It’s gotta be the shoes: Nike in the Spike-o-sphere

This chapter traces the history and significance of Nike shoes within the auteurist mediascape that Spike Lee has cultivated for over three decades. Lee has steadily created his own dynamic, paracinematic universe that both parallels the logic of Hollywood’s dominant mode of production and resists some of its core tenets by retaining at its centre the distinct idea of the auteur—precisely what transmedial storytelling and postmodern textuality are often viewed to have obliterated. The chapter focuses on the beginning of Lee’s professional career in the 1980s and its current moment, noting the strong affinities between these moments both in American culture and in Lee’s work, which are intimately bound up with one another. Examining Lee’s career in this way provides insight into Lee’s engagement with the problem of police brutality and the enduring injustices faced by the black community in the US.

PRINCIPLES OF THINKING AND THEIR ROLE IN PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC PERSONNEL

The article reveals the interrelationships between the philosophical interpretation of the principles of thinking and their role in the processes of training highly qualified personnel. Highly qualified personnel who are trained at the third level of higher education (postgraduate, adjunct) directly depend on the level of development of thinking. At the same time, the assessment of the development of thinking is conditioned by a clear and distinct idea of the foundations of the development of thinking in general. The author defends the point of view that the leading role in identifying the principles of thinking on which the training of highly qualified specialists is based is played by the addition in pedagogical science of formal logic and the standards of thinking set by it by non-logical ways of performing acts of thought.

Philosophical Disputation Containing a Distinct Idea of Those Things That Pertain Either to the Mind or to Our Living and Organic Body (1734) (Latin and English)

This section presents, in Latin and English, the entirety of Anton Wilhelm Amo’s 1734 Philosophical Disputation Containing a Distinct Idea of those Things that Pertain either to the Mind or to Our Living and Organic Body. In this work Amo attempts to work out the implications of the impossibility of being-acted-upon for the mind’s actions, and tries to show how the mind understands, wills, and effects things through the body by ‘intentions’ which direct motions in our body intentionally toward external things. Amo tries to show how far each type of human act belongs to the mind, how far to the body; he argues especially against Jean Le Clerc, who had attributed a broad range of acts to the mind.

Anton Wilhelm Amo's Philosophical Dissertations on Mind and Body

Anton Wilhelm Amo (c. 1703–after 1752) is the first modern African philosopher to study and teach in a European university and write in the European philosophical tradition. This book provides an extensive historical and philosophical introduction to Amo’s life and work, and provides Latin texts, with facing translations and explanatory notes, of Amo’s two philosophical dissertations, On the Impassivity of the Human Mind and the Philosophical Disputation containing a Distinct Idea of those Things that Pertain either to the Mind or to our Living and Organic Body, both published in 1734. The Impassivity is an extended argument that the mind cannot be acted on, that sensation is a being-acted-on by the sensed object, and therefore that sensation does not belong to the mind, and must belong instead to the body. The Distinct Idea works out the implications for the mind’s actions, and tries to show how the mind understands, wills, and effects things through the body by ‘intentions’ which direct motions in our body intentionally toward external things. Both dissertations try to show how far each type of human act belongs to the mind, how far to the body, and expose and resolve earlier philosophers’ self-contradictions on these questions.

How to Make the Passions Active: Spinoza and R.G. Collingwood

Most early modern philosophers held that our emotions are always passions: to experience an emotion is to undergo something rather than to do something. Spinoza is different; he holds that our emotions – what he calls our ‘affects’ – can be actions rather than passions. Moreover, we can convert a passive affect into an active one simply by forming a clear and distinct idea of it. This theory is difficult to understand. I defend the interpretation R.G. Collingwood gives of it in his book, The Principles of Art. An affect, it turns out, is passive when it is ambiguous whether we or somebody else is the subject of the affect. An affect is active when we fully accept the affect as our own. Here, I outline Collingwood's interpretation and then develop it further.

Impact of Social Economics in Social Development

Here, in the article, basically the society and economics how are related that will presented. Even, the nature of social economics or socioeconomics will be described here. This is an important branch of economics. Tis article contains various aspects of social economics. Some of important topics are as like social status, social class and so on. Thus by this article, we will get distinct idea about this topic.

Living without Labels

Charles Evans Hughes's career ran along the fault lines of most of the major political events of his lifetime. Muckraking catapulted him to fame. He governed New York during four key years of the Progressive era as an effective administrator and earnest reformer. He stayed with the Republican Party when the Progressives bolted in 1912. He ran for the presidency in 1916 but missed the prize, albeit by a narrower electoral college margin than any other contender until the very end of the century. He was instrumental in negotiating the international naval disarmament accords of 1921–22, landmarks of progressive internationalism in their day that fell under sharp criticism a decade later. He presided over the U.S. Supreme Court during the key years of the New Deal, though in most histories of the 1930s Court he comes across as something of an also-ran behind its more memorable shapers: Brandeis, Cardozo, Sutherland, Black, even Roberts. Hard to pin to any achievement or distinct idea, slipping in and out of the dramatic movements of his day, he was the kind of man who makes history but easily falls out of the history books.

IDENTIFICATION, THE SELF, AND AUTONOMY

Autonomy, we suppose, is self-regulation or self-direction. There is a distinct idea that is easily confused with self-direction, namely, self-expression, self-fulfillment, or self-realization. (I do not mean to suggest that the latter three terms are all synonymous. But in this essay, whatever differences there are among them play no role, so I will use them interchangeably.) Although it will turn out paradoxically that autonomy is neither self-regulation nor self-realization, it is reasonable to suppose that the former is a superior candidate. My teacher of Indian religion, Dr. Subodh Roy, blind from birth, chose not to undergo an operation that would have made him sighted because he believed, perhaps rightly, that the ability to see would interfere with his religious quest. He thereby chose not to realize one of his fundamental human capacities, one whose cultivation has produced some of the finest fruits of civilization. Joseph Raz describes a case in which a man places his life in jeopardy by undertaking a trip to deliver medical aid to a group of people in a distant place. Since he will be unable to secure food for several days, he, in effect, subordinates one of his own basic needs or interests to a goal that he deems more important. There is no reason to believe that, in refusing to express or realize a dimension of self, either Dr. Roy or Raz's philanthropist have failed to act autonomously.