Assertions, Handicaps, and Social Norms

How should we undertand the role of norms – especially epistemic norms – governing assertive speech acts? Mitchell Green (2009) has argued that these norms play the role of handicaps in the technical sense from the animal signals literature. As handicaps, they then play a large role in explaining the reliability – and so the stability (the continued prevalence) – of assertive speech acts. But though norms of assertion conceived of as social norms do indeed play this stabilizing role, these norms are best understood as deterrents and not as handicaps. This paper explains the stability problem for the maintenance of animal signals, and so human communication; the mechanics of the handicap principle; the role of deterrents and punishments as an alternative mechanism; and the role of social norms governing assertion for the case of human communication.

Experiencing Emotions

This chapter provides an account of the basic emotions and their expression. Emotions are experiences that have the function of indicating how we are faring in our environment. Emotions are also objects of experience: our perceptual systems are sensitive to the expression of emotion in our environment by features that have the function of indicating emotions. Thus, we come to have to knowledge of emotions by perceptually representing properties that function to indicate them. The chapter applies this account to expression in art. What does it mean to say that an artwork expresses sadness? Is perceiving joy in an artwork the same kind of experience as perceiving joy in a friend’s face? How may artworks express emotions without having emotions? The chapter offers a representationalist account of the basic emotions on which exteroceptive and interoceptive systems combine to constitute a system whose states—emotions—indicate how we are faring. Building on the work of Dominic Lopes (2005) and Mitchell Green (2007), the chapter offers a teleosemantic account of emotional expression in art that is impersonal and continuous with a representationalist account of the basic emotions. Features in the environment express emotions even in conditions in which there is no person to whom the emotion is attributable. We experience emotions in two ways: we may have emotions, and we experience emotions as represented properties of the environment. In both cases, experiencing emotions is a matter of experiencing how things are in the world and thus provides perceptual knowledge.

Asymmetrical Conversations

According to Mitchell Green, speech act theory traditionally idealizes away from crucial aspects of conversational contexts, including those in which the speaker’s social position affects the possibility of her performing certain speech acts. In recent times, asymmetries in communicative situations have become a lively object of study for linguists, philosophers of language and moral philosophers: several scholars view hate speech itself in terms of speech acts, namely acts of subordination (acts establishing or reinforcing unfair hierarchies). The aim of this paper is to address one of the main objections to accounts of hate speech in terms of illocutionary speech acts, that is the Authority Problem. While the social role of the speaker is the focus of several approaches (Langton 2018a, 2018b; Maitra 2012; Kukla 2014; Green 2014, 2017a, 2017b), the social role of the audience has too often been neglected. The author will show that not only must the speaker have a certain kind of standing or social position in order to perform speech acts of subordination, but also the audience must typically have a certain kind of standing or social position in order to either license or object to the speaker’s authority, and her acts of subordination.

Utterances without Force

In this paper the author attempts to reconcile two claims recently defended by Mitchell Green. The first is that illocutionary force is part of speaker meaning (Green 2018). The second is that illocutionary force is a product of cultural evolution (Green 2017). Consistent with the second claim, the author argues that some utterances – particularly those produced by infants and great apes – are produced with communicative intent, but without illocutionary force. These utterances lack the normative properties constitutive of force because their utterers have no grasp of the norms that operate on developed speech. If there can be utterances produced with communicative intent that lack force, we must consider how exactly force is a part of speaker meaning. In response the author argues that force is an inessential and acquired part of speaker meaning. As a result we need a conception of communicative intent more basic than illocutionary intent. He spells this out in terms of a ‘perlocutionary’ intention.