The Irrationality of Adaptive Preferences: A Psychological and Semantic Account

There is little agreement among moral and political philosophers when it comes to determining what it is that makes adaptive preferences problematic. The large number of competing explanations offered by philosophers illustrates the absence of any consensus. The most prominent versions of these explanations have recently come under attack by Dale Dorsey, who argues that adaptive preferences are a red herring: the problematic nature of adaptive preferences is not explained by the fact of adaptation but by an appeal to some other normative consideration. In this article I offer an account of adaptive preferences that both accommodates the thought that only some of our adaptive preferences are problematic and responds to the skeptical challenge pressed by Dorsey. I argue that some adaptive preferences are prima facie irrational as they exhibit a peculiar error in reasoning where individuals change the semantic content of the reasons underpinning the new preference.

Two Realms of Rights

Theorists generally see rights as inhabiting one or both of two realms: the legal or more broadly institutional and the moral realm. This chapter offers broad working accounts of these realms, comparing and contrasting their denizens. Both law and morality involve systems of rules, including deontic rules. Deontic legal or institutional rules as such are abstract objects from which nothing follows about what anyone ought to do. In short, as such, these rules are not normative. In contrast, deontic moral rules are normative. Consideration of the normativity of personal decisions suggests that there is room for a realm of rights that is neither institutional nor moral.

Task-Specific Knowledge of the Law of Pendulum Motion in Children and Adults

The present experiment investigated children and adults’ knowledge of the pendulum law under different task conditions. The question asked was whether adults and fourth-graders knew that the period of a pendulum is a function of pendulum length but is independent of its mass. The task was to judge the period on a rating scale (judgment task), to imagine the swinging pendulum and indicate the corresponding time interval (imagery task), or to adjust the period of a dynamically presented pendulum (perception task). Normative consideration of pendulum length as the only relevant factor was primarily found in the perception task and, for adults, in the imagery task, whereas in the judgment task, children and adults frequently considered the irrelevant dimension of mass. Most children showed poor imagery performance. Preceding adjustment (perception task) and rating (judgment task) had no differential influence on subsequent imagery performance.

Foreign Interventions and Secessionist Movements: The Democratic Factor

This article explores the impact of political regime type on the decision of third states to support secessionist movements abroad. It suggests that democracies share political values, which lead them to oppose their mutual secessionist claims, while autocracies are not bound by this normative consideration. The statistical analysis supports the effect of the democratic factor: democracies rarely support secessionist groups emerging from democratic states. Moreover, it shows that there is no autocratic counterpart to this argument. This research also casts some serious doubts on the ability of conventional explanations—namely vulnerability and ethnic affinities—to explain external support to secessionist movements.Résumé.Cet article analyse l'impact du type de régime politique sur la décision des États tiers d'appuyer des mouvements sécessionnistes à l'étranger. L'étude soutient que les démocraties partagent des valeurs politiques communes qui les mènent à s'opposer aux mouvements indépendantistes qui se manifestent parmi elles, alors que les régimes autocratiques ne sont pas liés par cette considération normative. L'analyse statistique valide l'effet du facteur démocratique : les démocraties appuient rarement les groupes sécessionnistes qui émergent au sein d'autres États démocratiques. Les données démontrent également qu'il n'y a pas d'équivalent autocratique faisant écho au facteur démocratique. L'étude indique en outre que les thèses courantes de la vulnérabilité et du lien ethnique expliquent mal l'appui des États tiers aux groupes sécessionnistes.

Restoration of Art and Restoration of Nature

Robert Elliot's "Faking Nature," represents one of the strongest philosophical rejections of the ground of restoration ecology ever offered. Here, and in a succession of papers defending the original essay, Elliot argued that ecological restoration was akin to art forgery. Just as a copied art work could not reproduce the value of the original, restored nature could not reproduce the value of nature. I reject Elliot's art forgery analogy, and argue that his paper provides grounds for distinguishing between two forms of restoration that must be given separate normative consideration: (1) malicious restorations, those undertaken as a means of justifying harm to nature, and (2) benevolent restorations, or, those which are akin to art restorations and which cannot serve as justifications for the conditions which would warrant their engagement. This argument will require an investigation of Mark Sagoff's arguments concerning the normative status of art restorations.