substituted judgment standard
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2019 ◽  
Vol 39 (6) ◽  
pp. 651-660 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleonore Batteux ◽  
Eamonn Ferguson ◽  
Richard J. Tunney

A considerable proportion of end-of-life decisions are made by the patient’s next-of-kin, who can be asked to follow the substituted judgment standard and decide based on the patient’s wishes. The question of whether these surrogate decision makers are actually able to do so has become an important issue. In this study, we examined how the likelihood of surrogates conforming to the substituted judgment standard varies with individual differences in mortality acceptance and confidence in their decision making. We recruited 153 participants in romantic relationships between 18 and 80 years old from the general population. We asked them to make hypothetical end-of-life decisions for themselves and on behalf of their partner, as well as predict what their partner would do, and complete a series of questionnaires. Participants predicted that their partner would make similar decisions to their own but were more likely to accept a life-saving treatment that could result in reduced quality of life on their partner’s behalf than for themselves. Decisions made by older adults were more likely to conform to the substituted judgment standard, which is encouraging given that they are more likely to be confronted with these decisions in real life, although this was not due to differences in mortality acceptance. Older adults were also more likely to have had previous discussions with their partner and thereby know that person’s wishes and feel confident that they made the right decision, but these factors did not affect their likelihood of conforming to the substituted judgment standard. This shows that encouraging discussions about end of life among families would ease the decision process, but more work is needed to ensure that surrogates can adhere to the substituted judgment standard.


2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (10) ◽  
pp. 703.1-709 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna-Karin Margareta Andersson ◽  
Kjell Arne Johansson

There are two main ways of understanding the function of surrogate decision making in a legal context: the Best Interests Standard and the Substituted Judgment Standard. First, we will argue that the Best Interests Standard is difficult to apply to unconscious patients. Application is difficult regardless of whether they have ever been conscious. Second, we will argue that if we accept the least problematic explanation of how unconscious patients can have interests, we are also obliged to accept that the Substituted Judgment Standard can be coherently applied to patients who have never been conscious at the same extent as the Best Interests Standard. We then argue that acknowledging this result is important in order to show patients respect.


2001 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 184-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
PAM R. SAILORS

Medical ethics has traditionally been governed by two guiding, but sometimes conflicting, principles—autonomy and benevolence. These principles provide the rationale for the two most commonly used standards for medical decisionmaking—the Substituted Judgment Standard shows our concern for autonomy, whereas the Best Interest Standard shows our commitment to benevolence. Both standards are vulnerable to criticisms. Further, the principles can seem to offer conflicting prescriptions for action. The criticisms and conflict figure prominently in discussion of advance directive decisionmaking and Alzheimer's disease. After laying out each of the current standards and its problems, with Alzheimer's issues as my central concern, I offer a new standard that avoids the problems while honoring our concerns for both autonomy and benevolence.


1997 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark R. Tonelli

Consensus is growing among ethicists and lawyers that medical decision making for incompetent patients who were previously competent should be made in accordance with that person's prior wishes and desires. Moreover, this legal and ethical preference for the substituted judgment standard has found its way into the daily practice of medicine. However, what appears on the surface to be an agreement between jurists, bioethicists, and clinicians obscures the very real differences between disciplines regarding the actual implementation of the sub stituted judgment standard. Ethicists and judges have carefully outlined how substituted judgments ought to be made and evaluated. Although differences arise, especially at the state court level, regarding the scope of the substituted judgment standard and its relation to other standards of surrogate decision making, agreement is fairly widespread on the priority of substituted judgment and on the necessity of sufficient evidence being available in order to support a particular substituted judgment.


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