strategic reactions
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2021 ◽  
pp. 019251212097288
Author(s):  
Michael Minkenberg ◽  
Anca Florian ◽  
Zsuzsanna Végh ◽  
Malisa Zobel

Radical right parties’ calls for a strong and illiberal nation-state have travelled across the political spectrum into the mainstream in Eastern Europe since the 2000s, contributing to a rightward shift in the region’s politics. The mechanisms behind such influences in Eastern Europe are not yet fully understood. Focusing on the strength of radical right parties and mainstream parties’ strategic reactions to them, this study explores how and under what circumstances radical right parties exert influence on mainstream parties’ general political positions and on their positions concerning ethnic and national minorities – a group frequently targeted by radical right intolerance in the region. Shifts in parties’ positions are analyzed using comparative data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and the authors’ own Viadrina Expert Survey. The study finds that where mainstream parties formally or informally cooperated with radical right parties or coopted their agenda, lasting rightward position shifts are observable. Consequently, the authors argue that by contributing to rightward shifts, especially on positions concerning minorities, radical right parties play a role in undermining liberal democratic values, thus contributing to the ‘depletion of democracy’.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 10-32
Author(s):  
Alireza Aghaee Shahrbabaki ◽  
Saeed Sakkaki ◽  
Peyman Parsa ◽  
Mohammad Saeed Heidary ◽  
Vahid Yousefi Pour

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
José Antonio Alonso ◽  
Francisco Javier Santos Arteaga

AbstractThis article seeks to explain the contradiction between the promises of welfare gains derived from the economic models recommending the removal of immigration restrictions and the realities experienced by countries attempting to apply restrictions to immigration flows. A formal model is built in which the strategic reaction of countries considers not only the benefits derived from migration but also the (economic and non-economic) costs that migration can generate in the host country. Strategic reactions drive what may be called the “paradox of adverse interest”: the fewer potential gains associated with liberalization of migration, the easier it becomes for nations to reach an unrestrictive agreement. The existence of two asymmetries (between the bargaining power of receiving and sending countries, and between the private nature of most of migration’s benefits and the social nature of its main costs) can hinder the agreement when the countries involved exhibit a high wage differential. Results suggest that permissive international agreements on migration are easier to reach in regional contexts, among countries with proximate economic conditions and levels of income.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 263178772097519
Author(s):  
Thomas J. Roulet ◽  
Rasmus Pichler

Research on organizational misconduct has examined how audiences generate discourses to make sense of behaviour that may transgress the line between right and wrong. However, when organizations are accused of misconduct, the resulting ambiguity also opens opportunities for organizations and their members to generate discourses aimed at deflecting blame. Little is known about how actors who are at risk of being held responsible actively respond to misconduct accusations by engaging in discursive strategies. To address this question, we build on crisis communication and discourse theory to integrate processes of scapegoating and whistleblowing into a holistic model. We develop a blame game theory – conceptualizing the sequence of discursive strategies employed by an organization and its members to strategically shift blame by attributing responsibility to others or denying misconduct. Our model identifies four blame game pathways as a function of two types of ambiguity: moral ambiguity and attributional ambiguity. We highlight accusations of misconduct as pivotal triggering events in the social construction of misconduct. By conceptualizing the discursive dynamics of strategic reactions to accusations of misconduct, our blame game theory contributes to the literature on organizational misconduct and has implications for research on social evaluations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 101232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher S. Armstrong ◽  
Stephen Glaeser ◽  
John D. Kepler

2018 ◽  
pp. 195-212
Author(s):  
TUNDIS , ENRICO ◽  
GABRIELE, ROBERTO ◽  
ZANINOTTO, ENRICO
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