A Truth-minimalist Reading of Foucault

That we have culturally acquired certain concepts and beliefs, that many concepts that refer to or impose social or cultural classifications have their origin in intended or unintended declarative speech acts, that the institutional facts they intentionally and unintentionally create have a contingent existence and that it is not always fully transparent to us that the facts so created are institutional facts, were Foucault's key insights in his early work. I argue that these insights can be fully articulated, explored and discussed with a minimalist conception of truth in mind. His observations anticipate current "rediscoveries" of those insights by analytic philosophers. A minimalist about truth holds that these insights do not require a revision of our ordinary concept of truth. The flip side of my argument is that Foucault and his followers should not have grounded his views in a substantial revision of the concept of truth. Truth is and has always been "a thing of this world"; his idiosyncratic reconceptualizations of truth are not needed to explore social dimensions of belief systems, the way social facts emerge and the relevance of genealogies.

Small Footbridges: 2 Contexts, 2 Responses

<p>This paper presents the design of two small footbridges in two different sites and economical contexts. The first footbridge, located in an urban site, is an arch made of Ultra-High-Performance Fibre-Reinforced Concrete (UHPFRC). The design technique combines the use of a contemporary material with the reappropriation of ancestral methods. The second footbridge, located in a remarkable natural site and made of weathering steel, presents both a tie-arch and truss structure. This minimalist conception leads to a “low- cost” structure.</p>

A Continuum of Violence

Chapter 11 outlines competing views on defining “violence.” A minimalist conception of violence as force focuses on the deliberate infliction of physical injury, highlighting the intentions of agents committing acts of violence at single moments in time. In contrast, a more comprehensive view of violence as violation recognizes a wider range of transgressions, privileging the experiences of victims and the “ripples of violence” affecting survivors, their families, and their communities over time. The chapter argues in favor of adopting a comprehensive approach, limited not to the use of force but drawing attention to violations of personal integrity more broadly. It draws on feminist work theorizing a continuum of violence against women to highlight why identifying a more complete spectrum of violent acts is vital, as manifestations of violence not only shade into one another but also inform and reinforce one another.

Conclusion

This chapter concludes the book and considers the implications and outlook for future research. The eleven hierarchies presented in the earlier chapters are presented together, and their similarities and differences, strengths and weaknesses, are discussed. Then a ‘parametric profile’ for English, Italian, Spanish, and Japanese is given. This shows how macro-, meso-, and microdifferences emerge from the general approach, fulfilling one of the goals of the book discussed in the Introduction and Chapter 1. Various potential refinements of parameter hierarchies and their likely advantages are discussed. The chapter concludes by noting that the minimalist conception of parametric variation is fundamentally distinct from the earlier approach, above all in the possible role of domain-general cognitive constraints (third factors).

Rule of, by, and for the People

Probing the meaning of Lincoln’s phrase, the chapter calls into question the prevalent conceptions of “rule” and “people.” In the dominant procedural or “minimalist” conception, the “people” are defined as selfish utility-maximizers; that is, individuals who seek to maximize benefits in exchange for minimal investments. “Rule” is simply government by the most successful self-seekers. The chapter also discusses the (recently advanced) alternative conceptions of “agonistic” and “deliberative” democracy. By contrast to the homo economicus extolled by liberal minimalism, agonistics privileges homo politicus (human beings as power seekers), while the deliberative model stresses rational argumentation (animal rationale). By returning to the criteria of relationality and potentiality, the chapter lifts up the aspirational or “promissory” quality of democracy, paying special attention to Derrida’s notion of “democracy to come” (à venir) and to the open-ended, unfinished character of “people” and humanity. Seen from this angle, democracy can also be called aporetic or “apophatic.”

Human Rights, Institutions and the Division of Moral Labor

Are human rights general moral norms, or are they conceptually tied to the political function of setting limits to the sovereignty of states? This essay steers a middle course in conceptualizing human rights as basic norms of political morality. Human rights arise out of general moral claims held by individual human beings simply as such, but they play a particular role as necessary conditions of political legitimacy. Nevertheless, we should not identify them with those norms whose violation might justify restrictions on the sovereignty of other states. Such an equation would result in an all too minimalist conception of human rights. The essay advocates a more ambitious conception that integrates civil rights and human rights, particular state and global politics, democracy and collective self-determination under the perspective of a division of moral labor.

Framing Multicultural Challenges in Freedom of Religion Terms

Multicultural challenges in Europe are being framed in human rights language, and in particular in terms of the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The question is whether the practical case-by-case application of the fundamental right to freedom of religion in national and European case law facilitates a ‘deep (and normative) diversity’ in Europe or rather only allows space for a limiting or ‘conditioned diversity’ instead. While opening up possibilities for minorities to live out their lives in accordance to their deeply-held convictions, it seems to us that the human rights working frame in a predominantly ‘minimalist’ conception comes with its inherent limitations as to the management of Europe's religious diversity. While human rights purport to liberate and protect, they also impose conditions, criteria and standards that are grounded in a Western vision of law, society and religion. Religious minorities stand to gain from playing by the human rights rules as long as they accept to mould, shape and limit their claims to fit dominant conceptions, which perhaps diverge from their own understandings, needs and aspirations. Drawing on case law collected through the RELIGARE project network, this article aims to illustrate some of the limitations and confines that Europe's diverse communities face in the areas of the workplace, the public place, the family, and State support to religions.

‘Is theology a science?’ Paul Feyerabend's anarchic epistemology as challenge test to T. F. Torrance's scientific theology

To answer in the affirmative Barth's question ‘Is theology a science? is to acknowledge both that such a question has a history and that the predicate ‘scientific’ is a contested one. T. F. Torrance inTheological Scienceand subsequent publications, seeks to proceed with a minimalist conception of science, as a study whose methods are directed by ‘faithfulness to object’. Paul Feyerabend, inAgainst Methodand subsequent publications, contends that such a minimalism amounts to an admission that there is no such thing as ‘the scientific method’, and that therefore the predicate ‘scientific’ lacks coherence and substance. According to Feyerabend, philosophers like Michael Polanyi (an important influence upon Torrance) are simply not bold enough to see their work through to the radical conclusions which it demands and he provides. For Feyerabend, science's reference to qualities such as ‘objectivity’ and ‘rationality’ are simply a smoke-screen for decisively influential vested interests of power and wealth – it is these which ultimately determine what we mean by science, and these which therefore must be unmasked in the cause of humanism. However, in the course of this dialogue we reveal that Feyerabend is too careless a thinker, given to rushing prematurely and too willingly to unwarranted and simplistic dichotomies. Thus Torrance's notion of the ‘scientific’ emerges intact, but not without Feyerabend's stimulating challenge raising important questions, not least to theology as a science. For here, above all, ‘human’ factors are likely unduly to influence scientific knowledge. Thus Feyerabend also points to areas where Torrance's project needs further development and closer scrutiny.

Can Minimalism Account for the Value of Truth?

Michael Dummett, in ‘Truth,’ mounted an objection to the redundancy theory of truth on the grounds that it neglects to account for the normative features he claimed are part of the concept of truth. Paul Horwich, in ‘The Minimalist Conception of Truth’, notes that the same objection could be leveled against minimalism. He defends minimalism against Dummett’s objection by offering a sketch of an instrumental account of the desirability of truth that is compatible with the minimalist thesis. In this paper, I will review Dummett’s objection and Horwich’s response, identifying some concerns with the account as it stands. I will modify the account to address those concerns, and so that it successfully explains the desirability of having all true beliefs in a way that is compatible with minimalism. I then mount an argument that truth is also intrinsically valuable. The question regarding the adequacy of the minimalist account of truth, then, hinges on whether the account is compatible with the fact of truth’s intrinsic value, along with the question of whether that fact entails its also being essentially valuable.

Deliberation and Global Governance: Liberal, Cosmopolitan, and Critical Perspectives

The paper develops a critical analysis of deliberative approaches to global governance. After first defining global governance and with a minimalist conception of deliberation in mind, the paper outlines three paradigmatic approaches: liberal, cosmopolitan, and critical. The possibilities and problems of each approach are examined and a common concern with the scope for “deliberative reflection” in global governance is addressed. It is argued that each approach, to varying degrees, foregrounds the currently underdetermined state of knowledge about global governance, its key institutions, agents, and practices. In doing so, the question “ What is global governance?” is retained as an important and reflective element of ongoing deliberative practices. It is suggested that this constitutes the distinctive and vital insight of deliberative approaches to global governance.