The White Papers, 1935–1936

This chapter focuses on the attempt to ‘sell’ rearmament – which the National Government increasingly believed was necessary – to the public through a series of White Papers outlining its position on defence in 1935 and 1936. The 1935 general election, the League of Nations Peace Ballot, the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, and the appointment of further subcommittees on defence requirements (and their effects on rearmament) are all discussed. The latter part of the chapter discusses Lithgow’s business empire, part of which was built on information he received through his work as a government advisor.

The Advisory Panel of Industrialists and Inside Information, 1933–1934

This chapter discusses the role of industrialists as advisers to the Committee of Imperial Defence and, crucially, the information such civilian businessmen were able to glean from the government as to future defence requirements. The role of Lithgow, Weir, and Balfour is explained in the context of these developments. How this information was used is the focus of the end of this chapter and subsequent chapters.

From Boom to Bust: The Private Naval Arms Industry and the Admiralty, 1919–1926

This chapter examines the fortunes of the private naval arms manufacturers between 1919 and 1926, as well as exploring the role of the Admiralty in the turbulent industrial climate of the early 1920s, where shipbuilding was badly affected by both global forces the Washington Naval Treaty.

Towards Rearmament, 1934–1935

This chapter outlines the major developments in the years 1934 and 1935, as Britain entered a period of planning without spending, and attempting to lay the groundwork for a potential rearmament without physically ordering a great deal of weapons. This involved a protracted debate over the ‘ultimate potential enemy’, including the role of Neville Chamberlain and Maurice Hankey in attempting to impose their will upon the future direction of British policy in light of the rise of Hitler, as well as creating a set of hypotheses upon which rearmament was to be based via the Defence Requirements Committee.

From Competition to Collaboration: The Warshipbuilders’ Committee and the National Shipbuilders’ Security Scheme, 1926–1931

This chapter explores the responses to lack of orders that the warshipbuilders and other naval arms manufacturers undertook after 1926 and the collapse of the Coventry Ordnance Works. These ranged from the predictable (diversification) to the illegal (cartels and price fixing). The role the Admiralty, particularly Chatfield, played in allowing this cartel to operate is also examined.

The Minister for Coordination of Defence and Early Rearmament, 1936–1937

This chapter looks at the appointment of a minister to oversee defence planning (Thomas Inskip), but mainly focuses on the lack of progress in 1936 and how this was allowed to occur. The work of Lord Weir – perhaps the most influential civilian adviser in the government – and the bottlenecks in construction he sought to alleviate are discussed. Finally, the role of the Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of Armaments, which was effectively derailed despite enormous public interest in removing private profit from warfare, is examined.

“Guilty Men,” Complexes, and Legends

This short chapter serves as an overview of the topic, and a brief survey of the literature on military industrial complexes and armaments manufacture

Later Rearmament and War Supply Organisation, 1937–1941

This chapter looks at rearmament itself, and argues that the transition towards wartime levels of production was not as smooth as it ought to have been given the circumstances. It looks at the role of engineers, such as Sir Harold Brown, who grew tired of the endless lists of committees, and effectively circumvented the Committee of Imperial Defence in order to secure production capacity effectively. Finally, it returns to the role of the shipbuilding cartel, showing how their scheme eventually came undone, and how the Admiralty took control of profiteering – but only well into the war itself.

Conclusion and Retrospective

This short chapter argues that we now need a different definition of a military-industrial complex, for the evidence in this book shows a different side to the alleged abuses of armament manufacturers and industrial elites. While plenty of illegal dealings occurred, they did not occur in the way some theorists have anticipated, nor by the actors judged most likely to hold influence in such a complex. The actions of ‘outsiders’ and ‘insiders’ during rearmament and WW2 paints a very different picture of industry, and shows why political, business, and military history can never be effectively separated when studying questions like these.

From “Outsiders” to “Insiders”: Industry and the Rehabilitation of the Supply Planning Framework

This chapter covers the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, and the impact it had upon British defence. It discusses the government’s understanding of ‘defensive deficiencies’ and the measures taken to remedy them via the cancellation of the Ten Year Rule and investigations in the Committee of Imperial Defence, all occurring in a time of severe political and financial constraints. The second part of the chapter covers the role of businessmen such as James Lithgow and their attempt to rationalise the bloated shipbuilding industry through the National Shipbuilders Security scheme.