A Novel Integration of Social Capital, Emotional Attachment and Organizational Innovation

The social capital and attachment theory are employed to theoretically define the relationships between three social capital dimensions (trust, interaction density and cooperation), three-dimensional emotional attachment (affection, passion and connection) and organizational innovation – by considering the organizational climate as a potential moderator. This study proposes a) social capital and emotional attachment contribution to organizational innovation b) moderating role of organizational climate in the relationship between social capital, emotional attachment and organizational innovation. The suggestions conclude that keeping an account of employees’ social capital and emotional attachment may help the organization to take an innovative position in the market.

Local Interaction Density (LID), a Fast and Efficient Tool to Prioritize Docking Poses

Ligand docking at a protein site can be improved by prioritizing poses by similarity to validated binding modes found in the crystal structures of ligand/protein complexes. The interactions formed in the predicted model are searched in each of the reference 3D structures, taken individually. We propose to merge the information provided by all references, creating a single representation of all known binding modes. The method is called LID, an acronym for Local Interaction Density. LID was benchmarked in a pose prediction exercise on 19 proteins and 1382 ligands using PLANTS as docking software. It was also tested in a virtual screening challenge on eight proteins, with a dataset of 140,000 compounds from DUD-E and PubChem. LID significantly improved the performance of the docking program in both pose prediction and virtual screening. The gain is comparable to that obtained with a rescoring approach based on the individual comparison of reference binding modes (the GRIM method). Importantly, LID is effective with a small number of references. LID calculation time is negligible compared to the docking time.

Choosing anarchy: institutional alternatives and the global order

The international system may be anarchic, but anarchy is neither fixed nor inevitable. We analyze collective choices between anarchy, a system of inefficient self-enforcement, and external enforcement, where punishment is delegated to a third party at some upfront cost. In equilibrium, external enforcement (establishing governments) prevails when interaction density is high, the costs of integration are low, and violations are difficult to predict, but anarchy (drawing borders) prevails when at least one of these conditions fail. We explore the implications of this theory for the causal role of anarchy in international relations theory, the integration and disintegration of political units, and the limits and possibilities of cooperation through international institutions.