The Government in SNA-Compliant DSGE Models

The government size in developed economies expanded remarkably after the Second World War. This growth shaped the role of the government as a key player in the economic activity and the aggregate dynamics of a country. However, the way in which the government is represented in DSGE models is often reductive, containing homogeneous public spending and a few distortionary taxes without clear counterparts in fiscal data. This paper shows how dynamic general equilibrium models can incorporate a detailed government sector as defined in the System of National Accounts (SNA). This government features six types of public expenditures (i.e. the government’s intermediate consumption, public wage bill, debt service, public investment, and transfers to households both in-kind and other-than-in-kind), and five distortionary taxes (i.e. consumption tax, capital and labor income taxes, corporate tax and social contributions).

Recycling Carbon Tax Revenue to Maximize Welfare

This paper explores how to recycle carbon tax revenue back to households to maximize welfare. Using a general equilibrium lifecycle model calibrated to reflect the heterogeneity in the U.S. economy, we find the optimal policy uses two thirds of carbon-tax revenue to reduce the distortionary tax on capital income while the remaining one third is used to increase the progressivity of the labor-income tax. The optimal policy attains higher welfare and more equality than the lump-sum rebate approach preferred by policymakers as well as the approach originally prescribed by economists--which called exclusively for reductions in distortionary taxes.

Bail-in and Bailout: Friends or Foes?

This paper analyzes the effects of bail-in and bailout policies on banks’ funding costs, incentives for loan monitoring, and financing capacity. In a model with moral hazard and two investment stages, a full bail-in turns out to be, ex post, the optimal policy to deal with a failing bank. Unlike a bailout, it allows the government to recapitalize the bank without resorting to distortionary taxes. As a consequence, however, investors expect bail-ins rather than bailouts. Ex ante, this raises banks’ cost of debt and depresses bankers’ incentives to monitor. When moral hazard is severe, this time inconsistency leads to a credit market collapse in which productive projects are not financed, unless the government precommits to an alternative resolution policy. The optimal policy is either a combination of bail-in and bailout—in which the government uses a minimal amount of public transfers to lower banks’ cost of debt—or liquidation, depending on the severity of moral hazard and the shadow cost of the partial bailout. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.

Effective tax rates in Ireland

This article provides estimates of the effective tax rates in Ireland for the 1995-2017 period. We use these aggregate tax indicators to compare the developments in the Irish tax policy mix with the rest of the European Union countries and investigate any potential relation with Ireland’s macroeconomic performance. Our findings show that distortionary taxes, e.g. on factors of production, are significantly lower while less distortionary taxes, e.g. on consumption, are higher in Ireland than most European countries. Thus, the distribution of tax burden falls relatively more on consumption and to a lesser extent on labour than capital; while in the EU average the norm is the opposite. The descriptive analysis indicates that this shift in the Irish tax policy mix is correlated with the country’s strong economic performance.

A Second-Best Analysis of Alternative Instruments for the Preservation of Natural Resources

The literature on second-best environmental taxation provides us with a broad understanding of the welfare impacts of pollution regulation. However, most of the research undertaken to date has focused on environmental pollution, while other topics in environmental economics, such as the preservation of natural resources, have not warranted much attention in the optimal taxation literature. This paper uses a simple general-equilibrium model to analyze the welfare effects of taxes on final goods, taxes on natural resources, and extraction permits with a second-best approach based on the existence of initial distortionary taxes. This analysis not only takes into account the non-use utility of the mere existence of natural resources, but also captures the consequences of enjoying environmental goods on labor supply decisions, through the use-value attributed to natural resources. The comparison of the welfare impacts of a tax on final consumption and a tax on the use of natural resources is not conclusive. A consumption tax leads to a higher primary welfare effect than a resources tax, while taxing natural goods generates more revenue-recycling income than taxing consumption goods. In addition, as extraction permits do not generate new public revenues to reduce pre-existing distortionary taxes, this intervention entails the highest welfare costs.

Optimal Dynamic Carbon Taxes in a Climate–Economy Model with Distortionary Fiscal Policy

How should carbon be taxed as a part of fiscal policy? The literature on optimal carbon pricing often abstracts from other taxes. However, when governments raise revenues with distortionary taxes, carbon levies have fiscal impacts. While they raise revenues directly, they may shrink the bases of other taxes (e.g. by decreasing employment). This article theoretically characterizes and then quantifies optimal carbon taxes in a dynamic general equilibrium climate–economy model with distortionary fiscal policy. First, this article establishes a novel theoretical relationship between the optimal taxation of carbon and of capital income. This link arises because carbon emissions destroy natural capital: they accumulate in the atmosphere and decrease future output. Consequently, this article shows how the standard logic against capital income taxes extends to distortions on environmental capital investments. Second, this article characterizes optimal climate policy in sub-optimal fiscal settings where income taxes are constrained to remain at their observed levels. Third, this article presents a detailed calibration that builds on the seminal DICE approach but adds features essential for a setting with distortionary taxes, such as a differentiation between climate change production impacts (e.g. on agriculture) and direct utility impacts (e.g. on biodiversity existence value). The central quantitative finding is that optimal carbon tax schedules are 8–24% lower when there are distortionary taxes, compared to the setting with lump-sum taxes considered in the literature.

The welfare effects of infrastructure investment in a heterogeneous agents economy

Public infrastructure is one of the foundations for the economic growth of a country. While there is a strong consensus regarding infrastructure’s effect on growth, less is known about the effect of infrastructure on welfare and the distribution of wealth. In this paper, we examine the quantitative effect of infrastructure investment on welfare and the degree of inequality present within a developing country. In so doing, we characterize the effects resulting from increased infrastructure investment by tracing out the entire transition path between steady states. Three results standout: (i) both average and individual welfare effects are sizable, regardless of how the additional investment is financed, (ii) when distortionary taxes are adjusted to finance additional investment, poorer agents benefit more when the interest income tax is used, while richer agents benefit more when either the consumption or labor income taxes are used, (iii) inequality, as measured by the wealth Gini, rises in the short-run, but the long-run effect depends on which financing method is chosen.

CARBON TAX FOR ACHIEVING CHINA’S NDC: SIMULATIONS OF SOME DESIGN FEATURES USING A CGE MODEL

China has set a goal of reducing its CO2 intensity of GDP by 60–65% from the 2005 level in 2030 as its nationally determined contribution (NDC) under the Paris Climate Change Agreement. While the government is considering series of market and nonmarket measures to achieve its target, this study assesses the economic consequences if the target were to meet through a market mechanism, carbon tax. We used a dynamic computable general equilibrium model of China for the analysis. The study shows that the level of carbon tax to achieve the NDC target would be different depending on its design features. An increasing carbon tax that starts at a small rate in 2015 and rises to a level to meet the NDC target in 2030 would cause smaller GDP loss than the carbon tax with a constant rate would do. The GDP loss due to the carbon tax would be smaller when the tax revenue is utilized to cut existing distortionary taxes than when it is transferred to households as a lump-sum rebate.

A Discriminatory Mechanism to Reduce Urban Congestion

In this article, we propose an optimal mechanism to reduce congestion when information is asymmetric. Each car driver receives a quantity of traffic rights such that his adjusted marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost of congestion and payments are based on willingness to pay. We show that the level of congestion achieved is lower and each car user can receive more or fewer rights than under complete information. With symmetric beliefs, the payment rule results from a seconddegree price discrimination. When beliefs are asymmetric, it results simultaneously from a second-degree price discrimination and from a third-degree price discrimination and high willingness-to-pay car users are discriminated against. The revenue raised can be used to reduce distortionary taxes, thereby gaining public acceptability.