Application of the constitutional principle of generality in Spanish companies’ taxation. A compared study to Portugal

Purpose This paper aims to analyse how constitutional law and corporate income tax (CIT) law, in the Iberian Peninsula, addresses the tax justice principle of generality. Also, it has as an intention to understand the dimension of tax exemptions predicted in the CIT law of both countries. Design/methodology/approach It analyses several data sources from Spain and Portugal, between them constitutions laws, CIT laws, general tax laws and some constitutional court cases. Furthermore, it uses the content analysis method to identify the level of exemptions and tax benefits present in the CIT law. Findings The results show that constitutional laws reserve a section to regulate tax issues, that it can present major or minor development. The Spanish article 31 explains the tax system and the Portuguese articles of 103 and 104 explain not only the tax system but also gives instructions about how must occur income, property and consumption taxation. Both jurisdictions, do not refer expressly to the generality principle, nevertheless, it has an implicit presence in the Supreme law and the same happen in the CIT law. They predict that all legal entities, public and private ones, have to contribute to financing the public expenditure. Furthermore, the respect to generality principle implies that tax income exemptions have to be justified, otherwise it can configure a break of the researched fundamental. In researched cases, the Spanish CIT have present more tax exemptions than Portugal, which can lead to consider a relation between the level of corporate contribution to income tax revenues collection and the tax exemptions predicted in the CIT law. Originality/value It allows understanding the difference between tax jurisdictions in the tax principles domain.

GENERAL VOTING LAW IN THE SYSTEM OF VOTING LAW

Universal suffrage occupies a fundamental place in the system of principles of modern electorallaw, which is the basis of legal regulation of the entire electoral process and defines the boundarieswhere the mechanism of electoral legal relations operates.Consolidation of the generality principle is necessary precondition for guaranteeing theelections. The need to apply the universal suffrage is due to the historical development of society, theresult of which was the demand to consolidate democratic ways of the formation of representativeagencies of state authority and local self-government agencies, the basis of which is the universalsuffrage.Ignoring the generality principle in the process of elections actually negates the fairness in therealization of the right to elect and be elected and as a result makes doubts about the legitimacy ofelections and democratic development of the country.

Generality, State Neutrality and Unemployment in the OECD

According to Buchanan and Congleton (1998 . Politics by Principle, Not Interest: Towards Nondiscriminatory Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), the generality principle in politics blocks special interests. Consequently, the generality principle should thereby promote economic efficiency. This study tests this hypothesis on wage formation and labor markets, by investigating whether generality defined as state neutrality could explain employment performance among OECD countries during 1970–2003. We identify three types of non-neutrality concerning unemployment. These include the level or degree of government interference in the wage bargaining process over and above legislation which facilitates mutually beneficial wage agreements, the constrained bargaining range (meaning the extent to which the state favors or blocks certain outcomes of the bargaining process), and the cost shifting (which relates to state interference shifting the direct or indirect burden of costs facing the parties on the labor market). Our overall hypothesis is that non-neutrality or non-generality increases unemployment rates. The empirical results from the general conditional model suggest that government intervention and a constrained bargaining range clearly increase unemployment, while a few of the cost shifting variables have unexpected effects. The findings thus give some, but definitely not unreserved, support for the generality principle as a method to promote economic efficiency. One implication may be that the principle should be amended by other requirements if the political process shall indeed be able to promote economic efficiency.

Liberal Political Economy And Philosophy Of James Buchanan

The article examines the scientific legacy of the Nobel Prize-winning economist James Buchanan (1919—2013). The focus is on the evolution of his views on constitutional political economy. The article shows the displacement of Buchanan’s preferences from the expansion of inclusiveness of collective choice rules and the number of constitutional constraints to the generality principle — a non-discriminatory democracy as a means to counteract majoritarian democracy failures. It is concluded that finally Buchanan adopted radical subjectivism of the Austrian economic school and post-Keynesianism embodied in the concept of constitutionally limited evolution.