sa skya paṇḍita
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2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 301
Author(s):  
Xin Huang

From the perspective of history, literature and translatology, this article discusses in depth the translation of Bosson and holds that: (1) his selection of source language text (SLT) should be timely—his adaptation to the social and historical context of the United States and the theme of the era; (2) his interpretation of SLT is much accurate since Bosson has devoted all his life to Tibetan and Mongolian studies; however, there still exists some under-translation—the translation carries less information than the original, Bosson fails to reproduce the deep meanings of SLT related to Tibetan culture; (3) his literal translation or foreignization, making the version featured by a purely linguistic translation method, in order to help the intended readers to insight into the laws how to render the Mongolian, or Tibetan into English; and (4) his expression in the version tends to be colloquial, and be rich in foreignized expressions. All these reflect the subjectivity from Bosson, as a linguistic translator, non-literary translator. Furthermore, Bosson’s subjectivity is not only an adaptation to the social and historical context, the theme of the era, but also a limited transcendence of these constraints.


Author(s):  
Georges B.J. Dreyfus

The philosophical importance of Sa skya Paṇḍita (Sagya Paṇḍita) lies in his clarification of the tradition of logic and epistemology established by Dharmakīrti. He actively promoted the study of Dharmakīrti’s thought in Tibet as a propaedeutic to the study of other systems of Buddhist philosophy as well as to a Buddhist account of knowledge; knowledge is a crucial element in the Buddhist tradition, for ignorance is considered the main obstacle to liberation, the summum bonum of the tradition. Like Dharmakīrti, Sa skya Paṇḍita held that the only two types of knowledge are perception and inference. Perception presents us with real individual objects, while inference enables us to consider these individuals in a conceptual way, in terms of universals; however, it is a mistake to regard these universals as real.


2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-83
Author(s):  
Bruce J. Stewart

Independent scholarThe present study focuses on the defining characteristic and variegation of direct perception (mngon sum, pratyakṣa) as laid out by Sa-skya Paṇḍita Kun-dga’ rgyal-mtshan (1182–1251) in the first eight verses of the ‘Direct Perception’ chapter in his Tshad-ma rigs pa’i gter. As is well known, direct perception along with inference (rjes dpag, anumāna) make up the two means of valid cognition (tshad ma, pramāṇa) according the Buddhist system of epistemology initiated by the renowned Buddhist philosopher Dignāga (circa 480–540) and expanded and further developed by his indirect follower Dharmakīrti (mid-7th century). Each of these means of valid cognitionis restricted to its respective objects (prameya, gzhal bya); the specifically characterised object (rang mtshan, svalakṣaṇa) is the object of a direct perception and the generally characterised object (spyi mtshan, sāmānyalakṣaṇa) is the object for an inference.


2010 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-33
Author(s):  
Jan-Ulrich Sobisch
Keyword(s):  

AbstractIn his influential Tibetan Renaissance (publ. 2005), Ronald Davidson categorizes the two eminent masters of the late 12th and early 13th centuries, Sa-skya Pandita Kun-dga'-rgyal-mtshan and 'Bri-gung 'Jig-rten-mgon-po, as "neoconservatives," portraying them as having an un-Buddhist and inauthentic fixation on India, and as working to suppress any deviation from their norms. This paper critically investigates Davidson's general and specific interpretations of his categorization and raises the question of methodology.


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