Women’s Transnational Activism, Norm Cascades, and Quota Adoption in the Developing World

Electoral quotas are a key factor in increasing women’s political representation in parliaments globally. Despite the strong effects of quotas, less attention has been paid to the factors that prompt countries to adopt electoral quotas across developing countries. This article employs event history modeling to analyze quota adoption in 134 developing countries from 1987 to 2012, focusing on quota type, transnational activism, and norm cascades. The article asks the following questions: (1) How might quota adoption differ according to quota type—nonparty versus party quotas? (2) How has the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, China (Beijing 95), contributed to quota diffusion? (3) Do global, regional, or neighboring country effects contribute more to quota adoption? Results provide new evidence of how quota adoption processes differ according to quota type, the central role played by participation in Beijing 95, and how increased global counts contribute to faster nonparty quota adoption while increased neighboring country counts lead to faster to party quota adoption.

Institutional Effects on the Careers of State Supreme Court Justices

We contend a direct connection exists between risk of removal from the bench and the length of judicial careers, as institutional mechanisms present varying but predictable degrees of risk to justices. Using event history modeling, we analyze the duration of judicial tenures and resultant levels of risk provided by selection methods. We demonstrate that justices in partisan elections have the shortest tenures and greatest risk of departure. By contrast, the Missouri Plan evidenced the longest careers, offering a trivial amount of risk to justices. We show that the length of judicial careers are, in part, a function of the institutional design of selection and retention systems.

Women's Transnational Activism, Norm Cascades, and Quota Adoption in The Developing World

Electoral quotas are a key factor in increasing women's political representation in parliaments globally. Despite the strong effects of quotas, less attention has been paid to the factors that prompt countries to adopt electoral quotas across developing countries. This article employs event history modeling to analyze quota adoption in 134 developing countries from 1987 to 2012, focusing on quota type, transnational activism, and norm cascades. The article asks the following questions: (1) How might quota adoption differ according to quota type—nonparty versus party quotas? (2) How has the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, China (Beijing 95), contributed to quota diffusion? (3) Do global, regional, or neighboring country effects contribute more to quota adoption? Results provide new evidence of how quota adoption processes differ according to quota type, the central role played by participation in Beijing 95, and how increased global counts contribute to faster nonparty quota adoption while increased neighboring country counts lead to faster to party quota adoption.

When War Helps Civil–military Relations

Coups remain a widespread and consequential political phenomenon, but it remains unclear whether interstate conflict protects leaders from the risk of coups or increases this risk. We theorize that interstate conflict—especially when it is prolonged—should protect domestic regimes from military overthrow by foreclosing many of the key pathways by which elites plot and execute coups. We test this argument using event history modeling. The evidence provides support for our claim that coup risk declines in the presence of enduring interstate conflict. Just as important, we detect no evidence that war increases coup risk.

Institutional Effects on the Careers of State Supreme Court Justices

<p align="center"> </p><p>We contend a direct connection exists between risk of removal from the bench and the length of judicial careers, as institutional mechanisms present varying but predictable degrees of risk to justices. Using event history modeling, we analyze the duration of judicial tenures and resultant levels of risk provided by selection methods. We demonstrate that justices in partisan elections have the shortest tenures and greatest risk of departure. By contrast, the Missouri Plan evidenced the longest careers, offering a trivial amount of risk to justices. We show that the length of judicial careers are, in part, a function of the institutional design of selection and retention systems.</p><strong><br clear="all" /> </strong><p><strong> </strong></p>

Getting Ahead in the Capitalist Paradise: Migration from China and Socioeconomic Attainment in Colonial Hong Kong

This article examines the initial labor market outcome and the subsequent mobility process of Chinese immigrants in Colonial Hong Kong using complete work history data and event history modeling. Contrary to the rhetoric that Hong Kong is a capitalist paradise for adventurers, the data showed that immigrants were penalized in their initial class placement, subsequent mobility, and current income attainment. Differences in educational attainment and the lack of transferability of pre-migration human capital partly explained the attainment gap between immigrants and the natives. Yet the disadvantage of immigrants was also embedded in the local economic structure. The process of deindustrialization significantly lowered the chance of immigrants getting good first jobs when entering the labor market. Moreover, since deindustrialization benefited the natives by providing them with more opportunities in the service sector, it inadvertently widened the gap in upward mobility chances between natives and immigrants.