Book Review: A Theory of Moral Education

In A Theory of Moral Education, Michael Hand homes in on a central problem of moral education and offers us a solution. Briefly put, the problem is this: There is often widespread disagreement about moral matters, even among those who have thought long and hard about them. So how is moral education possible without resorting to indoctrination? We are all aware of familiar strategies to avoid this problem, such as introducing various moral systems and conflicting beliefs without taking a stand on them, encouraging students to reach their own conclusions about moral matters, or even keeping well clear of the whole subject in the first place. Unfortunately, these options are not available to anyone who sees the need for moral education and takes it that bringing about rational assent to moral standards is among its aims. Given this starting point, the fact of reasonable disagreement makes it difficult to see how to avoid the problem of indoctrination. Hand’s solution is to argue that, while disagreement about moral matters is a salient feature of social life, there is a significant core of moral values about which there is actually little contention, and for which an adequate justification is within reach. Among them are “prohibitions on killing and causing harm, stealing and extorting, lying and cheating, and requirements to treat others fairly, keep one’s promises and help those in need” (p. 78). With well-known caveats, there is at least general assent to these prescriptions, but their rational justification is more problematic. The history of ethical theory is littered with arguments as to why such things are wrong, but the arguments are contentious—and that looks to compound the problem. Nevertheless, Hand believes that there is at least one sound argument that can be used to justify our core moral standards.

OPPORTUNITY AND PREFERENCE LEARNING: A REPLY TO CHRISTIAN SCHUBERT

This paper replies to Christian Schubert's critical review of my work on opportunity as a normative criterion. Schubert argues that the criterion I have proposed would not command general assent because it does not recognize the legitimacy of individuals’ preferences for achieving self-development by constraining their future opportunities. I argue that my account of the ‘responsible agent’ is compatible with self-development, and that preferences for self-constraint are less common than Schubert suggests. For the purposes of normative economics, my opportunity criterion is much more generally applicable than Schubert's criterion of ‘opportunity to learn’.

Justice for All? Two Bad Arguments (and Several Good Suggestions) for Resisting Double Jeopardy Reform

The government's latest proposals for double jeopardy law reform leave many unanswered questions and causes for concern regarding their scope and impact. However, the merits of such proposals can only be properly evaluated by viewing them in the broader context of constitutional criminal procedure. It is contended that the true significance of the double jeopardy prohibition is rooted in the constitutional value of the finality of acquittals. Two further supposed rationales for the prohibition, drawn from the Law Commission's recent analysis, are canvassed and conclusively rejected. The common law's ancient ban on double jeopardy is underpinned neither by the well-motivated desire to avoid distressful trials, nor by the promotion of investigative efficiency. Further reform debates would be facilitated by general assent to this clarification.

Achilles, Patroclus and Parental Care in Some Homeric Similes

None of these three passages from the Iliad would be classified as anything other than an extended simile, but the differences between them in subject matter and what is compared make clear how difficult it is to make any simple summary of the nature and functions of the extended simile in Homer that would gain general assent. As the immense quantity of scholarship on these similes would indicate, it is impossible either to argue convincingly that they can have only one or two main functions in the narrative, or categorically to prove or deny that a particular simile has a certain effect or significance for the narrative. To give one brief example, Stephen Nimis usefully distinguishes six major trends in interpretation among earlier scholars' views on the function of similes in Homer: (1) the presentation of the generic alongside the individual, (2) creation of atmosphere, (3) imagistic continuity, (4) characterization and foreshadowing, (5) incorporating the past into the present, and (6) allusion to antecedent literary traditions. Not all of the three similes quoted above perform all of these functions at once, but they certainly perform more than one of them. The only definition that would probably be generally accepted is the rather dry and unhelpful one that a simile functions by briefly interrupting the narrative in order to compare one element in the narrative with another, in order to illuminate something about the original element in the narrative. Moreover, an extended simile begins from an original main point of comparison, but it compares the likeness of two things that are actually not alike in many other respects.

Aristotle and Dido'sHamartia

Scholars have long recognized that the story of Dido in theAeneidis structured like a Greek tragedy and that several of Aristotle's concepts in thePoeticscan profitably be applied to it. Here I return to an old question, to which no answer yet given has commanded general assent: if Dido is a tragic heroine, what, in Aristotelian terms, is herhamartia?I shall argue that Aristotle's model of tragedy provides a useful blueprint for gauging both Dido's moral responsibility for her downfall and the moral and emotional response to it which Virgil expects from his readers. These matters have indeed been very extensively discussed by very distinguished scholars, but in many areas of classical literature – and nowhere more than in theAeneid– modern criticism has become so sophisticated and so attuned to the detection of subtleties such as irony, ambiguity, and ambivalence that it sometimes misses the significance of what is simple and obvious. Aristotle's model of tragedy, while not a refined critical tool, helps us to isolate some basic truths about the tragedy of Dido.

Closing remarks

Only a bold man would dare attempt a synthesis of the wide-ranging discussions of the last two days, let alone distil from them any general principles of biological recognition. The only sentiment which could command general assent is one of gratitude to the Society, the organizers and the contributors for putting before us such a fascinating collection of papers and letting us sharpen our wits on so much new knowledge. The following remarks will therefore be nothing more than personal footnotes; if they omit reference to much of the work which has been presented, and only mention a few of the issues that have been raised, that is a matter of sheer necessity, not of personal prejudice. In our first session we began by reviewing the physical chemistry of molecular interactions in terms of quantum mechanics and statistical mechanics. Professor Buckingham warned us against the temptation of regarding molecular association energies as made up of additive contributions from pairs of atoms or ions, and Professor Symons stressed the highly individual structure-forming habits of water, which make it so difficult to interpret its solvation properties in terms of simplified models which treat water as a uniform dielectric, or as a mixture of monomers and high polymers. Professor Truter then introduced us to the structures of the complexes formed by ferrichrome A, nonactin and other biological agents with metal ions of various kinds. She drew attention to the large conformational changes which often accompany complex formation, and suggested that some at least of these agents owe their specificity to their high flexibility. Presumably one should interpret this generalization in terms of an ability of the complexing agent to meet very precisely the stereochemical needs of one particular ion, coupled with an inability to meet the precise needs of other ions without a certain amount of mechanical strain. To take a single example, it is not immediately obvious how the needs of T1+ differ from those of the alkali metal ions; but that is because we tend to overlook the effect of ionic polarization on the stability of the solvated ion. The T1 + ion, because of its outer electron pair, has a low-lying dipole transition (6s -> 6p) which confers on it a high electric polarizability. As a result, a set of negative ligands on one side induce a negative charge on the other side, and this will hinder the approach of further ligands on that side - as suggested by the curious stereochemistry of some of Professor Truter’s T1 + complexes.

Soma andAmanita muscaria

The importance of the Soma-plant in Vedic religion has never been underestimated. Among the rituals of the Yajurvedic texts, thesoma-sacrifices are among the most elaborate and important, and are described in minute detail in theBrāhmaṇasandŚrauta-sūtras. These later texts nevertheless continue a direct tradition from theṚgveda, which can be seen to reflect an earlier stage in the development of the ritual, doubtless of a less rigidly formalized and probably less elaborate nature. Even so, theṚgvedais, so to speak, permeated by Soma. Understandably, therefore, from the early days of Vedic studies in the West, many scholars have speculated on the botanical identity of the plant in question. Numerous candidates have been nominated, the most frequently favoured being species of the generaEphedra, Sarcostemma, Periploca, and latterlyCannabis, and evenRheum. Not a single one of these conjectures has gained general assent, and the opinion is widely held that the problem is insoluble.

The Pain of God

The problem of the Pain of God is for me a perennial one, for wherever in the Anglican Communion God calls me to minister (with few exceptions) I have been and shall be called upon to assent to the proposition that God is ‘without body, parts or passions’ (Article I of the XXXIX Articles of Religion). My difficulty is simply that, although I am content to admit that God is incorporeus et impartibilis without any qualifications at all, I cannot admit that He is impassibilis without making so many qualifications that the admission almost dies of them. I suspect furthermore that those who are obliged to give general assent to the Westminster Confession of Faith may have a similar difficulty with Chapter II, Section I, which contains the same proposition. The scriptural warrant for it is said to be found in Acts 14.15, where Paul and Barnabas cry to the people of Lystra, ‘Men, why are you doing this? We also are men, of like nature with you, and bring you good news, that you should turn from these vain things to a living God who made the heaven and the earth and the sea and all that is in them.’ In its context, I understand this verse to imply that God, unlike Zeus and Hermes, is neither fickle nor whimsical, but constant and free to achieve His purpose. As the Greek Fathers would say, He is both autokinetos and tautokinetos.

A New Study of the Śaka-Kuṣāṇa Period

Among the most difficult unsolved problems of Indian history and archaeology are the chronology of the dynasties generally called Śaka and Kuṣāṇa and the dating of the art of Gandhāra. Writing of the former in 1919, Dr. Vincent Smith declared: ‘definite progress towards a conclusive solution of the problem based upon solid facts has been made.… and … the uncertainty as to the chronology has been reduced to a period of forty years in round numbers. Or to state it otherwise, the question is, “Did Kanishka come to the throne in A.D. 78, or about forty years later?”’ But Dr. Smith's optimistic faith in progress has not been realized, and the last thirty years have rather added to our uncertainty than lessened it. Confusion was made worse confused by the many theories, continually revised, of the late Professor Konow, who grappled with the problem until the time of his death, but produced no chronology to obtain general assent. A few years ago Dr. Ghirshman devised a new chronological scheme, which had the advantage of simplicity and was widely accepted, especially on the other side of the Channel; but this has not by any means passed unquestioned, and authorities are now perhaps further from unanimity than ever.

The Legal Status of Submarine Areas Beneath the High Seas.

The increasing number of claims by various states to submarine areas beneath the high seas has recently raised anew the question of the status of such claims in international law. The importance of the problem, with its possible impact on traditional legal concepts, has attracted the attention of writers and of several bodies interested in the development of international law, including the International Law Commission of the United Nations. It is to be hoped that out of the present ferment will emerge some sound legal principles which will reconcile new needs with established patterns in such a manner as to win general assent. To this end it may be useful, now that there are some years of state practice and learned discussion to draw upon, to comment on various views that have been advanced.