ANALYSIS OF THE CAPABILITIES OF PORTABLE MINE-HUNTING EQUIPMENT OF THE AUXILIARY MINE COUNTERMEASURE DIVISION TO SUPPORT THE SUCCESS OF AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS

<div><p class="Els-history-head">Revolution in Military Affair (RMA) has encouraged technological developments in the field of mine warfare. Technological developments in the field of mine warfare have produced smart littoral mines, in which a threat that can thwart the implementation of amphibious assaults. This study tries to analyze the Auxiliary Mine Counter Measure (MCM) Division portable mine-hunting equipment capabilities to support the success of amphibious assaults. This study uses the Measurement of Effectiveness (MoE) and the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) methods to measure capabilities and determine priorities for increasing the capability of portable mine-hunting equipment to support amphibious attack support. As a result, the equipment that rushes portable mines is an increase in support for amphibious assaults because it is incompatible with existing technological developments. To be able to support the spirit of the invasion, it is necessary to procure new equipment designed by following latest developments in mine warfare technology.</p></div>

Technology-Driven Revolutions in Military Affairs

The term Revolutions in Military Affair (rma) was originally coined by the Soviets realizing that the US planned to utilize electronics and computers to improve both its weapons and battle management. Other such revolutions were caused by the emergence of aircraft, submarines, mechanized warfare, precision-guided munitions (pgms), unmanned vehicles and Net-Centric-Warfare. Beside its effect on fighting, military technology also affects the public and its leadership. Several technological developments, such as rockets and drones, cyberwarfare, and homemade explosives and chemical and biological weapons, are already changing current concepts and conduct of warfare through their direct effect on warfighting and by their potential effect on the public and its leadership. Consequently, rmas should be analyzed in terms of the linkages between the rear, where chaos can be created, and the front, where the armed forces typically operate.

Linguoculturological peculiarities of evolution of the borrowed concepts

The subject of this research is the determination of common and different aspects in evolutionary transformations of the borrowed concepts in various linguocultures. The object of this research is the borrowed concepts of &ldquo;reserve&rdquo; in the Russian linguoculture and such in the French and English. The author examines the frequency characteristics of lexemes &ndash; representative concepts, semantic saturation, and structure of the concepts depending on the time and historical events in the Russian, French and English linguocultures. The ways of infiltration from the original language to recipient language are reviewed. Analysis is conducted by means of etymological, definitive, comparative and contrastive methods based on the material of national corpuses of indicated languages by appealing to dictionaries data. It is demonstrated that in the XVIII-XIX centuries the concept of &ldquo;reserve&rdquo; was segmental in all three languages and had three segments: &ldquo;military affair&rdquo;, &ldquo;financial-economic activity&rdquo; and &ldquo;personality traits&rdquo;. However, the structure of the concept of &ldquo;reserve&rdquo; in the Russian language has undergone transformations: the &ldquo;personality traits&rdquo; segment was eliminated, while in the French and English languages the conceptual attributes of personality traits&rdquo; segment of the concept of &ldquo;reserve&rdquo; relevant back in the XVIII century, have survived to this day. The author explores the possible reasons of elimination of the segment of &ldquo;personality traits&rdquo; in the Russian language.

Comparative Characteristics of the Activities of A. B. Lobanov-Rostovsky and N.P. Ignatiev During the Russian-Turkish War of 1878-1879

Successes in Russian politics of the XIX century are significant thanks to the efforts of diplomats Alexei Borisovich Lobanov-Rostovsky and Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatieff. In studies of the XX century, they are almost forgotten. Ignatieff is an experienced tactician, a supreme professional who owns a military affair. He had diplomatic cunning. Sometimes Ignatieff showed adventurism. Basically, these qualities provided him good luck in the diplomatic field. However, Ignatieff was not enough historical knowledge. It was in diplomatic negotiations during the Russian-Turkish war of 1878-1879 that this lacuna prevented his success. He insisted on the idea of pan-Slavism, not taking into account all international factors. The diplomat did not take into account the historical features of the Ottoman Empire, Europe’s interest in its power and influence, that is, the historical totality of the international system of counterweights. Lobanov-Rostovsky - strategist. And it was inherent evasiveness, skillful ability to convince of the correctness. However, the role of historical education in his diplomatic practice was enormous. In a more deliberate line of conduct at the conclusion of the final Treaty of Constantinople, he was helped by fundamental «background knowledge» that allowed him to adequately assess the geopolitical situation. The Prince was engaged in history from an early age. The hobby grew into professional occupations. For 16 years he published historical essays in leading historical journals. He had access to secret documents of the Russian Empire thanks to the trust of Emperor Alexander II. Lobanov used to work with primary sources. History has taught him that sometimes you need to act quickly, and in some situations, to exercise the greatest caution. In the situation of the Russian-Turkish war, he set himself only specific goals. If the San Stefano peace Treaty of 1878, signed by count Ignatieff, is well known, then the final Treaty of Constantinople, signed by Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky, is still very little mentioned. Meanwhile, after the Treaty of San Stefano, there were events that undermined its positive results. A “Berlin treatise of the great powers” in 1878 deprived Russia of a significant part of the acquisitions that it has achieved under the Treaty of San Stefano. Here Lobanov faced important General and specific tasks. To solve them, the new Ambassador had to have absolutely unique characteristics. In addition to the enormously developed ability Lobanov to build relationships with people: personal goodwill and the confidence of Alexander II; the respect in the higher Turkish circles; the location to him of the Sultan, who himself appealed to the Emperor with a request to appoint Ambassador Lobanov. The totality of personality traits and circumstances led to a convincing success, which was the final Treaty of Constantinople in 1879, which resulted in an independent state-the Autonomous Principality of Bulgaria.

Simply the Best?

This chapter examines officer promotion and selection policies in India. It begins with a conceptual discussion of the role of civilians in this process, examining its practice in other democracies. Thereafter it describes the historical evolution in the Indian military’s officer promotion and selection policies. In doing so it makes three broad arguments. First, promotion policies are an almost exclusive military affair, and civilians have little to do with the processes. As in other established democracies, senior officer promotions are subject to the approval of political authorities; but, exceptions apart, there is little evidence that civilians have actively shaped these policies. Second, a lack of civilian guidance exacerbates parochial divisions within the military. Third, military promotion policies would be better served with greater (but informed) civilian oversight. There is a need therefore to create conditions for a dialogue on promotion, selection, and placement policies. Such a measure, however, also needs to create safeguards to prevent politicization of the military.

Mexico Opens the Door to American Capital, 1877–1880

Historians treating the American-Mexican diplomatic crisis during the Hayes administration have tended to regard it as a political and military affair, involving such points of controversy as the American recognition of Porfirio Díaz, the Mexican inability to keep order on the frontier, invasions of Mexico by American troops to punish marauding Indians, and, behind and above all, Mexican fears of American territorial ambitions. No one will deny that these dramatic circumstances deserve attention, but some writers have largely ignored the economic side of the question. Under cover of the rifle fire along the border and the excited buzzing in the government offices American business promoters, long anxious to take part in the development of Mexican resources, finally obtained the terms which would make this development possible. In September, 1880, after three years of controversy and war scares had almost extinguished American hopes, the Mexican government granted generous concessions for the building of the Mexican Central and the Mexican National Railroads and, in so doing, opened the way for an inrush of American capital.