The Goals of Philosophy of Religion: A Reply to Ireneusz Zieminski

In a recent article, Ireneusz Zieminski (2018) argues that the main goals of philosophy of religion are to (i) define religion; (ii) assess the truth value of religion and; (iii) assess the rationality of a religious way of life. Zieminski shows that each of these goals are difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Hence, philosophy of religion leads to scepticism. He concludes that the conceptual tools philosophers of religion employ are best suited to study specific religious traditions, rather than religion more broadly construed. But it’s unclear whether the goals Zieminski attributes to philosophy of religion are accurate or even necessary for successful inquiry. I argue that an essentialist definition of religion isn’t necessary for philosophy of religion and that philosophers of religion already use the conceptual analysis in the way Zieminski suggests that they should. Finally, the epistemic standard Zieminski has in view is often obscure. And when it is clear, it is unrealistically high. Contemporary philosophers of religion rarely, if ever, claim to be offering certainty, or even evidence as strong as that found in the empirical sciences.

Introduction and Summary for Part II: Plato’s Meno

The chapter summarizes the main lessons to be taken from the two studies of Plato’s Meno that follow (Chapters 4 and 5), drawing out the significance of the various turning points in the dialogue. It explains why Plato makes Socrates abandon the search for a definition of virtue, and turn to something like a geometrical approach instead (here called the ‘iconic method’) as a solution for discovering ‘what it is’ about a concept, especially for concepts that defy unitary definition. The nature of this enquiry into ‘what it is’, and the difference between investigating a concept and applying it, are brought out. The parallels between Plato’s rejection of Socrates’ quest for essentialist definition and the work of the later Wittgenstein are noted, and the chapter explains how Plato’s hypothetical method would be ideally suited to explaining open-ended concepts (if it were well done, which it is not).

ETHNICITY AND GREEK HISTORY: RE‐EXAMINING OUR ASSUMPTIONS

The study of ethnicity has become particularly popular over the last twenty years. This article explores certain unexamined assumptions concerning ancient ethnicity and points out certain important blind spots of modern research, focusing in particular on Jonathan Hall's contributions to the debate. Greek historians have devoted little time to thinking about the groups to which the concept of ethnicity is applicable: by exploring together the similarities and differences between poleis, regional, trans-regional, and Panhellenic ethnicities, some startling conclusions emerge. Furthermore, Greek historians have devoted little time to explaining why the concept of ethnicity is a better conceptual tool than that of nationality. But the concept of ethnicity tends to elide the question of an organised community and its shared activities in the formation of identity, with major resulting consequences. Instead of an essentialist definition of ethnicity, like that of Hall, I sketch an alternative framework that approaches ethnicity not as a static entity but as an open-endedprocess, in which the diverse Greek ethnicities moved variously within a spectrum, ranging between a collective and a communal pole.

Definitional Argument in Evolutionary Psychology and Cultural Anthropology

ArgumentEvolutionary psychologists argue that because humans are biological creatures, cultural explanations must include biology. They thus offer to unify the natural and social sciences. Evolutionary psychologists rely on a specific history of cultural anthropology, particularly the work of Alfred Kroeber to make this point. A close examination of the history of cultural anthropology reveals that Kroeber acknowledged that humans were biological and culture had a biological foundation; however, he argued that we should treat culture as autonomous because that would bring benefits to the biological sciences as well as the human sciences. Hence, the historical caricature of his work by evolutionary psychology fails. The paper concludes that cultural anthropologists were successful in creating their discipline, at least in part, because they argued by pragmatic definition. Evolutionary psychology, on the other hand, offers an essentialist definition of “culture” and thus offers a much less promising vision of interdisciplinary collaboration.