Deflationary Truth and the Problem of Relativistic Grounds of Emotivism

The article discusses the Frege-Geach problem, which is considered one of the most serious difficulties for emotive meta-ethics. The paper describes how recognition of an emotive content by moral statements in the form of attitudes leads to the emergence of the Frege-Geach problem. The essence of the problem is explained, which consists in the impossibility to make a logical conclusion in a situation of mixed contexts, when the antecedent has a value meaning, and the consequent is descriptive. The authors consider one way to solve this problem, which involves the use of a deflationary theory of truth. It is proved that the adoption of deflationism about the truth makes it possible to draw a logical conclusion in mixed contexts. They also raise the question of whether the application of deflationary truth concept is sufficient to avoid the relativistic effects of emotivism on normative ethics. The authors note that the synthesis of deflationism and emotivism is not able to explain the internalism of moral statements, which always have a hidden prescriptive modality. The conclusion is made that deflationism does not allow emotivism to avoid relativistic consequences in the field of normative ethics. Therefore, the authors conclude that emotivism should be called the nihilistic theory of the rationale for moral statements.

Deflating Deflationary Truthmaking

In this paper we confront a challenge to truthmaker theory that is analogous to the objections raised by deflationists against substantive theories of truth. Several critics of truthmaker theory espouse a ‘deflationary’ attitude about truthmaking, though it has not been clearly presented as such. Our goal is to articulate and then object to the underlying rationale behind deflationary truthmaking. We begin by developing the analogy between deflationary truth and deflationary truthmaking, and then show how the latter can be found in the work of Dodd, Hornsby, Schnieder, Williamson, and others. These philosophers believe that the ambitions of truthmaker theory are easily satisfied, without recourse to ambitious ontological investigation—hence the analogy with deflationary truth. We argue that the deflationists’ agenda fails: there is no coherent deflationary theory of truthmaking. Truthmaking, once deflated, fails to address the questions at the heart of truthmaking investigation. Truthmaking cannot be had on the cheap.

Scientific realism with correspondence truth: A reply to Asay (2018)

Asay (2018) criticizes our contention that psychologists do best to adhere to a substantive theory of correspondence truth. He argues that deflationary theory can serve the same purposes as correspondence theory. In the present article we argue that (a) scientific realism, broadly construed, requires a version of correspondence theory and (b) contrary to Asay’s suggestion, correspondence theory does have important additional resources over deflationary accounts in its ability to support generalizations over classes of true sentences.

Theoretical Foundations for Human Rights

This article explores an alternative to the established dichotomy between philosophical (natural law) accounts of human rights, characterized by a foundationalist tendency, and political (practice-based) accounts of human rights, which aspire to be non-foundationalist. I argue that in order to justify human rights practice, political accounts of human rights cannot do without the support of theoretical foundations, although not necessarily of the natural-law variety. As an alternative to natural-law metaphysics, a deflationary theory of human rights, based on a deflationary account of truth, is put forward. Starting from a distinction between ‘extreme’ and ‘moderate’ forms of deflationism, this article defends a constructivist theory of human rights grounded on the Humean notion of conventionalism. This innovative approach to human rights provides political conceptions of human rights with the foundations (or quasi-foundations) they need, but are currently lacking.

Semantic Non-factualism in Kripke’s Wittgenstein

Kripke’s Wittgenstein is standardly understood as a non-factualist about meaning ascription. Non-factualism about meaning ascription is the idea that sentences like “Joe means addition by ‘plus’” are not used to state facts about the world. Byrne and Kusch have argued that Kripke’s Wittgenstein is not a non-factualist about meaning ascription. They are aware that their interpretation is non-standard, but cite arguments from Boghossian and Wright to support their view. Boghossian argues that non-factualism about meaning ascription is incompatible with a deflationary theory of truth. Wright argues that non-factualism about meaning ascription is incoherent. To support the standard interpretation, I’ll respond to each argument in turn. To the degree that my responses are successful, Byrne and Kusch have an unmotivated interpretation of Kripke’s Wittgenstein. Wilson provides a factualist interpretation that is not based on Boghossian and Wright’s arguments. Miller argues for a non-factualist interpretation against Wilson, but I’ll show that Miller’s interpretation faces a dilemma. Miller’s argument cannot be maintained if a coherent interpretation of the skeptical solution is to be provided. I’ll show how this dilemma can be avoided and provide an independent argument against Wilson so that a non-factualist interpretation of the skeptical solution can be maintained.

Bahasa Dan Kebenaran Menurut John Langshaw Austin

Abstrak: John Langshaw Austin menjadi terkenal sebagai filosof Lingkaran Oxford yang menekankan pentingnya tuturan performatif. Namun dalam artikelnya “Truth” (1950) ia menggunakan teori korespondensi dalam memahami masalah kebenaran. Austin mengkritik Strawson yang menggunakan teori deflasioner tentang kebenaran berdasarkan analisis mengenai pentingnya tuturan performatif. Dalam tulisan ini akan dijelaskan mengapa Austin lebih memilih teori korespondensi dari pada teori deflasioner dalam memahami kebenaran. Juga akan ditunjukkan sumbangan khas Austin yang membarui teori korespondensi umum yang menggunakan metafora “cermin” dan “peta” realitas dengan menekankan sifat konvensional ide korespondensi. Menurut penulis, hal ini merupakan suatu usaha yang serius dan berguna dalam mengartikulasikan cara kita menggunakan simbol-simbol bahasa yang ditentukan secara sewenang-wenang untuk merepresentasikan realitas dunia. Kata-kata Kunci: Kebenaran, teori korespondensi, teori koherensi, teori deflasioner, teori tindak-tutur, aspek ilokusioner bahasa, tuturan deskriptif, tuturan performatif, konvensi deskriptif, konvensi demonstratif. Abstract: John Langshaw Austin is an “Ordinary Language Philosopher” of Oxford, who is famous for emphasizing the importance of performative statements. In his article, “Truth” (1950), however, he used correspondence theory for understanding the problem of truth. Austin criticized Strawson, who uses the deflationary theory of truth that is compatible with the analysis of performative utterances. This article will explain why Austin chooses the correspondence theory of truth rather than deflationary one. It will also elaborate Austin’s specific contribution in changing the version of the correspondence theory, which uses the metaphor of “mirroring” or “mapping”’ the world, to a conventional correspondence theory. It is, in my opinion, a serious and notable attempt to articulate our use of arbitrary symbols in the representation of brute reality. Keywords: Truth, correspondence theory, coherence theory, deflationary theory, speech-act theory, the illocutionary aspect of language, descriptive utterance, performative utterance, descriptive convention, demonstrative convention.