Formulative Strategy: Why the African Union-led International Mediation in South Sudan Failed to Prevent Atrocity Crimes

The puzzle of the African Union mediation is that it enjoys regional effectiveness in leading peace processes and yet often fails to prevent atrocity crimes. While existing studies focus on the lack of capacity to explain failures, I draw on atrocity mediation literature that emphasizes coercive strategies for ripening to explore widely significant factors associated with the AU mediation. I adopt the “framework of mediator behavior” in international mediation studies to analyze AU policies on conflict responses and the mediation in South Sudan. My approach is consistent with the content analysis of qualitative data. I find that the significant factor in the AU mediation is the “patient” policy, like “strategic patience.” The policy reflects formulative strategy of conflict mediation that describes the mediator who controls the process but shifts control of substantive decision-making to the parties. Formulative strategy is technically non-coercive, so the AU embraces it to respect sovereignty. The paradox is that formulative strategy is the AU legitimacy source—which anchors effectiveness—and failure. The AU mediation failed because of strategic choice, not the lack of capabilities. This study contributes to a broader understanding of the AU mediation and challenges mediator behavior assumptions.

U.S. Domestic Vulnerability and the Supply of Third-Party Mediation

Most U.S. presidents will pursue third-party conflict mediation sometime during their administration. However, the approach and level of commitment to those endeavors vary greatly across time and results are often minimally successful. This study explains this variation in terms of domestic political considerations, suggesting that the potential risks and payoffs in the domestic sphere primarily drive the supply of mediation, rather than conflict characteristics, “ripeness” for resolution, or the national interest. Presidents are shown to engage in mediation when they are relatively secure domestically, enjoying legislative success in Congress. The results are consistent with the notion that presidents prefer political cover when engaging in foreign policy. Thus, the argument informs the literature on mediator behavior by linking it with theories of foreign policy decision making and suggests that the political context in which mediation is offered will influence its prospects for success, often explaining why mediation efforts fall short. Moreover, given the trend toward divided government in the United States, the results presented here suggest that mediation will become less prevalent in U.S. foreign policy.