Rules versus Discretion in Bank Resolution

Recent reforms have given regulators broad powers to “bail-in” bank creditors during financial crises. We analyze efficient bail-ins and their implementation. To preserve liquidity, regulators must avoid signaling negative private information to creditors. Therefore, optimal bail-ins in bad times only depend on public information. As a result, the optimal policy cannot be implemented if regulators have wide discretion, due to an informational time-inconsistency problem. Rules mandating tough bail-ins after bad public signals, or contingent convertible (co-co) bonds, improve welfare. We further show that bail-in and bailout policies are complementary: if bailouts are possible, then discretionary bail-ins are more effective.

1. Introduction to Family Law

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter begins with an overview of families and family law in England and Wales today. It then discusses themes and issues in contemporary family law, covering rules versus discretion; women’s and men’s perspectives on family law; sex and gender identity; sexual orientation; cultural diversity; and state intervention versus private ordering, including the role of the family court and of non-court dispute resolution in family cases, and challenges facing the family justice system.

The New European Union Framework for Banking Crisis Management: Rules versus Discretion

What Tolstoy says about families also applies to banks: sound banks are all alike, but every failing bank fails in its own way. This is the reason why broad discretion is needed to manage banking crises. This paper studies the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive to assess whether it grants the competent authorities enough discretionary powers to deal with banking crises in the most efficient way. The new EU legal framework for banking resolution is marked by a very complex system of rules, with numerous constraints on the discretionary choices of the competent authorities, which could make it difficult to reach the goals underlying the BRRD, i. e., ensuring long term financial and economic stability and reducing the public cost of banking crises.