Morphological marking of constituent questions: A case for nonlocal amalgamation

This paper considers the role of nonlocal amalgamation in a system of analyses for typologically diverse languages. Nonlocal amalgamation (Bouma et al. 2001) was suggested in particular to get rid of extraction rules in Pollard and Sag's (1994) analysis of long-distance dependencies. However, in implemented projects like the English Resource Grammar (Flickinger, 2000, 2011) and the Grammar Matrix (Bender et al., 2002, 2010), the extraction rules have been maintained, while nonlocal amalgamation is used for the analysis of phenomena like the easy-adjectives. Zamaraeva and Emerson (2020) argue that, if extraction rules are kept, then supporting the English easy-adjectives may be an insufficient reason to maintain nonlocal amalgamation in a cross-linguistic system like the Grammar Matrix, as it complicates the analysis of multiple question word fronting with flexible word order (in languages such as Russian [rus]). However, I present here a case of morphological marking of questions (in languages like Makah [myh]) which further motivates nonlocal amalgamation, as the analysis is remarkably more simple with it than it is without it. An analysis of morphological marking of questions needs to be part of a cross-linguistic system such as the Grammar Matrix as well as an analysis of multiple fronting, which adds a new tension at the level of the Matrix "core" and provides concrete material for discussion of issues ranging from empirical implementation of theoretical ideas like nonlocal amalgamation to the big question of how much of typological space a single system of grammar is expected to cover.

Causal versions of maximum entropy and principle of insufficient reason

The principle of insufficient reason (PIR) assigns equal probabilities to each alternative of a random experiment whenever there is no reason to prefer one over the other. The maximum entropy principle (MaxEnt) generalizes PIR to the case where statistical information like expectations are given. It is known that both principles result in paradoxical probability updates for joint distributions of cause and effect. This is because constraints on the conditional P ( effect ∣ cause ) P\left({\rm{effect}}| {\rm{cause}}) result in changes of P ( cause ) P\left({\rm{cause}}) that assign higher probability to those values of the cause that offer more options for the effect, suggesting “intentional behavior.” Earlier work therefore suggested sequentially maximizing (conditional) entropy according to the causal order, but without further justification apart from plausibility on toy examples. We justify causal modifications of PIR and MaxEnt by separating constraints into restrictions for the cause and restrictions for the mechanism that generates the effect from the cause. We further sketch why causal PIR also entails “Information Geometric Causal Inference.” We briefly discuss problems of generalizing the causal version of MaxEnt to arbitrary causal DAGs.

Postcolonial Proportionality

In Johar, the Supreme Court unanimously struck down Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which criminalized same-sex relations. The idea of transformative constitutionalism figured centrally, as did a piece of the global template of rights-protection—proportionality. In Johar, the Indian Constitution was envisioned as a transformative document, in two senses: anti-colonial and cosmopolitan. It gave birth to a radically new constitutional order that conferred citizenship and political power on the previously disenfranchised living under the yoke of British imperial rule. The Indian Constitution was also a cosmopolitan constitution in its fidelity to the universal principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity. These two conceptions of transformative constitutionalism define the scope of admissible reasons for proportionality analysis. Section 377 of the Indian Penal was unconstitutional on the cosmopolitan ground that mere social morality was an insufficient reason to limit the right to engage in harmless, constitutionally protected activity, the basis on which courts around the world have struck down parallel provisions. I argue that Section 377 was also unconstitutional for the anti-colonial reason that it was an element of the Imperial constitutional order in British India in the period after the Indian Mutiny in 1857 of indirect colonial rule.

The Human Right of Reproduction: Ovum Donation and Surrogacy

The right to reproduction, including the use of modern methods of fertility medicine, is well founded on constitutional grounds and is protected by the Constitution Germany and of Estonia as well. This right is protected also at the level of European human rights, by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which addresses the right to a private and family life. In light of Article 8(2) of that convention, restrictions to these are deemed legitimate only when they are based on scientifically valid evidence and to protect the wellbeing of the child. The author concludes that the current state of scientific knowledge gives insufficient reason to justify prohibition of ovum donation and surrogate motherhood. Said prohibition discriminates against people who rely on such methods (thereby infringing on Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 3(1) of the German Basic Law). Therefore, ovum donation and surrogacy should be allowed by law, as is proposed under sections 6 and 8 of the proposal for a modern law on reproductive medicine (AME-FMedG) issued by the Augsburg and Munich Working Group of medical ethics lawyers.

The Speculative Hopper: Toward a Geology of a Toxic Absolute

The paper examines the overall course of the so-called “speculative turn” in contemporary Continental philosophy with regard to the ecology of the Absolute. Following the radical redefinition of the mechanics of speculation that has been proposed by theorists of the speculative turn (especially Quentin Meillassoux) as rejection of the absolute essence of classical metaphysics, the author concentrates on the tension between speculative rejection and the problem of grounds which arises from putting the question this way. By rejecting the Absolute as sufficient reason and therefore undermining the grounds of thought, speculative philosophy expands the field of grounds. The logic of sufficient reason is augmented by insufficient reason, sufficient unreason, and insufficient unreason. This field of grounds encompasses the whole “kinesis” of the speculative turn, including the current attempts to turn away from speculation and move beyond the grounds and absolute relied upon in the “new geophilosophy.” The author notes that the shift from the question of “what?” to the question of “where?” indicates that the new geophilosophy is a “territorial geophilosophy.” Even though it nullifies the problem of grounds, it remains subject to grounds as insufficient reason, and thereby exemplifies the vulgar understanding of speculative thought as mere speculation. At the same time, the speculative turn replaces territorial geophilosophy with a resource-based geophilosophy which is more concerned with the question of “when?”. The author maintains that precisely this kind of questioning forces speculative philosophy both to the edge of the field of the Absolute and to a solution for the problem of rejecting grounds as insufficient unreason, Insufficient unreason unlocks a vertical dimension to strata of the Absolute, through which speculation turns into a trowel that unearths the absolutus and discards the Absolutes.

Deliberative and Participatory Democracy

This chapter explores the relationship between participatory and deliberative democracy; analysing their similarities and differences, compatibilities and tensions, to ascertain whether they should, and can, be pursued in tandem. The case is made that the normative and explanatory potential of each approach is diminished without the presence of the other in these conceptions so it is desirable and coherent to pursue a ‘participatory deliberative democracy’ in which citizens participate in making collective decisions through deliberation. There are certainly challenges in combining them, but the inconclusive evidence on their compatibility provides insufficient reason not to try given the legitimacy benefits that could be accrued if successful. Indeed, it is concluded that many citizens would welcome more opportunities to participate in, meaningful and consequential, deliberation.

The rationality of belief change and the unexpected effects of a conflict of values

This article is based on a question that is already present in the work of Festinger et al.: Why is the unequivocal disproof of a given belief an insufficient reason for abandoning that belief? We will first outline the cognitive dissonance theory and then discuss how, in a seemingly counterintuitive way, beliefs that are contradicted by facts—that is, factual contradictions—lead only to minimal belief changes, whereas beliefs that are in contradiction with some fundamental value held by an individual—that is, axiological contradictions—represent a challenge to the individual’s entire belief system and may lead to disaffiliation. The objective of this article is to propose an alternative explanatory hypothesis to that of Festinger—which is now disputed—and thus provide new answers to help understand the process by which beliefs are abandoned. This article has epistemological ambitions insofar as it aims to demonstrate that by means of a paradigm based on reasons and abduction—the Boudon-Peirce Paradigm—it is possible to propose an alternative, explanatory hypothesis to that of Festinger’s and to provide new answers to facilitate understanding the process of abandonment of beliefs. This comprehensive paradigm has allowed the discovery that conflicts of values—axiological contradictions—can cause disaffiliation.