Game Theory in Pragmatics: Evolution, Rationality, and Reasoning

Game theory provides formal means of representing and explaining action choices in social decision situations where the choices of one participant depend on the choices of another. Game theoretic pragmatics approaches language production and interpretation as a game in this sense. Patterns in language use are explained as optimal, rational, or at least nearly optimal or rational solutions to a communication problem. Three intimately related perspectives on game theoretic pragmatics are sketched here: (i) the evolutionary perspective explains language use as the outcome of some optimization process, (ii) the rationalistic perspective pictures language use as a form of rational decision-making, and (iii) the probabilistic reasoning perspective considers specifically speakers’ and listeners’ beliefs about each other. There are clear commonalities behind these three perspectives, and they may in practice blend into each other. At the heart of game theoretic pragmatics lies the idea that speaker and listener behavior, when it comes to using a language with a given semantic meaning, are attuned to each other. By focusing on the evolutionary or rationalistic perspective, we can then give a functional account of general patterns in our pragmatic language use. The probabilistic reasoning perspective invites modeling actual speaker and listener behavior, for example, as it shows in quantitative aspects of experimental data.

Formal Pragmatics

In this article, three theoretic frameworks are discussed: optimality-theoretic, game-theoretic, and decision-theoretic pragmatics, the last being based on Ducrot’s argumentation theory. The close similarities between optimality-theoretic and game-theoretic pragmatics are pointed out. Concerning decision-theoretic pragmatics, some arguments are provided demonstrating that an independent, argumentation-theoretic grounding is neither needed nor useful. Rather, it seems more appropriate to incorporate the argumentation-theoretic insights into a general Gricean-oriented theory of natural language interpretation, let it be optimality-theoretic pragmatics or a game-theoretic variant.

Information structure as parallel tree building

This paper presents a Synchronous Tree Adjoining Grammar (STAG) account of Information Structure, whereby Givenness-marking requires a link between nodes on a syntactic tree and LF nodes whose interpretation is supplied by a contextually determined set of Given semantic objects. By hypothesis, the interpretation of linked nodes bypasses a default interpretation principle that requires pragmatic reasoning to disambiguate elements and enrich semantic material. Thus, interpreting Given elements requires less cognitive effort than Focused elements. This, combined with some established insights from Game-theoretic pragmatics, yields empirical advantages over more traditional semantic/pragmatic analyses of equal simplicity.

Papers on pragmasemantics

Optimality theory as used in linguistics (Prince & Smolensky, 1993/2004; Smolensky & Legendre, 2006) and cognitive psychology (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001) is a theoretical framework that aims to integrate constraint based knowledge representation systems, generative grammar, cognitive skills, and aspects of neural network processing. In the last years considerable progress was made to overcome the artificial separation between the disciplines of linguistic on the one hand which are mainly concerned with the description of natural language competences and the psychological disciplines on the other hand which are interested in real language performance. The semantics and pragmatics of natural language is a research topic that is asking for an integration of philosophical, linguistic, psycholinguistic aspects, including its neural underpinning. Especially recent work on experimental pragmatics (e.g. Noveck & Sperber, 2005; Garrett & Harnish, 2007) has shown that real progress in the area of pragmatics isn’t possible without using data from all available domains including data from language acquisition and actual language generation and comprehension performance. It is a conceivable research programme to use the optimality theoretic framework in order to realize the integration. Game theoretic pragmatics is a relatively young development in pragmatics. The idea to view communication as a strategic interaction between speaker and hearer is not new. It is already present in Grice' (1975) classical paper on conversational implicatures. What game theory offers is a mathematical framework in which strategic interaction can be precisely described. It is a leading paradigm in economics as witnessed by a series of Nobel prizes in the field. It is also of growing importance to other disciplines of the social sciences. In linguistics, its main applications have been so far pragmatics and theoretical typology. For pragmatics, game theory promises a firm foundation, and a rigor which hopefully will allow studying pragmatic phenomena with the same precision as that achieved in formal semantics. The development of game theoretic pragmatics is closely connected to the development of bidirectional optimality theory (Blutner, 2000). It can be easily seen that the game theoretic notion of a Nash equilibrium and the optimality theoretic notion of a strongly optimal form-meaning pair are closely related to each other. The main impulse that bidirectional optimality theory gave to research on game theoretic pragmatics stemmed from serious empirical problems that resulted from interpreting the principle of weak optimality as a synchronic interpretation principle. In this volume, we have collected papers that are concerned with several aspects of game and optimality theoretic approaches to pragmatics.