Ability-Biased Technical Change and Productivity Bonus in a Nested Production Structure: A Theoretical Model with Endogenous Hicks-Neutral Technology Spillover

This paper develops a model of endogenous trade-mediated productivity spillover in which jointly trade-intensity, capital-intensity of production, and skill-intensity for adoption of technology from an exogenously available stock of world knowledge determine firm’s productivity. The representative firm, in the process of maximising profit (or minimising costs), takes into account the benefits of technological improvements embodied in imported intermediates. Sectors with higher skilled labour intensity will have an advantage in extracting the ‘bonuses’ from spillovers. The framework is useful for exploring technology adoption, considering wage premium, investigating innovative changes in sectors, and analysing productivity differences.

Keeping up with the Neighbors: Social Interaction in a Production Economy

It is well-documented that individuals care about how others around them are doing. This paper studies a production economy in which consumers provide labor supply to a representative firm to earn income for consumption, and their utility depends on their own leisure time, their own consumption level, as well as their neighbors’ consumption levels. We characterize the unique equilibrium for such an economy, allowing for three different types of effects of the neighborhood size: linear effect, zero effect, and nonlinear effect. Four network structures (empty network, ring network, star network, and core-periphery network) with different production technologies are analyzed. Our work contributes to a better understanding of the general equilibrium effect of social preferences and network structures.

DEALING WITH TIME IN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS: SOME MARSHALLIAN INSIGHTS

According to Alfred Marshall, the element of time is the most important and difficult aspect to deal with in the economic analysis. Accordingly, he has placed the concept of time at the core of his economic reasoning, and he has developed a number of analytical tools that allow including time in his analytical framework: most notably, the cœteris paribus pound, the representative firm, and the distinction between short and long periods. However, he encountered an insurmountable impasse when dealing with the real elapsing of time in his static framework: the solution proposed in his Principles of Economics remained, for him, highly unsatisfactory, problematic, and incomplete. The real elapsing of time—unavoidable in his reflections—copes very badly indeed with his analytical construction based on equilibrium. The continuity of time is the element of the Marshallian analysis most quickly criticized and rejected. After him, in the economic analysis, time gradation was rigorously divided into “short” and “long” periods, whereas Marshall’s concerns for the continuity of real time were banished from what was considered a “rigorous” analysis. The main aims of this paper are to frame Marshall’s distinction between short and long periods and to underline those aspects of his contribution that were lost or were substantially simplified in later literature.

A NOTE ON THE LARGE-FIRM MATCHING MODEL: CAN A NONBINDING MINIMUM WAGE REDUCE WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT?

We show that, in the large-firm search model, employment may decrease even when the level of the introduced minimum wage lies below the equilibrium wage of the laissez-faire economy. Wages also decrease in the presence of the minimum wage. The argument is based on multiple equilibria and the idea that, in a large-firm context, the representative firm may choose to overemploy workers in order to renegotiate lower wages.

GREASE OR SAND THE WHEEL? THE EFFECT OF INDIVIDUAL BRIBES ON THE DRIVERS OF AGGREGATE PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH

The Asian paradox suggests a net grease-the-wheel effect of corruption. Under the assump-tion of diminishing returns to bribes, going beyond the single-representative-firm assumption,we argue that the grease and sand-the-wheel effects are likely to co-exist among a large numberof firms, and that the industrial effect of corruption depends on the productivity drivers that fuelfirm’s dynamics. We decompose Indonesian manufacturing labor productivity growth whilecontrasting and comparing the contributions of no-, low- and high-bribing firms over the period1975-94. We confirm the coexistence of grease and sand-the-wheel effects. Industrial produc-tivity gains stem first from the net entry of non-corrupted firms, evidencing a sand-the-wheeleffect. Market share reallocation from low to high productivity growth incumbents paying lowbribes is the second source of productivity growth, pointing at a grease-the-wheel effect. Intra-plant productivity growth is overall negative and largely attributable to high-corruption plants,suggesting a sand-the-wheel effect.Keywords: corruption, bribery, productivity

GREASE OR SAND THE WHEEL? THE EFFECT OF INDIVIDUAL BRIBES ON THE DRIVERS OF AGGREGATE PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH

The Asian paradox suggests a net grease-the-wheel effect of corruption. Under the assump-tion of diminishing returns to bribes, going beyond the single-representative-firm assumption,we argue that the grease and sand-the-wheel effects are likely to co-exist among a large numberof firms, and that the industrial effect of corruption depends on the productivity drivers that fuelfirm’s dynamics. We decompose Indonesian manufacturing labor productivity growth whilecontrasting and comparing the contributions of no-, low- and high-bribing firms over the period1975-94. We confirm the coexistence of grease and sand-the-wheel effects. Industrial produc-tivity gains stem first from the net entry of non-corrupted firms, evidencing a sand-the-wheeleffect. Market share reallocation from low to high productivity growth incumbents paying lowbribes is the second source of productivity growth, pointing at a grease-the-wheel effect. Intra-plant productivity growth is overall negative and largely attributable to high-corruption plants,suggesting a sand-the-wheel effect.Keywords: corruption, bribery, productivity