Red Sea. To capture it, Major-General William Platt's two Indian divisions would have to confront the best Italian troops remaining in East Africa. The chapter shows how the attack on the Keren position had been the pivotal point in the East Africa campaign as it delivered the decisive blow to the Italians and allowed Platt the opportunity to accomplish what Wavell had asked him to do: secure the Sudanese border and then clearing the Italians from the coast beyond.

Hoping for the Best

This chapter examines how the British Empire's position in East Africa remained politically unclear and militarily vulnerable. This had left a clear sense that whilst they were undoubtedly hoping for the best in terms of local defense and security issues, they were failing to make any preparations for the worst. In reality, in both London and Cairo the extent of their opponent's weakness was still entirely unknown. Gaining reliable intelligence about the intentions of their soon-to-be enemies had proven a difficult task due to the restrictions on military activity during the preceding years. However, it was eventually reported that general mobilization had been ordered across Italian East Africa, with considerable troop movements towards French and British Somaliland and in the direction of the Kenyan border.

Second Front

This chapter illustrates how the opening shots of the East African offensive actually began on the northern front. The advance by British and Commonwealth troops that started from the Sudanese border saw some of the heaviest fighting and the most resolute defense conducted by the Italians, not just in this campaign but in any of the entire war. In many respects, it was what Wavell had anticipated from his earliest strategic reviews: that the Red Sea would prove an attractive draw to his opponents, who would place many of their best units in Eritrea and northern Ethiopia. Once the safety of the Red Sea was guaranteed, the United States could once again permit their merchant ships to use this route, which meant that more of the hard-pressed British shipping would be available for use elsewhere.