Introduction

This chapter introduces the topic of the book. It provides some initial examples of the roles constituent power has played in justifying or limiting political action. It also examines the two main ways in which constituent power has been understood by constitutional theorists: as an extra-legal constitution-making force that always escapes constitutionalization (i.e. original constituent power), and as a substantively unlimited constitution-making authority (i.e. derived constituent power) that can be expressed through a constitution’s amendment rule. It then summarizes the content of each of the subsequent chapters.

The Juridical People

This chapter argues that to the extent that a constituent assembly is not a sovereignty entity but a means for the exercise of constituent power, it can be subject to substantive limits arising from a constituent mandate. Part I of the chapter examines the place of the imperative mandate in contemporary constitutional change. Part II analyses the extent to which ‘the people’, understood as a juridical entity, could be said to engage in constituent action through an electoral exercise. It examines whether, during an episode of constitutional change, the electorate necessarily acts as a state organ (a view exemplified in the work of a number of constitutional theories as well as in some judicial decisions). In answering that question in the negative, the chapter develops a distinction between constitutional and constituent referendums. Part III explores the process that led to the convocation of the Venezuelan Constituent Assembly of 1999. In that process, the court recognized the electorate’s right to convene an extraordinary constitution-making body through a referendum that took place outside of the established amendment rule. However, the constituent mandate contained in the referendum’s question was transgressed by the assembly, which assumed sovereign authority. The courts, relying on the theory of constituent power, later sanctioned that transgression.

Introduction

What is an amendment? This chapter shows why this question is central to the study of constitutional change. Some constitutional changes are identified as amendments but in reality may be more. Whether a constitutional change is an amendment entails implications for how the change must be made, whether a court can and should evaluate its constitutionality, and what the change requires for legitimation. This chapter returns to the origins of formal amendment—to the Articles of Confederation, America’s first constitution, which codified the very first amendment rule in a national constitution—to uncover the foundations of amendment practice and what makes an amendment different from other constitutional changes. This chapter moreover raises a question about an increasingly common phenomenon that straddles the border of legality and legitimacy: the violation of amendment rules. This chapter explains that the Indian basic structure doctrine and Bruce Ackerman’s theory of constitutional moments are, at bottom, variations on the same theme we see all over the world: changes to amendment rules that occur in defiance of the rules of formal amendment. Many examples follow to illustrate this point. The chapter closes by describing and situating the importance of the chapters to follow in this book. This chapter considers constitutions from around the globe.